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Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are designed under the so-called black-box model,
which considers adversaries that receive black-box access to the hardware implementation.
Although a “black-box” treatment covers a wide range of attacks, it fails to capture reality
adequately, as real-world adversaries can exploit physical properties of the implementation,
mounting attacks that enable unexpected, non-black-box access, to the components of the
cryptographic system. This type of attacks is widely known as physical attacks, and has
proven to be a significant threat to the real-world security of cryptographic systems. The
present dissertation is (partially) dealing with the problem of protecting cryptographic
memory against physical attacks, via the use of non-malleable codes, which is a notion
introduced in a preceding work, aiming to provide privacy of the encoded data, in the
presence of adversarial faults.
In the present thesis we improve the current state-of-the-art on non-malleable codes
and we provide practical solutions for protecting real-world cryptographic implementations
against physical attacks. Our study is primarily focusing on the following adversarial
models: (i) the extensively studied split-state model, which assumes that private memory
splits into two parts, and the adversary tampers with each part, independently, and (ii) the
model of partial functions, which is introduced by the current thesis, and models adversaries
that access arbitrary subsets of codeword locations, with bounded cardinality. Our study
is comprehensive, covering one-time and continuous, attacks, while for the case of partial
functions, we manage to achieve a stronger notion of security, that we call non-malleability
with manipulation detection, that in addition to privacy, it also guarantees integrity of the
private data. It should be noted that, our techniques are also useful for the problem of
establishing, private, keyless communication, over adversarial communication channels.
Besides physical attacks, another important concern related to cryptographic hard-
ii
ware security, is that the hardware fabrication process is assumed to be trusted. In reality
though, when aiming to minimize the production costs, or whenever access to leading-edge
manufacturing facilities is required, the fabrication process requires the involvement of sev-
eral, potentially malicious, facilities. Consequently, cryptographic hardware is susceptible
to the so-called hardware Trojans, which are hardware components that are maliciously
implanted to the original circuitry, having as a purpose to alter the device’s functional-
ity, while remaining undetected. Part of the present dissertation, deals with the problem
of protecting cryptographic hardware against Trojan injection attacks, by (i) proposing a
formal model for assessing the security of cryptographic hardware, whose production has
been partially outsourced to a set of untrusted, and possibly malicious, manufacturers, and
(ii) by proposing a compiler that transforms any cryptographic circuit, into another, that
can be securely outsourced.
iii
Acknowledgements
In this part, I would like to thank those who I feel played an important role in the process
of writing the present thesis.
First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Aggelos Kiayias, for
his guidance and support, and for giving me the freedom to work on various research topics.
Our discussions have been invaluable to me, as they cultivated my ability to identify new
research directions and establish their importance, boosting my confidence as a researcher.
Besides the scientific part, I am also thankful for the great non-scientific moments that we
shared over the years; for the trips, the summer schools, and the hospitality.
I would like to thank Feng-Hao Liu, who, besides my supervisor, is the person that I
have been closely collaborating with, during my PhD studies, and who introduced me to
non-malleable cryptography while he was a post-doc at the University of Maryland. I am
thankful for all the technical discussions and the uncountable hours of brainstorming. I
also want to thank my coauthors, Elias Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou, for the fruit-
ful discussions on various game-theoretic concepts, and also, Guisepe Ateniese, Bernardo
Magri and Daniele Venturi, for our discussions on Trojan resilience. Also, I want to thank
Vassilis Dougalis, Elias Koutsoupias, Stavros Toumpis and Stathis Zachos, for inspiring
me during my undergraduate and post-graduate studies, and for their support on my very
first steps.
I would like to thank the members of the examination committee, Sebastian Faust
and Markulf Kohlweiss, for their valuable comments and the insightful discussions, and
the non-examining chair Myrto Arapinis, for always being helpful and willing to assist me
with all practical concerns related to the process of submitting and examining my PhD
thesis, and all the technical and non-technical discussions. I am also thankful to the people
who participated to my annual reviews, namely my second supervisor, Kousha Etessami,
iv
Myrto Arapinis, and of course my supervisor, Aggelos Kiayias.
Life would be much harder without having good friends to rely on. I want to thank my
good friend, Thanos Tsouanas, for being in my life in a critical moment, inspiring me to
choose a path that led to the development of the current thesis. I am grateful to my friend,
neighbour and guarantor, Marilena Karanika, for all the good moments and for making
my life in Edinburgh more convenient, and also, Charis Chanialidis for the friendship and
all the chats the we had during my studies in Edinburgh.
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Katerina Samari, Thomas Zacharias
and Giorgos Panagiotakos, for all the beautiful moments; the trips, the discussions about
life, as well as for all that we shared during hard times. Also, I want to thank Tatiana
Kyrou for dealing with all sort of bureaucratic issues during my PhD studies, Chrystalla
Pavlou, Veselin Blagoev and Alexandru Cojocaru, for the chats on the 5th floor of the
Informatics Forum, Nikos Leonardos, and all the members of the Security and Privacy
group, the Blockchain Lab and the CryptoSec group, for the interesting discussions.
I could never achieve anything without the support of my beloved family; my mother,
Elli, with her endless love, her priceless advice and her discreetness, letting me to choose
my own path in life, and my sister, Eleni, who is the most noble and generous person that I
know, always being supportive in every step I make. I am thankful for their unconditional
love and for always being by my side. I am grateful to my father Dimitris, who, even while
not being present, has been a source of inspiration, that to a great extent shaped me into
the person I am today.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Sandy Ganoti, who stood by my side
during my studies, making beautiful and giving special purpose to my life in Edinburgh. I




I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my
own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been
submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified. The ideas
presented in the current thesis are mainly based on the following papers:
• A. Kiayias, F.-H. Liu, and Y. Tselekounis. Non-Malleable Codes for Partial Functions
with Manipulation Detection. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2018, pages
577-607 [KLT18a].
• A. Kiayias, F.-H. Liu, and Y. Tselekounis. Practical Non-Malleable Codes from `-
more Extractable Hash Functions. In ACM CCS 16: 23rd Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 1317-1328 [KLT16].
• G. Ateniese, A. Kiayias, B. Magri, Y. Tselekounis and D. Venturi. Secure Outsourc-
ing of Cryptographic Circuits Manufacturing. In ProvSec 2018: 12th International
Conference on Provable Security [AKM+18].
• A. Kiayias, F.-H. Liu, and Y. Tselekounis. `-more Extractable Hash Functions and
Applications to Non-Malleable Cryptography [KLT18b].
Additional publications, dealing with problems independent of the ones studied by the
present dissertation, are listed below, and they are not included in the current text:
• A. Kiayias and Y. Tselekounis. Tamper resilient circuits: The adversary at the gates.
In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2013, pages 161-180 [KT13].
• A. Kiayias, E. Koutsoupias, M. Kyropoulou and Y. Tselekounis. Blockchain Mining
Games. In EC 2016: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and




List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Physical attacks and provable security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Non-malleable codes and physical security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.2 Models of memory tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Secure communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Protection against hardware Trojans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.1 Non-malleable codes for partial functions and applications . . . . . . 10
1.4.2 `-more weakly extractable hash function families and non-malleability 11
1.4.3 Circuit outsourcing and Trojan resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Preliminaries 14
2.1 Notation and basic notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Randomness extractors and universal hash function families . . . . . 19
2.2 Tampering function classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Non-malleable codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Non-malleable codes for partial functions with manipulation detection 24
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vii
3.1.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.2 Applications of MD-NMC for partial functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1.3 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Preliminaries on MD-NMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 An MD-NMC for partial functions, in the CRS model . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Removing the CRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4.1 Security against adaptive adversaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.2 MD-NMC security of the block-wise code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Continuous MD-NMC with light updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Instantiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Extractable hash function families 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1.2 KEAs and previous work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 `-more weakly extractable hash function families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Constructing 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from KEA . . . . . 76
4.3.1 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from RSS-NMC codes
against affine functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.2 Constructing RSS-NM codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.3 Our resulting instantiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.4 Constructing `-more weakly extractable hash under KEA . . . . . . 86
4.3.5 Leakage-resilient `-more wECRH under KEA . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4 `-more weakly extractable hash functions in the random oracle model . . . 92
5 Non-malleable codes in the split-state model 94
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1.2 Technical overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1.3 Related work on split-state NMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 A non-malleable code against split-state tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3 Instantiating authenticated encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6 Continuous non-malleable codes 112
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
6.3 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4 Continuous NMC from `-more wECRH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4.1 Instantiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7 Non-malleable commitments 128
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.3 Non-malleable commitments from `-more wECRH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
8 Secure circuit outsourcing 135
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
8.1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.1.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.2.1 Boolean Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.2.2 Simulation-based security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.3 A circuit outsourcing compiler based on MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
9 Conclusions 151
9.1 Contributions and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Bibliography 153
List of Figures
3.1 Description of the MD-NMC scheme in the CRS model. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 3.3.2. The gray part signifies
the portion of the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one. . . 39
3.3 Description of the scheme in the standard model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
ix
3.4 The function g1 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7. . . . . . 54
3.5 The function g2 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7. . . . . . 55
3.6 The function g3 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7. . . . . . 55
3.7 The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 3.4.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.8 The unfolded code of Exp1 and Exp2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.9 Hybrids for the proof of Theorem 3.5.3. The gray part signifies the portion of
the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one. . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1 The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 4.3.16. The gray part signifies
the portion of the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one. . . 91
5.1 Hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 5.2.2. Their programs are based
on the encoding scheme, (Init,Enc,Dec), the encryption scheme, (KGen,E,D),
and the extractor that is specified in the proof, E . The gray part signifies the
portion of the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one. . . . . 104
6.1 The algorithm A′ playing in Leak0A′,mb(k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 The algorithm TComp executed by A′. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.1 On the left side we present the description of a (compiled) circuit. On the right
side the same circuit is represented as three different components. The mapping
function M establishes the connections between the blue component and the
green and red components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.2 The MPC compiler for the case of m = 2 outsourcing facilities. The components
Γ̂1 and Γ̂2 can be outsourced, while the connectivity between them and the
remaining components are built in-house. Γ̂1 and Γ̂2 exchange the outputs
of the next message functions Next1, Next2, and they internally update their
states. The dotted line depicts the circuit boundaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
List of Tables
x
5.1 Comparison of multi-bit NMCs in the split-state model. k is the security pa-
rameter, “IT” stands for information-theoretic security, “Comp.” for compu-
tational security, “AE” for authenticated encryption, and “LR” for leakage-
resilient, respectively. In the information-theoretic setting, typically security
breaks with probability ε = 2−Ω(k); in the computational setting, we have
ε = negl(k), e.g., ε = k−ω(1) or 2−Ω(k), depending on how strong the under-




The enormous technological advancements of the last decades, led to the emerge of an era
in which, almost every aspect of our life has been digitized. While this brings convenience
and facilitates innovation, it also poses serious concerns about the privacy, as well as the
integrity and authenticity of the users’ data. The role of cryptography is to provide rigorous
and realistic mathematical models of security, followed by provably secure solutions that
protect against malicious behaviours.
The wide use of cryptographic hardware, is one of the impacts of the digital era in
our lives. By the term “cryptographic hardware” (or “cryptographic device”), we refer
to any device that possess some sort of private memory (private state) and implements
specific cryptographic algorithms, whose security depends solely on the privacy of the
memory contents. In each invocation, the device evaluates the cryptographic algorithm
over the private state and any potential public user input, and returns the output of the
computation to the caller. An instance for such a cryptographic system is a smart-card.
Smart-cards are light-weight hardware devices, widely used by payment systems, enabling
the authentication of users, by requiring them to provide proof of knowledge of the secret
code (referred to as pin), that is stored in the device’s private state.
Although cryptographic devices have revolutionized and improved human lives, at the
same time they pose serious security concerns, mainly due to the following reasons: (1)
they can easily fall into the hands of malicious users, as they are susceptible to theft, and
(2) their implementation requires the involvement of numerous entities, that are assumed
to be trusted. In this context, it is possible for a malicious user to alter the functionality of
the device, by exploiting physical properties of the implementation, in a way that enables
recovery of the private state, thus allowing impersonation of legitimate users. Furthermore,
1
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the adversarial advantage could increase, when the adversary is (partially) controlling the
fabrication process, which is assumed to be trusted.
The present dissertation deals with problem of protecting cryptographic hardware
against physical and hardware Trojan injection, attacks, using cryptographic methods.
Along with that, we highlight the applicability of our techniques to the problem of estab-
lishing secure communication in the presence of man-in-the-middle adversaries.
Before presenting the contributions of the thesis, we introduce a formal model, together
with basic notions.
1.1 Physical attacks and provable security
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are designed assuming adversaries that receive
black-box access to the cryptographic device, i.e., they are allowed to execute the device on
inputs of their choice, and by observing the output behaviour, they try to infer information
related to the private state. In this setting, the value of the private memory, as well as
the algorithm executed by the device, cannot be altered by the attacker. This mode of
interaction is usually modeled as a security game that formally defines the capabilities of
the adversary and the outcomes of the game that signify that security has been breached.
After defining the model, the next step is to construct cryptographic schemes and formally
prove their security.
Broadly speaking, there are two main types of cryptographic security, namely, com-
putational and information-theoretic, or unconditional. The former type assumes com-
putationally bounded adversaries and relies on intractability assumptions over problems
that have been studied by researchers for decades, and there is strong evidence that such
problems do not have efficient, i.e., polynomial-time, solvers. Under this assumption, the
security of the cryptographic scheme is reduced to the underlying hardness assumption,
by formally proving that, any efficient adversary that compromises the security of the
cryptographic scheme, yields an efficient solver for the underlying problem, reaching a
contradiction. On the other hand, security in the information-theoretic setting is with
respect to computationally unbounded adversaries, and the proof of security is based on
probabilistic arguments, showing that “bad” events occur with negligible probability. In
this setting, the proof often relies on assumptions related to the probabilistic behaviour of
the environment, like for instance, assumptions on the error probability, when studying
the problem of data transmission over noisy channels.
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Even though the approach described above covers many practical scenarios, it does not
model reality adequately, as real-world adversaries can be much more powerful. In reality,
the adversary, besides observing the device’s input-output behaviour, it can also exploit the
physical properties of the implementation, mounting attacks that enable unexpected, non-
black-box access, to the components of the cryptographic system. Consequently, security
can be compromised, as such attacks are not covered by the security model. An instance
of this type of attacks was considered in [Koc96], in which Kocher presents an attack
that recovers the secret key of an encryption scheme, by measuring the power consumed
by the device during the encryption operation, while in [KJJ99], Kocher et al. manage
the same thing, this time by measuring the time needed for the encryption to complete.
In subsequent works [GST17, GST14], Genkin, Shamir and Tromer manage to extract
4096-bit RSA decryption keys within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer
during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts.
Besides physical attacks in the passive setting, in which the adversary performs different
kinds of measurements, there is also a wide range of active physical attacks. The works
of [BS97, BDL01, BDL97, GA03, AK96, SA03], consider adversaries that induce faults
to the computation, and then show how to leak sensitive information, by inspecting the
output of the tampered computation. Physical attacks have proven to be a significant
threat to the real-world security of cryptographic implementations, as they can fully break
the security of cryptographic systems.
Over the past decade, the cryptographic community has made a substantial progress
towards protecting cryptographic implementations from physical attacks. From a theoret-
ical perspective, this line of research focuses on providing rigorous adversarial models, that
cover a wide range of real-world attacks, followed by provably secure solutions. The efforts
made by the community, led to the development of two important directions in cryptogra-
phy, establishing the branches that nowadays are known as leakage-resilient and tamper-
resilient, cryptography. The former, deals with the problem of protecting cryptographic
implementations against passive attacks, by considering adversaries that receive bounded
information (leakage) related to the private state of the cryptographic primitive (see for
instance [ISW03, MR04, DP08, FKPR10, FRR+10, BKKV10, DDF14, DLZ15, DGL+16]),
while tamper-resilient cryptography is dealing with active physical attacks, considering ad-
versaries that, either tamper with the memory of the cryptographic device, which is a
model originally considered in the seminal work of Gennaro et al. [GLM+04], or adver-
saries that induce faults to the computation; a model originally considered by [IPSW06]
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and subsequently by [FPV11, DK12, DK14, KT13].
Part of this dissertation focuses on securing cryptographic memory against tampering
and leakage attacks, via the use of non-malleable codes [DPW10].
1.1.1 Non-malleable codes and physical security
The notion of non-malleable codes (NMC) was introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and
Wichs [DPW10], as a relaxation of error correction and error detection codes, aiming to
provide strong privacy, without ensuring correctness. Informally, non-malleable encoding
schemes are keyless primitives, guaranteeing that any modified codeword, decodes, either to
the original message, or to a completely unrelated one, with overwhelming probability. The
definition of non-malleability is simulation-based, stating that for any tampering function
f , there exists a simulator that simulates the tampering effect, by only accessing f , i.e.,
without making any assumptions on the distribution of the encoded message. Besides the
original definition [DPW10], the work of Aggarwal et al. [ADKO15], considers a reduction
based definition according to which, security against a function class F , is proven by a
reduction from F to a class of trivial functions, consisting of the identity function and all
constant functions. As the authors prove, their definition is equivalent to the one given in
[DPW10].
The main application of non-malleable codes, that motivated the seminal work of
Dziembowski et al. [DPW10], is the protection of cryptographic implementations from
active physical attacks against memory, known as tampering attacks. In this setting, the
adversary tampers with the memory contents of the cryptographic device, receives the
output of the computation on inputs of its choice, with respect to the tampered memory
value, and tries to extract information related to the original memory value. Non-malleable
codes provide a straightforward method to protect against such attacks [DPW10] and we
briefly discuss it in the paragraph that follows.
Consider a non-malleable encoding scheme (Enc,Dec), consisting of the encoder, Enc,
and the decoder, Dec, and any reactive cryptographic functionality G, with private state
s, receiving public input m. For instance, consider G to be the computation of a digital
signature over the input message m and signing key s. The evaluation of G, over m, s, will
be denoted by [G, s](m). Using (Enc,Dec) we can transform the functionality [G, s] into
a tamper-resilient functionality [Ĝ, c], which is secure against tampering with the private
state c. The transformation is as follows: first we compute the non-malleable encoding of
s, i.e., we compute c ← Enc(s), and then we define the functionality [Ĝ, c], such that on
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input message m, [Ĝ, c](m), first recovers the signing key by computing s← Dec(c), then
executes [G, s](m), i.e., it executes the original functionality [G, s] on input message m,
erases the private state c, and stores a fresh non-malleable encoding of s, by recomputing
c ← Enc(s). In the i-th round of interaction between the adversary and the device, the
adversary evaluates [Ĝ, c] on input mi of its choice, and in addition, it is allowed to issue
a tampering query, fi, against c, receiving [G, fi(c)](mi), i.e., the adversary receives the
output of the functionality on input mi, with respect to the tampered memory value fi(c).
In case, Dec(fi(c)) = ⊥, i.e., if the attacker creates an invalid codeword,1 the private
memory of the device is erased and the functionality outputs ⊥, in all subsequent rounds
(in that case we say that the devices self-destructs). As it is stressed by Gennaro et
al. [GLM+04], the self-destruct mechanism is essential, otherwise the adversary can fully
recover the private state.
The non-malleability property of (Enc,Dec), guarantees that in a single round, any
admissible modification of the private state, c, decodes, either to the original value s, or
to a completely unrelated one, and in addition, the tampering effect can be simulated
without accessing s. This implies that, any information the attacker learns by evaluating
[G, f(c)](mi), it could also be computed by either evaluating [G, c](mi), i.e., without tam-
pering with c, or by evaluating [G, c′](mi), for a private state value c
′, that is completely
unrelated to s, thus privacy of the private state is guaranteed. Since the non-malleable
encoding of s is refreshed after each invocation of the functionality, the above construction
is continuously secure, i.e., it provides security against multi-round adversaries, even if the
underlying non-malleable code is one-time secure.
The transformation described above requires erasure of the private state after each
invocation of the functionality. However, even if fully erasing the private state is feasible,
such erasures can be problematic in the presence of tampering adversaries, as it was origi-
nally pointed out by Faust et al. [FMNV14]. Consider a scenario in which besides storing
the encoding of a private key, the memory of the device also contains other, unencoded
data. In this setting, erasing only the part that stores the encoding of the private key
could compromise security, as the adversary might be able to copy the codeword on the
unencoded part of the memory, rendering the self-destruct mechanism of the device useless.
A solution to the problem would be to erase the entire memory of the device, still in most
cases, there is a good chance that the users will use the uncoded part of the memory to
store important data that should not be erased. The straightforward way to prevent the
1The output of the decoder on invalid input codewords, is defined to be the special symbol “⊥”.
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adversary from getting permanent access to the codeword by making copies of it, would
be to encode the entire memory of the device. However, this approach has serious disad-
vantages, that where originally identified by [FMNV14]. First of all, protecting the entire
memory is implausible, as in many cases a major part of it consists of non-sensitive data
that don’t require protection. Secondly, the proposed solution is highly inefficient, as each
invocation of the device requires decoding and re-encoding the entire state, introducing
substantial overhead.
Motivated by the above considerations, Faust et al. [FMNV14], introduce the notion
of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC) as an extension to the original notion, con-
sidering adversaries that tamper continuously with the same codeword, as opposed to the
original notion, that requires erasures in order to be applied to the continuous setting.
In Chapter 2, we provide formal definitions for the notions of non-malleable codes and
continuous non-malleable codes, while in Chapters 3,5,6, we construct these notions for
various function classes, that we informally introduce below.
1.1.2 Models of memory tampering
Ideally, we would like to achieve non-malleability against arbitrary function classes, how-
ever, it not hard to see that this is impossible. For instance, consider (Enc,Dec), to be
the encoding and decoding, respectively, procedures, of an encoding scheme, and assume
that the tampering function class permits the application of (Enc,Dec). Then, we define
the tampering function f as f(c) := Enc(Dec(c) + 1), where c denotes the encoding of the
private message, s. Clearly, for any codeword c, the decoding of f(c) is equal to s + 1,
which is a message highly related to the original one, thus no secure construction can exist
against any function class that contains f . Therefore, when aiming for non-malleability,
restricting the function class is unavoidable.
In the original paper [DPW10], the authors present the first non-malleable code for the
class of bit-wise independent tampering functions, denoted as Fbit, that tamper with each
bit of the codeword, independently. In particular, an element f ∈ Fbit, can be represented
as a vector of functions (f1, . . . , fν), where ν denotes the codeword length, in bits, and each
fi tampers with the i-th codeword bit, independently of the value of the remaining bits.
Besides an explicit construction against Fbit, the authors of [DPW10], using probabilistic
arguments, they prove the existence of non-malleable codes for function classes of bounded
size, namely for all function classes F , such that log (log(|F|)) < ν, where |F| denotes the
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size of the function class.2 Although the probabilistic method of [DPW10], does not directly
yield efficient explicit constructions, it gives efficient non-malleable codes in the random
oracle model, for more general classes of tampering functions. The results of [DPW10]
are in the information-theoretic setting, i.e., they provide security against computationally
unbounded adversaries.
Due to their important application, constructing non-malleable codes has received a lot
of attention over the last years. The main objective in this line of research, is to construct
efficient encoding schemes against function classes, expressive enough to model real-world
attacks. As in the case of error correction/detection codes, the efficiency of non-malleable
encoding schemes, depends on how efficient the encoding and decoding procedures are,
while another important measure of efficiency, is the information rate of the scheme, which
is defined as the ratio of the message to codeword, length, as the message length goes to
infinity. Based on the notation introduced so far, the information rate of an encoding






where c is the codeword output by Enc(s), and |s| (resp. |c|) denotes the message (resp.
codeword) length.
The split-state model. Due to the impossibility of non-malleable codes for arbitrary
functions classes, various models have been proposed and studied over the years. An
important model, that the present thesis is partially focusing on, is the extensively studied
split-state model. The split-state model is a generalization of the bit-wise independent
tampering function class, and was originally introduced in the context of non-malleable
codes, by Dziembowski et al. [DPW10] and Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12], who considered
the case of two split-states. Briefly speaking, in the split-state model with two states,
the codeword (private memory) is split into two parts, c0, c1, and the attacker is allowed
to apply on it any function f = (f0, f1), that results in a tampered codeword equal to
(f0(c0), f1(c1)). As in the case of bit-wise independent tampering, the critical point here
is that each fi, for i ∈ {0, 1}, tampers with ci, independently of the value c1−i. This is
a plausible model to assume, since there are many scenarios in which sensitive data may
be split into two storage devices, that are physically separated, for security reasons. In
this setting, an adversary that receives tampering access over the memory components,
2Note that for the function family Fall, consisting of all functions f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν , we have
log (log(|Fall|)) = ν + log(ν).
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modifies the contents of each memory independently of the contents of the other. Note
that, the model can generalize to multiple split-states, with the two-state variant being
the hardest to achieve. Part of the current thesis (cf. Chapter 5,6), considers the problem
of constructing efficient non-malleable codes against split-state attackers, with two states,
and from now on, any reference to the split-state model will be with respect to the two-state
variant.
The class of partial functions. The current state-of-the-art on non-malleable codes,
which is discussed extensively in subsequent chapters, consider adversaries that receive
full access over the codeword, while imposing structural or computational restrictions to
the way the function computes over the input. In the present thesis (cf. Chapter 3), we
initiate a study on the notion of non-malleable codes, for functions that receive partial
access over the codeword. Informally speaking, the class of partial functions contains all
functions that read/write on an arbitrary subset of codeword bits,3 of specific cardinality.
As we elaborate later in the thesis, this is a plausible and important, yet overlook class.
In Chapter 3, we construct efficient non-malleable codes for the class of partial func-
tions, while in Chapter 5, we provide efficient constructions against split-state adversaries.
In Chapter 6, we consider continuous attacks and we construct continuously secure non-
malleable codes for split-state adversaries, while a weaker notion of continuous security
against partial functions is also presented in Chapter 3.
1.2 Secure communication
Non-malleable codes can be useful, not only as a countermeasure against physical attacks,
but in any setting in which a restriction is imposed to the way the adversary accesses the
data. As an example, consider two parties that wish to communicate securely, while given
access to two independent and possibly insecure channels. Assuming the adversary tampers
independently with the data transmitted over the two channels,4 split-state non-malleable
codes provide a straightforward way for establishing a private, keyless communication
channel, ensuring non-malleability of the transmitted data. This property has also been
identified by [BDKM18, CGM+16], who present the notion of non-malleable codes in the so-
called streaming model, in which the adversary is accessing codeword blocks in a streaming
3When considering alphabets larger than {0,1}, the function is accessing codeword symbols.
4This could happen because the adversary prefers not to slow down the transmission rate, in order to
avoid detection.
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fashion, i.e., tampering with the i-th block only depends on the view over the previous
i − 1 blocks. The main drawback of existing constructions, is that they do not provide
integrity, which we believe is an important property when applying NMCs in the context
of secure communication.
The results presented in the current dissertation find useful application, not only in the
context of securing cryptographic hardware against memory tampering, but also for pro-
viding private, keyless and non-malleable communication, that also guarantees integrity of
the transmitted data. As we discuss later in the thesis, this type of security can be achieved
via the use of non-malleable codes, as well as via the use of non-malleable commitments,
which are studied in Chapter 7 of the present thesis.
1.3 Protection against hardware Trojans
Up to now, and as far as hardware security is concerned, we have considered adversaries
that receive tampering access over the cryptographic implementation, assuming that the
fabrication process has been performed by a trusted party. In reality, though, when aiming
to minimize the production costs, or whenever access to leading-edge manufacturing facil-
ities is required, the fabrication process demands the involvement of several, potentially
malicious, facilities. Consequently, integrated circuits (ICs) are susceptible to the so-
called hardware Trojans, which are hardware components that are maliciously implanted
to the original circuitry, having as a purpose to alter its functionality, while remaining
undetected. Hardware Trojans are aiming at disabling or compromising the security de-
fences of a system, or covertly leaking information related to the systems’ private state
[LKG+09, CNB09, BRPB14]. The injection of Hardware Trojans can occur during the
design phase, by a malicious designer, or during the manufacturing phase, by a malicious
fabrication facility. Once the Trojan is implanted, it may be active the entire time, or it
may be triggered by some special event, e.g., when the user supplies the circuit with some
special input, or after a specific number of circuit invocations.
In Chapter 8 of the thesis, we deal with the problem of secure circuit outsourcing, by
providing a rigorous security model that covers a large class of hardware Trojans, together
with a construction that is based on the notion of secure multi-party computation.
1.4 Contributions
In the current section, we briefly summarize the outcomes of the present dissertation.
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1.4.1 Non-malleable codes for partial functions and applications
In the present thesis, we initiate a comprehensive study on non-malleable codes for the class
of partial functions, that read/write on an arbitrary subset of codeword bits (symbols),
with specific cardinality. Our constructions are efficient in terms of information rate, while
allowing the attacker to access asymptotically almost the entire codeword. In addition,
they satisfy a notion of security which is stronger than non-malleability, that we call non-
malleability with manipulation detection (MD-NMC), guaranteeing that any modified
codeword decodes, either to the original message, or to ⊥, with overwhelming probability.
Our results are informally summarized bellow.
1. (MD-NMC in the CRS model): First, we construct an information rate 1 MD-
NMC, in the common reference string (CRS) model,5 tolerating adversarial access
over a 1−1/Ω(log k) faction of codeword bits, where k denotes the security parameter.
The proposed construction combines Authenticated Encryption together with an
inner code that protects the key of the encryption scheme.
2. (MD-NMC in the standard model): In our second result we show how to remove
the CRS, and we present a computationally secure MD-NMC in the standard model,
over alphabets of length O(log k), with information rate 1 − 1/Ω(log k), tolerating
adversarial access over a 1− 1/Ω(log k) fraction of codeword blocks (or symbols).
3. (Continuous MD-NMC ): In our final result, we construct continuous non-malleable
codes, for a weaker notion of security than the one presented in [FMNV14], since our
codewords need to be updated after each tampering query. Nevertheless, our update
operation uses only shuffling and refreshing operations, avoiding the full re-encoding
process. Also, by incorporating the seed of a pseudo-random generator inside the
codeword, the final construction is deterministic.
In Chapter 3, we propose various applications of the primitive in tamper-resilient cryptog-
raphy, namely, for protecting the cryptographic memory of boolean and arithmetic circuits
against tampering attacks, and also for protecting data transmission over adversarial chan-
nels.
5The common reference string (CRS) model, assumes that all parties receive access to a trusted,
honestly and correctly, generated string, and generalizes the common random string model, in which the
common string is sampled according to the uniform distribution.
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NMC for partial functions and All-or-Nothing Transforms. Besides the impor-
tance of non-malleable codes for partial functions in the active setting, in which the function
is allowed to partially read/write the codeword, the passive analogue of the primitive, i.e.,
when the function is only given read access over the codeword, matches the model consid-
ered by All-Or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs), which is a notion originally introduced by
Rivest [Riv97], providing security guarantees similar to those of leakage resilience: reading
an arbitrary subset (up to some bounded cardinality) of locations of the codeword does not
reveal the underlying message. As non-malleable codes provide privacy, non-malleability
for partial functions is the active analogue of (and in fact implies) AONTs, thus our con-
structions yield efficient AONTs under standard assumptions (only one-way functions),
which, was an open question until now.
1.4.2 `-more weakly extractable hash function families and
non-malleability
In the present dissertation, we introduce the notion of `-more extractable, collision resis-
tant, hash function families. Briefly speaking, `-more extractable hash function families
capture the idea that, if an adversary, that is given ` ∈ N precomputed hash values
v1, . . . , v`, manages to produce a new valid hash value ṽ, then it must know a pre-image
of ṽ. This is a generalization of the notion of extractable hash functions by Bitansky et
al. [BCCT12] and Goldwasser et al. [GLR11], which corresponds to the ` = 0 case, in which
the adversary gets no access to any valid hash values, prior to producing its own value. By
appropriately relaxing the extractability requirement without hurting the applicability of
the primitive, we manage to instantiate `-more extractable hash functions under the same
assumptions used by Bitansky et al. and Goldwasser et al., i.e., a variant of the Knowledge
of Exponent Assumption. We call the resulting notion, `-more weakly extractable, collision
resistant hash function family (wECRH), and we present the following results.
1. (Extractability [BCCT12] 6=⇒ 1-more extractability): We prove that our
generalization is strict, by showing that the extractable hash function family of
[BCCT12, GLR11], is not 1-more extractable.
2. (Constructing `-more wECRH): In our second result, we construct the notion of
`-more wECRH. In particular, we provide two instantiations of the primitive. The
first one is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem and the variant
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of the knowledge of exponent assumption used by [BCCT12], while the latter is in
the random oracle model.
3. (Leakage-resilient `-more wECRH): Finally, as an extension of the notion of
`-more wECRH, we formalize and construct the notion of leakage-resilient, `-more,
weakly extractable hash function families, considering attackers that, in addition to
receiving access to ` precomputed hash values, they also receive bounded leakage over
the randomness used to compute those values.
Subsequently, we illustrate the power of the primitive by providing constructions that
significantly improve the current state-of-the-art in non-malleable cryptography. In par-
ticular, we provide the following results based on `-more wECRH.
1. (NMC for split-state functions): We significantly improve the efficiency of non-
malleable codes in the split-state model, by constructing an encoding scheme with
codewords of length |s| + O(k), where |s| is the length of the message, and k is the
security parameter. This is a substantial improvement over previous constructions,
both asymptotically and concretely.
2. (Continuous NMC against split-state functions): We leverage the power of
`-more wECRH in the continuous setting, and assuming leakage-resilient `-more ex-
tractable hash functions, we construct efficient, continuously non-malleable, leakage-
resilient codes against split-state attackers, improving the efficiency of [FMNV14].
3. (Non-malleable commitments): Finally, we prove that `-more extractable hash
functions imply succinct, non-interactive, non-malleable commitments, that satisfy a
stronger definition than the ones by Crescenzo et al. [DIO98], and Pass and Rosen
[PR05], in the sense that the simulator does not require access to the original message,
while the attacker’s auxiliary input is allowed to depend on it.
1.4.3 Circuit outsourcing and Trojan resilience
In Chapter 8 of the thesis, we propose a formal model for assessing the security of integrated
circuits, whose fabrication has been outsourced to a set of untrusted and possibly malicious,
manufacturers. The model that we propose assumes that the circuit specification and
design, are trusted, but the fabrication facilities may be malicious. In this setting we
provide the following, informally stated results.
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1. (A formal model for secure circuit outsourcing): We provide a simulation-
based definition for the problem of secure circuit outsourcing, ensuring that no in-
formation over circuit’s private information will be released, even in the presence of
Trojans. Our model provides security against powerful adversaries that are allowed
to make arbitrary modifications over the outsourced circuit components.
2. (A complier for secure circuit outsourcing): We propose a compiler that trans-
forms any cryptographic circuit, into another that can be securely outsourced. Our
compiler, relies on secure multi-party computation (MPC) with certain suitable prop-
erties, that are attainable by existing schemes.
1.5 Outline
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we present basic definitions that will be
used throughout the thesis. The notions introduced by the current thesis are presented in
the corresponding chapters. Chapter 3 introduces the notion of non-malleable codes with
manipulation detection and provides efficient constructions for the class of partial func-
tions. In the same chapter, we also present and construct a weaker notion of continuous
non-malleable codes [FMNV14]. In Chapter 4, we introduce the notion of l-more weakly
extractable, collision-resistant hash function families (wECRH), and we provide two in-
stantiations of the primitive. In subsequent chapters, i.e., Chapters 5,6,7, we demonstrate
the applicability of the primitive by providing a variety of applications in non-malleable
cryptography. In particular, in Chapter 5, we show how how to construct practically ef-
ficient non-malleable codes against split-state functions, while in Chapter 6 we show how
to improve the efficiency of continuous non-malleable codes for split-state adversaries. In
Chapter 7 we present another important application of wECRH, by showing how to con-
struct efficient, succinct, non-interactive non-malleable commitments. Finally, in Chapter
8 we deal with the problem of secure circuit outsourcing, providing a formal model and a
feasibility result based on multi-party computation.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this Chapter we present the notation and basic definitions and that will be used through-
out the thesis. Newly introduced notions will be presented in subsequent chapters.
2.1 Notation and basic notions
Definition 2.1.1 (Notation). Let t, i, j, be non-negative integers. Then, [t] denotes the
set {1, . . . , t}. For vectors x,y, 〈x,y〉 denotes the inner product of x, y, and [x]i is the
i-th coordinate of x. For bit-strings x, y, x||y, is the concatenation of x, y, |x| denotes
the length of x, for i ∈ [|x|], x[i] is the i-th bit of x,
ft
j=1 xj := x1|| . . . ||xt, and for i ≤ j,
x[i : j] := x[i]|| . . . ||x[j]. For a set I, |I|, P(I), are the cardinality and power set of I,
respectively, and for I ⊆ [|x|], x|I is the projection of the bits of x with respect to I. For
a string variable c and value v, c ← v denotes the assignment of v to c, and c[I] ← v,
denotes an assignment such that c|I equals v.
For a distribution D over a set X , x← D, denotes sampling an element x ∈ X , accord-
ing to D, x← X denotes sampling a uniform element x from X , UX denotes the uniform
distribution over X and x1, . . . , xt
rs← X denotes sampling a uniform subset of X with t
distinct elements, using rejection sampling. The statistical distance between two random
variables X, Y , with range D, is denoted by ∆(X,Y ), i.e., ∆(X,Y ) := 12
∑
u∈D |Pr[X =
u] − Pr[Y = u]|. In addition, “≈” and “≈c”, denote statistical and computational in-
distinguishability, respectively, and negl(k) denotes an unspecified, negligible function, in
k. For random variables X, Y , H∞(X) and H̃∞(X|Y ), denote the min-entropy and av-
erage min-entropy conditioned on Y , of X, respectively. For any element g and vector
r = (r1, . . . , rt), g
r := (gr1 , . . . , grt).
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For a randomized algorithm A, using y ← A(x) we denote the execution of A on input
x, receiving output y. In this setting, y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes the
execution of A on input x with randomness r. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any x, r ∈ {0, 1}∗, the computation of A(x; r)
terminates in at most poly(|x|+ |r|) steps.
Given two ensembles of random variables X = {Xk}k∈N and Y = {Yk}k∈N, we write
X ≡ Y to denote that the two ensembles are identically distributed, X ≈ Y to denote
that the two ensembles are statistically close, i.e., ∆(Xk, Yk) ≤ negl(k), and X ≈c Y
to denote that the two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., for all PPT
distinguishers D, |Pr [D(Xk) = 1]− Pr [D(Yk) = 1]| ≤ negl(k).
Next we provide the definition of one-time message authentication code (MAC) follow-
ing [KL14].
Definition 2.1.2 (One-time MAC [KL14]). Let k be the security parameter. A message
authentication code Π = (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is one-time ε-secure, if for all algorithms A =
(A1,A2),






(s̃, t̃)← A2(t, st)
Output 1 if Vrfysk(s̃, t̃) = 1 and s̃ 6= s.
The definition of leakage-resilient one-time MAC follows.
Definition 2.1.3 (One-time MAC against leakage). Let k be the security parameter and
L be a function class. A message authentication code Π = (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is one-time
ε-secure against L if for all algorithms A = (A1,A2,A3),
Pr
[
LRMac− forgeA,Π(k) = 1
]
≤ ε,




g ← A1(1k), g ∈ L
(s, st)← A2(1k, g(sk))
t← Macsk(s)
(s̃, t̃)← A3(t, st)
Output 1 if Vrfysk(s̃, t̃) = 1 and s̃ 6= s.
The above definitions will be used for building authenticated encryption, which is
defined in Definition 2.1.6.
Below, we provide formal definitions for the notions of collision resistant hash function
families and the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLOG).
Definition 2.1.4 (Collision resistant hash function family [KL14]). A fixed length, collision
resistant, hash function family, is a pair of probabilistic algorithms Hk = (Gen, h) satisfying
the following:
• Gen is a PPT algorithm which receives as input a security parameter 1k and outputs
a key z.
• h receives z, and x ∈ {0, 1}p1(k) and outputs hz(x) ∈ {0, 1}p2(k), where p1(k), p2(k) =
poly(k), p2(k) < p1(k).
• For all PPTadversaries A, the collision-finding experiment HcollA,Hk , which is de-
fined bellow, satisfies the following property:
Pr[HcollA,Hk(1
k) = 1] ≤ negl(k),
for some negligible function negl(·), where
HcollA,Hk(k):
– A key z is generated by executing Gen(1k).
– A is given z and outputs x,x′.
– If x 6= x′ and hz(x) = hz(x′) output 1, otherwise output 0.
2.1. Notation and basic notions 17
For simplicity, the key of the hash function, z, will be omitted from the notation.
Definition 2.1.5 (Hardness of the discrete logarithm problem [KL14]). For any k ∈ N
and any group-generation algorithm G, we say that the discrete logarithm problem is hard








(G, g, p)← G(1k), |G| = p
s′ ← Zp, w := gs
′
s← A(G, g, p, w)
If gs = w, return 1, otherwise, return 0
and G is the description of a cyclic group for which the group operation if efficiently com-
puted.
Below, we define the notion of authenticated encryption with ciphertext indistinguisha-
bility under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), for a single oracle query and against
one-time leakage.
Definition 2.1.6 (1-IND-CPA secure authenticated encryption against one-time leak-
age)). Let k be the security parameter, let (KGen,E,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme
and let L be a set of functions. Then, (KGen,E,D) is authenticated, 1-IND-CPA secure
against one-time leakage with respect to L, if it satisfies the following properties:
1. (Correctness): For every message s, Pr[Dsk(Esk(s)) = s] = 1, where sk ← KGen(1k).
2. (1-IND-CPA security under leakage): for any g ∈ L and for any triple of








, where sk ←
KGen(1k).




ẽ 6= e ∧ Dsk(ẽ) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣∣ sk ← KGen(1k); (s, st)← A1(1k, g(sk));e← Esk(s); ẽ← A2(e, st)
]
≤ negl(k).
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When the scheme is computationally secure, we consider computational indistinguishability
instead of statistical, and A is PPT.
Here, it should be noted that the leakage function is being defined by the attacker
before receiving the challenge ciphertext, otherwise security breaks. Also, when we don’t
consider oracle, or leakage, queries, we require that Esk(s0) ≈ Esk(s1), for any pair of
messages s0, s1. In this setting, the encryption scheme is simply called semantically secure.
Finally, when considering unforgeability without leakage, A1 is only receiving the security
parameter.
Next we state the t-variant, due to [BCCT12], of the Knowledge of Exponent As-
sumption (KEA), [Dam92, HT98, BP04], with individual auxiliary inputs for the ad-
versary and the extractor, which is known not to contradict the impossibility results of
[BCPR14, BP15].
Assumption 2.1.7 (t-KEA [BCCT12]). Let t, k ∈ N. There exists a group generation
algorithm G, such that for any pair (G, g) sampled according to G(1k), where G is a group
of prime order p ∈ (2k−1, 2k), the following holds: for any PPT algorithm A with auxiliary
input zv ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), there exist PPT extractor EA with auxiliary input zE ∈ {0, 1}poly(k),





(v, v′)← A(gr, gar, zv), v′ = va :
x← EA(gr, gar, zE) ∧ g〈r,x〉 6= v
]
≤ negl(k).
Next we recall the definition of extractable hash of [BCCT12]. The definition can be
modified to support different auxiliary inputs for the adversary and the extractor, as the
t-KEA above, but here we present the original version.
Definition 2.1.8 (Extractable hash [BCCT12]). For k ∈ N, an efficiently samplable hash
function ensemble H = {Hk}k∈N is extractable, if for any PPT algorithm A, there exists




y ← A(h, z),∃x : h(x) = y :
x′ ← EHA (h, z) ∧ h(x′) 6= y
]
≤ negl(k).
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2.1.1 Randomness extractors and universal hash function families
Using extractors [NZ93] we can extract randomness from sources that produce weakly-
random values, assuming those values have sufficient min-entropy. Here, we follow the
definition given by [DRS04], that uses average conditional min-entropy H̃∞(·).
Definition 2.1.9 (Randomness Extractor [DRS04]). A polynomially time computable
function Ext :M×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}k is an average case, strong, (m, ε)-extractor, if for all
random variables S, Z, where S is a variable over M and H̃∞(S|Z) ≥ m, it holds that
∆(Ext(S;R), Uk | (R,Z)) ≤ ε,
where R denotes the random coins of Ext. The value L = m− k is called the entropy loss
of Ext, and n is the seed length of Ext.
Universal hash functions are good randomness extractors, and they are defined as
follows:
Definition 2.1.10 (ρ-Universal Hashing [CW77]). A family H of deterministic functions
h :M→ {0, 1}k is called a ρ-universal hash family, if for any s1 6= s2 ∈M, Prh←H[h(s1) =
h(s2)] ≤ ρ. If ρ = 1/2k, H is called universal.
Now we state the leftover-hash lemma [HILL99], following the definition given in
[BDK+11].
Lemma 2.1.11 (Leftover-Hash Lemma [HILL99, BDK+11]). Assume that the family H of
functions h :M→ {0, 1}k is a 1+γ
2k
-universal hash family. Then, the extractor Ext(s;h) =
h(s), where h is sampled according to H, is an average case, strong (m, ε)-extractor, where




and L = m− k is the entropy loss.
Below, we define the inner product hash function family and in Lemma 2.1.13 we prove
that it is universal.
Definition 2.1.12 (The inner product hash function family). Let Fp be a finite field of
prime order p, where p is a k-bit prime number. For any t ∈ N, the inner-product function
family Hip = (Gen, h), for messages over Ftp is defined as follows:
• Gen(1k): sample (r1, . . . , rt)← Ftp and set z = (r1, . . . , rt).
• Hash computation: on input message s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ Ftp, compute hz(s) =∑t
i=1 si · ri, where the summation refers to the addition operation, and · is the mul-
tiplication operation, over Fp.
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Lemma 2.1.13. The function family Hip of Definition 2.1.12 is universal.
Proof. For any k in N, let Fp be any field of order p, where p is a k-bit integer, and let
s = (s1, . . . , st), s̄ = (s̄1, . . . , s̄t) be two distinct messages, i.e., s and s̄ differ in at least one
coordinate. Without loss of generality, we assume that s1 6= s̄1. Then,
Pr
hz←Hip











i=2 ri · (si − s̄i)
(s1 − s̄1)−1
]
Hence, for any choice of r2, . . . , rt, there is a unique r1 for which hz(s) = hz(s̄). Since r1 is
random over Fp, we have that Pr[hz(s) = hz(s̄)] ≤ 1/p ≤ 1/2k.
2.2 Tampering function classes
In this section we formally define the tampering function classes that will be considered in
the present thesis. We begin by defining the class of partial functions that are the main
subject of Chapter 3.
Definition 2.2.1 (The class of partial functions FανΓ (or Fα)). Let Γ ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an
alphabet, α ∈ [0, 1) and ν ∈ N. Any f ∈ FανΓ , f : Γν → Γν , is indexed by a set I ⊆ [ν],
|I| ≤ αν, and a function f ′ : Γαν → Γαν , such that for any x ∈ Γν , (f(x))|I = f
′ (x|I) and
(f(x))|Ic = x|Ic , where I
c := [ν]\I.





). Also, the length of the codeword, ν, according to Γ, will be omitted from
the notation and whenever Γ is omitted we assume that Γ = {0, 1}. In Chapter 3.3, we
consider Γ = {0, 1}, while in Chapter 3.4, Γ = {0, 1}O(log k), i.e., the tampering function
operates over blocks of size O(log k). When considering the CRS model, the functions are
parameterized by the common reference string.
Below, we define the class of affine functions that will be used in Sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2.
Definition 2.2.2 (The function family Faff). For any field F and any positive integer t,
we define the affine function class over Ft, as follows
Faff =
{
f(x1, . . . , xt) = (d · x1 + b1, . . . , d · xt + bt) | (b1, . . . , bt) ∈ Ft, d ∈ F
}
.
Here, the pair (+, ·) denotes the standard addition and multiplication operations over F,
and any element in Faff will be denoted by (b, d).
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Below, we define the split-state functions class, Fss, which is the main subject of Chap-
ter 5.
Definition 2.2.3 (The split-state function family Fss). For any, even, ν ∈ N and any
efficiently computable function f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν , f ∈ Fss, if there exist efficiently
computable functions f0 : {0, 1}ν/2 → {0, 1}ν/2, f1 : {0, 1}ν/2 → {0, 1}ν/2, such that for
every x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}ν/2 × {0, 1}ν/2, f(x0||x1) = f0(x0)|| f1(x1).
In the subsequent chapters, we will slightly abuse notation, allowing split-state func-
tions to operate over pairs of bitstrings, i.e., for f = (f0, f1) ∈ Fss and x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}ν/2×
{0, 1}ν/2, we will use the notation f(x0, x1) = (f0(x0), f1(x1)).
2.3 Non-malleable codes
Below, we define encoding schemes, based on the definitions by [DPW10, LL12].
Definition 2.3.1 (Encoding scheme [DPW10]). A (κ, ν)-coding scheme, κ, ν ∈ N, is a
pair of algorithms (Enc,Dec) such that: Enc : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}ν is an encoding algo-
rithm, Dec : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}κ ∪ {⊥} is a decoding algorithm, and for every s ∈ {0, 1}κ,
Pr
[
Dec(1k,Enc(1k, s)) = s
]
= 1, where the probability runs over the randomness used by
(Enc,Dec).
For encoding schemes in the CRS model the definition is as follows.
Definition 2.3.2 (Encoding scheme in the Common Reference String (CRS) Model
[LL12])). A (κ, ν)-coding scheme in the CRS model, κ, ν ∈ N, is a triple of algorithms
(Init,Enc,Dec) such that: Init is a randomized algorithm which receives 1k, where k de-
notes the security parameter, and produces a common reference string Σ ∈ {0, 1}poly(k),
and (Enc(1k,Σ, ·),Dec(1k,Σ, ·)) is a (κ, ν)-coding scheme, κ, ν = poly(k).
For brevity, 1k will be omitted from the inputs of Init, Enc and Dec. Also, we can
easily generalize the above definitions with respect to larger alphabets, i.e., by considering
Enc : {0, 1}κ → Γν and Dec : Γν → {0, 1}κ ∪ {⊥}, for some alphabet Γ ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
Below we state the definition of strong non-malleability in the CRS model based on
the definitions by [DPW10, LL12].
Definition 2.3.3 (Strong non-malleability in the CRS model [DPW10, LL12]).
Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be a (κ, ν)-encoding scheme in the common reference string model, and
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F be a family of functions f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν . For any f ∈ F , s ∈ {0, 1}κ, sample
Σ← Init(1k) and define the tampering experiment
TamperΣ,fs :=
{
c← Enc(Σ, s), c̃← fΣ(c), s̃← Dec(Σ, c̃)
Output same∗ if c̃ = c, and s̃ otherwise.
}
which is a random variable over the randomness of Init, Enc and Dec. The encoding scheme
(Init,Enc,Dec) is strongly non-malleable with respect to the function family F , if for any










where Σ← Init(1k), and “≈” may refer to statistical, or computational, indistinguishability,
with parameter k.
In the above definition, f is parameterized by Σ to differentiate tamper-proof input,
i.e., Σ, from tamperable input, i.e., c. Also, according to the standard definition of non-
malleability, the decoding procedure is not randomized, however, as it is suggested by Ball
et al. [BDKM16], Dec may be randomized.
Next, the uniqueness is defined due to [FMNV14]. The uniqueness property is essential
for achieving non-malleability in the continuous setting against split-state attackers, which
is the main subject of Chapter 6.
Definition 2.3.4 (Uniqueness [FMNV14]). Let ES = (Init,Enc,Dec) be a split-state en-
coding scheme in the CRS model. Then, ES satisfies the uniqueness property if for any
PPT algorithm A and all, sufficiently large k ∈ N, we have:
Pr
[
Σ← Init(1k); (c0, c1, c′1)← A(1k,Σ) :
Dec(Σ, (c0, c1)) 6= ⊥ ∧ Dec(Σ, (c0, c′1)) 6= ⊥ ∧ c1 6= c′1
]
≤ negl(k),
and symmetrically for the case in which we fix the right part of the codeword.
The definition of the split-state continuous tampering oracle due to [FMNV14] follows.
Definition 2.3.5 (The split-state tampering oracle Ocnm [FMNV14]).
Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be a split-state, (κ, ν)-encoding scheme, in the CRS model. For any
(c0, c1) ∈ {0, 1}ν/2×{0, 1}ν/2, and any split-state function f = (f0, f1), f0, f1 : {0, 1}ν/2 →
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{0, 1}ν/2, define the stateful oracle Ocnm(·, ·) with initial state st := 0, as follows,
Ocnm((c0, c1), (f0, f1)) :
If st = 1, return ⊥
(c̃0, c̃1)← (f0(c0), f1(c1))
If (c0, c1) = (c̃0, c̃1) return same
∗
If Dec(Σ, (c̃0, c̃1)) = ⊥, return ⊥ and set st← 1
Else return (c̃0, c̃1)
where Σ← Init(1k).
The λ-bit leakage oracle, returning a total of at most λ bits.
Definition 2.3.6 (The λ-bit leakage oracle Oλ(·, ·)). A leakage oracle Oλ(·, ·), is a stateful
oracle, with initial state st := 0. For any λ ∈ N, string s, and function g : {0, 1}|s| →
{0, 1}λ′, if λ′+st ≤ λ, Oλ(s, g) outputs g(s), and updates it state to st← st+λ′, otherwise
it outputs ⊥.
Below we provide the definition of continuously non-malleable, leakage-resilient codes,
due to [FMNV14].
Definition 2.3.7 (Continuously non-malleable, leakage-resilient codes [FMNV14]). Let
ES = (Init,Enc,Dec) be a split-state encoding scheme in the CRS model, and let λ, q ∈ N.
Then, ES is a q-continuously λ-leakage resilient ( (q, λ)-CNMLR ) code, if for every,














Σ← Init(1k); (c0, c1)← Enc(Σ, s);
out← AOλ(c0,·),Oλ(c1,·),Ocnm((c0,c1),·)(Σ); Output : out
}
and A makes at most q tampering queries against Ocnm.
Chapter 3
Non-malleable codes for partial
functions with manipulation detection
3.1 Introduction
The notion of non-malleable codes (NMC) was introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak
and Wichs [DPW10], as a relaxation of error correction and error detection codes, aim-
ing to provide strong privacy, without ensuring correctness. Informally, non-malleable
encoding schemes are keyless primitives, guaranteeing that any modified codeword de-
codes, either to the original message, or to a completely unrelated one, with overwhelm-
ing probability. As non-malleability against general function classes is impossible (cf.
Chapter 1), various subclasses of tampering functions have been considered, such as
split-state functions [ADL14, DKO13, ADKO15, LL12, AAG+16, DPW10, KLT16], bit-
wise tampering and permutations [DPW10, AGM+15a, AGM+15b], bounded-size func-
tion classes [FMVW14], bounded depth/fan-in circuits [BDKM16], space-bounded tam-
pering [FHMV17], and others (cf. Section 3.1.3). One characteristic shared by those
function classes is that they allow full access to the codeword, while imposing structural or
computational restrictions to the way the function computes over the input. In the present
chapter, we initiate a study on non-malleability for functions that receive partial access
over the codeword, which is an important yet overlooked class, as we elaborate below.
The class of partial functions. The class of partial functions contains all functions that
read/write on an arbitrary subset of codeword bits,1 with specific cardinality. Concretely,
1When considering alphabets larger than {0,1}, the function is accessing codeword symbols.
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let c be a codeword with length ν. For α ∈ [0, 1), the function class Fαν (or Fα for brevity)
consists of all functions that operate over any subset of bits of c with cardinality at most αν,
while leaving the remaining bits intact. The work of Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14]
explicitly defines this class and uses a subclass (the one containing functions that always
touch the first αν bits of the codeword) in a negative way, namely as the tool for deriving
capacity lower bounds for information-theoretic non-malleable codes against split-state
functions. Partial functions were also studied implicitly by Faust et al. [FMVW14], while
aiming for non-malleability against bounded-size circuits.2
Even though capacity lower bounds for partial functions have been derived (cf. [CG14]),
our understanding about explicit constructions is still limited. Existential results can be
derived by the probabilistic method, as shown in prior works [DPW10, CG14],3 but they
do not yield explicit constructions. On the other hand, the capacity bounds do not apply
to the computational setting, which could potentially allow more practical solutions. This
is a direction that needs to be explored, as besides the theoretical interest, partial functions
is a natural model that complies with existing attacks that require partial access to the
registers of the cryptographic implementation [BDL97, BDL01, BS97, BDH+98, TMA11].4
Besides the importance of partial functions in the active setting, i.e., when the function
is allowed to partially read/write the codeword, the passive analogue of the class, i.e., when
the function is only given read access over the codeword, matches the model considered by
All-Or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs), which is a notion originally introduced by Rivest
[Riv97], providing security guarantees similar to those of leakage resilience: reading an
arbitrary subset (up to some bounded cardinality) of locations of the codeword does not
reveal the underlying message. As non-malleable codes provide privacy, non-malleability
for partial functions is the active analogue of (and in fact implies) AONTs, that find nu-
merous applications [Riv97, Boy99, CDH+00, Sti01, RP11].
Plausibility. At a first glance one might think that partial functions better comply with
the framework of error-correction/detection codes (ECC/EDC), as they do not touch the
2 Specifically, in [FMVW14], the authors consider a model where a common reference string (CRS) is
available, with length roughly logarithmic in the size of the tampering function class; as a consequence,
the tampering function is allowed to read/write the whole codeword while having only partial information
over the CRS.
3Informally, prior works [DPW10, CG14] showed existence of non-malleable codes for classes of certain
bounded cardinalities. The results cover the class of partial functions.
4The attacks by [BDL97, BDL01, BDH+98] require the modification of a single (random) memory bit,
while in [BS97] a single error per each round of the computation suffices. In [TMA11], the attack requires
a single faulty byte.
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whole codeword. However, if we allow the adversary to access asymptotically almost the
entire codeword, it is conceivable it can use this generous access rate, i.e., the fraction
of the codeword that can be accessed (see below), to create correlated encodings, thus
solving non-malleability in this setting is essential. Additionally, non-malleability provides
simulation based security, which is not considered by ECC/EDC.
We illustrate the separation between the notions using the following example. Consider
the set of partial functions that operate either on the right or on the left half of the codeword
(the function chooses if it is going to be left or right), and the trivial encoding scheme that
on input message s, outputs (s, s). The decoder, on input (s, s′), checks if s = s′, in which
case it outputs s, otherwise it outputs ⊥. This scheme is clearly an EDC against the
aforementioned function class,5 as the output of the decoder is in {s,⊥}, with probability
1; however, it is malleable since the tampering function can create encodings whose validity
depends on the message. On the other hand, an ECC would provide a trivial solution in
this setting, however it requires restriction of the adversarial access fraction to 1/2 (of the
codeword); by accessing more than this fraction, the attacker can possibly create invalid
encodings depending on the message, as general ECCs do not provide privacy. Thus, the
ECC/EDC setting is inapt when aiming for simulation based security in the presence of
attackers that access almost the entire codeword. Later in this section, we provide an
extensive discussion on challenges of non-malleability for partial functions.
Besides the plausibility and the lack of a comprehensive study, partial functions can
potentially allow stronger primitives, as constant functions are excluded from the class.
This is similar to the path followed by Jafargholi and Wichs [JW15], aiming to achieve
tamper detection (cf. Section 3.1.3) against a class of functions that implicitly excludes
constant functions and the identity function. In what follows we prove that this intu-
ition holds, by showing that partial functions allow a stronger primitive that we define
as non-malleability with manipulation detection (MD-NMC), which in addition to simu-
lation based security, also guarantees that any tampered codeword will either decode to
the original message, or to ⊥. Again, and as in the case of ECC/EDC, we stress that
manipulation/tamper-detection codes do not imply MD-NMC, as they do not provide
simulation based security.6
Having the above discussion in mind, it is clear that partial functions is an interesting
and well-motivated model, and the goal of the present chapter is to answer the following
5It is not an ECC as the decoder does not know which side has been modified by the tampering
function.
6Clearly, MD-NMC imply manipulation/error-detection codes.
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(informally stated) question:
Is it possible to construct efficient (high information rate) non-malleable codes
for partial functions, while allowing the attacker to access almost the entire
codeword?
In what follows we answer the above question in the affirmative. Before presenting the
results of the present chapter (cf. Section 3.1.1), we identify several challenges that are
involved in tackling the problem.
Challenges. We first define some useful notions that will be used later.
• Information rate: the ratio of message to codeword length, as the message length
goes to infinity.
• Access rate: the fraction of the number of bits (resp. symbols)7 that the attacker
is allowed to access, over the total codeword bits (resp. symbols), as the message
length goes to infinity.
The access rate measures the effectiveness of a non-malleable code in the partial function
setting and reflects the level of adversarial access to the codeword. In this chapter, we
aim at constructing non-malleable codes for partial functions with high information rate
and high access rate, i.e., both rates should approach 1, simultaneously. Before discussing
the challenges posed by this requirement, we first review some known impossibility results.
First, non-malleability for partial functions with concrete access rate 1 is impossible, as the
function can fully decode the codeword and then re-encode a related message [DPW10].
Second, information-theoretic non-malleable codes with constant information rate (e.g.,
0.5) are not possible against partial functions with constant access rate [CG14],8 and
consequently, solutions in the information-theoretic settings such as ECC and Robust
Secret Sharing (RSS) do not solve our problem. Based on these facts, in order to achieve
our goal, the only path is to explore the computational setting, aiming for access rate at
most 1− ε, for some ε > 0.
At a first glance one might think that non-malleability for partial functions is easier to
achieve, compared to other function classes, as partial functions cannot touch the whole
7This is of the case of bigger alphabets.
8Informally, in [CG14] (Theorem 5.3) the authors showed that any information-theoretic non-malleable
code with a constant access rate and a constant information rate must have a constant distinguishing
probability.
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codeword. Having that in mind, it would be tempting to conclude that existing design-
s/techniques with minor modifications are sufficient to achieve our goal. However, we will
show that this intuition is misleading, by pointing out why prior approaches fail to provide
security against partial functions with high access rate.
The current state of the art in the computational setting considers tools such as
(Authenticated) Encryption [DLSZ15, AAG+16, KLT16, FN17, LL12, DKS17a], non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [LL12, FN17, FMNV14, DKS17a], and `-more
weakly extractable collision resistant hashes [KLT16], where others use KEM/DEM tech-
niques [DLSZ15, AAG+16]. Those constructions share a common structure, incorporating
a short secret key sk (or a short encoding of it), as well as a long ciphertext, e, and a
proof π (or a hash value). Now, consider the partial function f that gets full access to
the secret key sk and a constant number of bits of the ciphertext e, partially decrypts
e and modifies the codeword depending on those bits. Then, it is not hard to see that
non-malleability falls apart, as the security of the encryption no longer holds. The at-
tack requires access rate only O((|sk|)/(|sk| + |e| + |π|)), for [LL12, FN17, DKS17a] and
O(poly(k)/|s|) for [DLSZ15, AAG+16, KLT16]. A similar attack applies to [FMNV14],
which is in the continuous setting.
One possible route to tackle the above challenges, is to use an encoding scheme over
the ciphertext, such that partial access over it does not reveal the underlying message.9
The guarantees that we need from such a primitive resemble the properties of AONTs,
however this primitive does not provide security against active, i.e., tampering, attacks.
Another approach would be to use Reconstructable Probabilistic Encodings [BDKM16],
which provide error-correcting guarantees, yet still it is unknown whether we can achieve
information rate 1 for such a primitive. In addition, the techniques and tools for protecting
the secret key can be used to achieve optimal information rate as they are independent
of the underlying message, yet at the same time, they become the weakest point against
partial functions with high access rate. Thus, the question is how to overcome the above
challenges, allowing access to almost the entire codeword.
In the present thesis we solve the challenges presented above based on the following
observation: in existing solutions the structure of the codeword is fixed and known to
the attacker, and independently of the primitives that we use, the only way to resolve
the above issues is by hiding the structure via randomization. This requires a structure
recovering mechanism that can either be implemented by an “external” source, or otherwise
9In the presence of NIZKs we can have attacks with low access rate that read sk, e, and constant
number of bits from the proof.
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the structure needs to be reflected in the codeword in some way that the attacker cannot
exploit. In the present thesis we implement this mechanism in both ways, by first proposing
a construction in the common reference string (CRS) model (cf. Section 3.3), and then
we show how to remove the CRS using slightly bigger alphabets (cf. Section 3.4).
3.1.1 Results
In the present chapter, we introduce the notion of non-malleable codes with manipulation-
detection (MD-NMC), and we present the first construction for this type of codes. We
focus on achieving simultaneously high information rate and high access rate, in the partial
functions setting, which by the results of [CG14], it can be achieved only in the computa-
tional setting.
The contribution is threefold. First, we construct an information rate 1 non-malleable
code in the CRS model, with access rate 1 − 1/Ω(log k), where k denotes the security
parameter. The proposed construction combines Authenticated Encryption together with
an inner code that protects the key of the encryption scheme (cf. Section 3.3). The result
is informally summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Informal). Assuming one-way functions, there exists an explicit compu-
tationally secure MD-NMC in the CRS model, with information rate 1 and access rate
1− 1/Ω(log k), where k is the security parameter.
The proposed scheme, in order to achieve security with error 2−Ω(k), produces code-
words of length |s| + O(k2 log k), where |s| denotes the length of the message, and uses
a CRS of length O(k2 log k log(|s| + k)). We note that the construction does not require
the CRS to be fully tamper-proof and we refer the reader to the end of Section 3.3 for a
general discussion on the topic.
As a second result, we show how to remove the CRS by slightly increasing the size
of the alphabet. This yields a computationally secure MD-NMC in the standard model,
achieving information and access rate 1−1/Ω(log k). The proposed construction is proven
secure by a reduction to the security of the scheme presented in Theorem 4.1.4. Below, we
informally state the result.
Theorem 3.1.2 (Informal). Assuming one-way functions, there exists an explicit, compu-
tationally secure MD-NMC in the standard model, with alphabet length O(log k), informa-
tion rate 1− 1/Ω(log k) and access rate 1− 1/Ω(log k), where k is the security parameter.
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The scheme produces codewords of length |s|(1 + 1/O(log k)) +O(k2 log2 k).
In Section 3.5, we consider security against continuous attacks. We show how to achieve
a weaker notion of continuous security, while avoiding the use of a self-destruct mechanism,
which was originally achieved by [FN17]. Our notion is weaker than full continuous security
[FMNV14], since the codewords need to be updated. Nevertheless, our update operation
is deterministic and avoids the full re-encoding process [DPW10, LL12]; it uses only shuf-
fling and refreshing operations, i.e., we avoid cryptographic computations such as group
operations and NIZKs. We call such an update mechanism a “light update.” Informally,
we prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1.3 (Informal). One-way functions imply continuous non-malleable codes with
deterministic light updates and without self-destruct, in the standard model, with alphabet
length O(log k), information rate 1− 1/Ω(log k) and access rate 1− 1/Ω(log k), where k is
the security parameter.
As we stated earlier in this chapter, non-malleable codes against partial functions imply
AONTs [Riv97]. The first AONT was presented by Boyko [Boy99] in the random oracle
model, and then Canetti et al. [CDH+00] consider AONTs with public/private parts
as well as a secret-only part, which is the full notion. Canetti et al. [CDH+00] provide
efficient constructions for both settings, yet the fully secure AONT (called “secret-only”
in that paper) is based on non-standard assumptions.10
Assuming one-way functions, our results yield efficient, fully secure AONTs, in the
standard model. This resolves, the open question left in [CDH+00], where the problem of
constructing AONTs under standard assumptions was posed. Our result is presented in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.4 (Informal). Assuming one-way functions, there exists an explicit secret-
only AONT in the standard model, with information rate 1 and access rate 1−1/Ω(log k),
where k is the security parameter.
The above theorem is derived by the Informal Theorem 4.1.4, yielding an AONT whose
output consists of both the CRS and the codeword produced by the NMC scheme in the
CRS model. A similar theorem can be derived with respect to the Informal Theorem
3.1.2. Finally, and in connection to AONTs that provide leakage resilience, our results
imply leakage-resilient codes [LL12] for partial functions.
10In [Sti01] the authors present a deterministic AONT construction that provides weaker security.
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Later in this chapter, we provide concrete instantiations of the proposed constructions,
using textbook instantiations ([KL14]) for the underlying authenticated encryption scheme.
For completeness, we also provide information theoretic variants of our constructions that
maintain high access rate and thus necessarily sacrifice information rate.
3.1.2 Applications of MD-NMC for partial functions
In the present section we present applications of MD-NMC for the class of partial func-
tions.
Security against passive attackers - AONTs. Regarding the passive setting, our
model and constructions find useful application in all settings where AONTs are useful
(cf. [Riv97, Boy99, CDH+00, RP11]), e.g., for increasing the security of encryption without
increasing the key-size, for improving the efficiency of block ciphers and constructing re-
motely keyed encryption [Riv97, Boy99], and also for constructing computationally secure
secret sharing [RP11]. Other uses of AONTs are related to optimal asymmetric encryption
padding [Boy99].
Security against memory tampering - (binary alphabets, logarithmic length
CRS). As with every NMC, the most notable application of the proposed model and con-
structions is when aiming for protecting cryptographic devices against memory tampering.
Using our CRS based construction we can protect a large tamperable memory with a small
(logarithmic in the message length) tamperproof memory, that holds the CRS.
The construction is as follows. Consider any device performing cryptographic opera-
tions, e.g., a smart card, whose memory is initialized when the card is being issued. Each
card is initialized with an independent CRS, which is stored in a tamper-proof memory,
while the codeword is stored in a tamperable memory. Due to the independency of the CRS
values, it is plausible to assume that the adversary is not given access to the CRS prior to
tampering with the card; the full CRS is given to the tampering function while it tampers
with the codeword during computation. This idea is along the lines of the only computa-
tion leaks information model [MR04], where data can only be leaked during computation,
i.e., the attacker learns the CRS when the devices performs computations that depend
on it. We note that in this work we allow the tampering function to read the full CRS,
in contrast to [FMVW14], in which the tampering function receives partial information
over it (our CRS can also be tampered, cf. the end of the current section). In subse-
quent rounds, the CRS and the codeword are being updated by the device, which is the
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standard way to achieve security in multiple rounds while using a one-time NMC [DPW10].
Security against memory tampering - (logarithmic length alphabets, no CRS).
In modern architectures data is stored and transmitted in chunks, thus our block-wise en-
coding scheme can provide tamper-resilience in all these settings. For instance, consider the
case of arithmetic circuits, having memory consisting of consecutive blocks storing integers.
Considering adversaries that access the memory of such circuits in a block-wise manner,
is a plausible scenario. In terms of modeling, this is similar to tamper-resilience for arith-
metic circuits [GIP+14], in which the attacker, instead of accessing individual circuit wires
carrying bits, it accesses wires carrying integers. The case is similar for RAM computation
where the CPU operates over 32 or 64 bit registers (securing RAM programs using NMC
was also considered by [FMNV15, DLSZ15, DKS17b, DKS18]). We note that, the memory
segments in which the codeword blocks are stored do not have to be physically separated,
as partial functions output values that depend on the whole input in which they receive
access to. This is in contrast to the split-state setting in which the tampering function
tampers with each state independently, and thus the states need to be physically separated.
Security against adversarial channels. In Wiretap Channels [BTV12, Wyn75, OW]
the goal is to communicate data privately against eavesdroppers, under the assumption that
the channel between the sender and the adversary is “noisier” than the channel between
the sender and the receiver. The model that we propose and our block-wise construction
can be applied in this setting to provide privacy against a wiretap adversary under the
assumption that due to the gap of noise there is a small (of rate o(1)) fraction of symbols
that are delivered intact to the receiver and dropped from the transmission to the adversary.
This enables private, key-less communication between the parties, guaranteeing that the
receiver will either receive the original message, or ⊥. In this way, the communication will
be non-malleable in the sense that the receiver cannot be lead to output ⊥ depending on
any property of the plaintext. Our model allows the noise in the receiver side to depend
on the transmission to the wiretap adversary, that tampers with a large (of rate 1− o(1))
fraction of symbols, leading to an “active” variant of the wiretap model.
3.1.3 Related work
Manipulation detection has been considered independently of the notion of non-malleability,
in the seminal paper by Cramer et. al. [CDF+08], who introduced the notion of algebraic
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manipulation detection (AMD) codes, providing security against additive attacks over the
codeword. A similar notion was considered by Jafargholi and Wichs [JW15], called tamper
detection, aiming to detect malicious modifications over the codeword, independently of
how those affect the output of the decoder. Tamper detection ensures that the application
of any (admissible) function to the codeword leads to an invalid decoding.
Non-malleable codes for other function classes have been extensively studied, such as
constant split-state functions [CZ14, DNO17]. The first explicit non-malleable code in the
split-state model, for the information-theoretic setting was proposed by [DKO13], yet their
scheme can only encode single-bit messages. Subsequent constructions for multi-bit mes-
sages are discussed in subsequent chapters. Non-malleable codes for other function classes
have been extensively studied, e.g., bit-wise independent tampering [DPW10], bounded-
size function classes [FMVW14], the k-split setting [CZ14], block-wise tampering [CKM11,
CGM+15], and bounded depth and fan-in circuits [BDKM16]. The work of [ADKO15] de-
velops beautiful connections among different function classes. In [BDKM18] the authors
consider AC0 circuits, bounded-depth decision trees and streaming, space-bounded adver-
saries.
Other aspects of non-malleable codes have also been studied, such as rate-function class
tradeoff, in the information-theoretic setting [CG14]. Other variants of non-malleable
codes have been proposed, such as continuous non-malleable codes [FMNV14, JW15],
augmented non-malleable codes [AAG+16], locally decodable/updatable non-malleable
codes [DLSZ15, DKS17b, FMNV15, CKR16, DKS18], which were used to secure the imple-
mentation of RAM computation, and non-malleable codes with split-state refresh [FN17].
Leakage resilience was also considered as an additional feature, e.g., [LL12, DLSZ15,
CKR16, FN17].
A related line of work in tamper resilience aims to protect circuit computation against
tampering attacks on circuit wires [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14] or gates [KT13]. In this
setting, using non-malleable codes for protecting the circuit’s private memory is an option,
still in order to achieve security the encoding and decoding procedures should be protected
against fault injection attacks using the techniques from [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14,
KT13].
3.2 Preliminaries on MD-NMC
In the present chapter, we exploit the fact that the class of partial functions does not include
constant functions and we achieve a notion that is stronger than non-malleability, which
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we call non-malleability with manipulation detection. Below, we formalize this notion as a
strengthening of non-malleability and we show that the proposed constructions achieve this
stronger notion. Informally, manipulation detection ensures that any tampered codeword
will either decode to the original message, or to ⊥, with overwhelming probability.
The definition provided below is with respect to alphabets, as in Section 3.4 we consider
alphabets of size O(log k).
Definition 3.2.1 (Non-Malleability with Manipulation Detection (MD-NMC)). Let Γ be
an alphabet, let (Init,Enc,Dec) be a (κ, ν)-encoding scheme in the common reference string




Σ← Init(1k), c← Enc(Σ, s), c̃← fΣ(c), s̃← Dec(Σ, c̃)
Output : s̃.
}
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc, Dec and Init. The encoding scheme
(Init,Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with manipulation detection with respect to the function
family F , if for all, sufficiently large k and for all f ∈ F , there exists a distribution D(Σ,f)








Output s if s̃ = same∗, and ⊥ otherwise
}
k∈N
where Σ ← Init(1k) and D(Σ,f) is efficiently samplable given access to f , Σ. Here, “≈”
may refer to statistical, or computational, indistinguishability.
In the above definition, f is parameterized by Σ to differentiate tamper-proof input,
i.e., Σ, from tamperable input, i.e., c. The following lemma is useful for proving MD-NMC
security throughout the chapter.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let (Enc,Dec) be a (κ, ν)-coding scheme and F be a family of functions.
For every f ∈ F and s ∈ {0, 1}κ, define the tampering experiment
Tamperfs :=
{
c← Enc(s), c̃← f(c), s̃← Dec(c̃)
Output same∗ if s̃ = s, and s̃ otherwise.
}
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc and Dec. (Enc,Dec) is an MD-
NMC with respect to F , if for any f ∈ F and all sufficiently large k: (i) for any pair of
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and (ii) for any s,
Pr
[
Tamperfs /∈ {⊥, s}
]
≤ negl(k).
Here, “≈” may refer to statistical, or computational, indistinguishability.
Proof. By Definition 3.2.1 we have that (Enc,Dec) is an MD-NMC against F , if for any
f ∈ F , there exists an efficiently samplable distribution Df over {0, 1}k ∪{⊥, same∗}, such
that for any message s{






Output s if s̃ = same∗, and ⊥ otherwise
}
(3.1)
Let 0 be the zero message in {0, 1}κ. For any f ∈ F , we define Df as follows:
• Sample c← Enc(0) and compute c̃← f(c), s̃← Dec(c̃).
• Output: if s̃ = 0, set s̃← same∗, else, s̃← ⊥. Output s̃.
From the above we have that for any s,
s̃← Df




c← Enc(0), c̃← f(c), s̃← Dec(c̃)
if s̃ = 0, s̃← same∗, else, s̃← ⊥. Output s̃
}





c← Enc(s), c̃← f(c), s̃← Dec(c̃)
if s̃ = s, s̃← same∗, else, s̃← ⊥. Output s̃
}








where the first relation follows by the definition of Df , the second one follows from the





and the third one follows from the assumption that Pr
[
Tamperfs /∈ {⊥, s}
]
≤ negl(k). This
concludes our proof since for any f ∈ F and any message s, Relation 3.1 is satisfied.
For encoding schemes in the CRS model the above lemma is similar, and Tamperfs
internally samples Σ← Init(1k).
3.3 An MD-NMC for partial functions, in the CRS model
In this section we consider Γ = {0, 1} and we construct a rate 1 MD-NMC for Fα, with
access rate α = 1− 1/Ω(log k).
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Before presenting the encoding scheme for Fα, we provide the intuition behind the con-
struction. As a staring point, we consider a naive scheme (which does not work), and then
show how we resolve all the challenges. Let (KGen,E,D) be a (symmetric) authenticated
encryption scheme and consider the following encoding scheme: to encode a message s, the
encoder computes (sk||e), where e ← Esk(s) is the ciphertext and sk ← KGen(1k), is the
secret key. We observe that the scheme is secure if the tampering function can only read-
/write on the ciphertext, e, assuming the authenticity property of the encryption scheme,
however, restricting access to sk, which is short, is unnatural and makes the problem triv-
ial. On the other hand, even partial access to sk, compromises the authenticity property
of the scheme, and even if there is no explicit attack against the non-malleability property
of the code, there is no hope for proving security based on the properties of (KGen,E,D),
in a black-box way.
A solution to the above problems would be to protect the secret key using an inner
encoding, yet the amount of tampering is now restricted by the capabilities of the inner
scheme, as the attacker knows the exact locations of the “sensitive” codeword bits, i.e.,
the non-ciphertext bits. In the proposed construction, we manage to protect the secret key
while avoiding the bottleneck on the access rate, by designing an inner encoding scheme
that provides limited security guarantees when used standalone, still when it is used in
conjunction with a shuffling technique that permutes the inner encoding and ciphertext
bit locations, it guarantees that any attack against the secret key will create an invalid
encoding with overwhelming probability, even when allowing access to almost the entire
codeword.
The proposed scheme is depicted in Figure 3.1 and works as follows: on input message
s, the encoder (i) encrypts the message by computing sk ← KGen(1k) and e ← Esk(s),
(ii) computes an m-out-of-m secret sharing, z, of (sk||sk3) (interpreting both sk and sk3
as elements in some finite field),11 and outputs a random shuffling of (z||e), denoted as
PΣ(z||e), according to the common reference string, Σ. Decoding proceeds as follows: on
input c, the decoder (i) inverts the shuffling operation by computing (z||e)← P−1Σ (c), (ii)
reconstructs (sk||sk′), and (iii) if sk3 = sk′, it outputs Dsk(e), otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
The proposed instantiation yields a rate 1 computationally secure MD-NMC in the CRS
model, with access rate 1 − 1/Ω(log k) and codewords of length |s| + O(k2 log k), under
mild assumptions, e.g., one way functions.
11In general, any polynomial of small degree, e.g., skc, would suffice, depending on the choice of the
underlying finite field. Using sk3 suffices when working over fields of characteristic 2. We could also use
sk2 over fields of characteristic 3.










Locations defined by the CRS
Figure 3.1: Description of the MD-NMC scheme in the CRS model.
Below, we formally define our construction.
Construction 3.3.1. Let k, m ∈ N, let (KGen,E,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme,
(SSm,Recm) be an m-out-of-m secret sharing scheme, and let l← 2m|sk|, where sk follows
KGen(1k). We define an encoding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec), that outputs ν = l + |e| bits,
e← Esk(s), as follows:
• Init(1k): Sample r1, . . . , rl
rs← {0, 1}log(ν), and output Σ := (r1, . . . , rl).
• Enc(Σ, ·): for input message s, sample sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s).
– (Secret share) Sample z ← SSm(sk||sk3), where z =
f2|sk|
i=1 zi, z ∈ {0, 1}2m|sk|,
and for i ∈ [|sk|], zi (resp. z|sk|+i) is an m-out-of-m secret sharing of sk[i]
(resp. sk3[i]).
– (Shuffle) Compute c← PΣ(z||e) as follows:
1. (Sensitive bits): Set c← 0ν . For i ∈ [l], c[ri]← z[i].
2. (Ciphertext bits): Set i ← 1. For j ∈ [l + |e|], if j /∈ {rp | p ∈ [l]}:
c[j]← e[i], i++.
Output c.
• Dec(Σ, ·): on input c, compute (z||e) ← P−1Σ (c), (sk||sk′) ← Recm(z), and if sk3 =
sk′, output Dsk(e), otherwise output ⊥.
The set of indices of zi in the codeword will be denoted by Zi.
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In the above, we consider sk, sk3, as elements over GF(2poly(k)).
In a high level, the construction presented above, combines authenticated encryption
with an inner encoding that works as follows. It interprets sk as an element in the finite
field GF(2|sk|) and computes sk3 as a field element. Then, for each bit of (sk||sk3), it
computes an m-out-of-m secret sharing of the bit, for some parameter m (we note that
elements in GF(2|sk|) can be interpreted as bit strings). Then, by combining the inner
encoding with the shuffling technique, we get an encoding scheme whose security follows
from the observations that we briefly present below:
• For any tampering function which does not have access to all m shares of a single
bit of (sk||sk3), the tampering effect on the secret key can be expressed essentially
as a linear shift, i.e., as ((sk+ δ)||(sk3 + η)) for some (δ, η) ∈ GF(2|sk|)×GF(2|sk|),
independent of sk.
• By permuting the locations of the inner encoding and the ciphertext bits, we have
that with overwhelming probability any tampering function who reads/writes on a
(1− o(1)) fraction of codeword bits, will not learn any single bit of (sk||sk3).
• With overwhelming probability over the randomness of sk and the CRS, for non-zero
η and δ, (sk + δ)3 6= sk3 + η, and this property enables us to design a consistency
check mechanism whose output is simulatable, without accessing sk.
• The security of the final encoding scheme follows by composing the security of the
inner encoding scheme with the authenticity property of the encryption scheme.
Below we present the formal security proof of the above ideas.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let k, m ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1). Assuming (SSm,Recm) is an m-out-of-
m secret sharing scheme and (KGen,E,D) is 1-IND-CPA secure (cf. Definition 2.1.6),12
authenticated encryption scheme, the code of Construction 3.3.1 is a MD-NMC against
Fα (cf. Definition 2.2.1), for any α, m, such that (1− α)m = ω(log(k)).
Proof. Let I be the set of indices chosen by the attacker and Ic = [ν]\I, where ν =
2m|sk|+ |e|. The tampered components of the codeword will be denoted using the symbol
“˜” on top of the original symbol, i.e., we have c̃ ← f(c), the tampered secret key sk
(resp. sk3) that we get after executing Recm(z̃) will be denoted by s̃k (resp. s̃k
′
). Also the
12This is an abbreviations for indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack, for a single pre-challenge
query to the encryption oracle.
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tampered ciphertext will be ẽ. We prove the needed using a series of hybrid experiments
that are depicted in Figure 5.1. Below, we describe the hybrids.
Expf,s0 :
Σ← Init(1k)
c← Enc(Σ, s), c̃← 0ν
c̃[I]← fΣ(c|I ), c̃[I
c]← c|Ic
s̃← Dec(c̃)
Output same∗ if s̃ = s and s̃ otherwise.
Expf,s1 :
Σ← Init(1k)
c← Enc(Σ, s), c̃← 0ν
c̃[I]← fΣ(c|I ), c̃[I
c]← c|Ic




Output same∗ if s̃ = s and s̃ otherwise.
Expf,s2 :
Σ← Init(1k)
sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s)
z∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, sk), c← PΣ(z∗||e)
c̃← 0ν , c̃[I]← fΣ(c|I ), c̃[I
c]← c|Ic











Output same∗ if s̃ = s and s̃ otherwise.
Expf,s3 :
Σ← Init(1k)
sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s)
z∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, sk), c← PΣ(z∗||e)
c̃← 0ν , c̃[I]← fΣ(c|I )










If ẽ = e:
s̃← same∗
Output s̃.
Figure 3.2: The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 3.3.2. The gray part signifies
the portion of the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one.
• Expf,s0 : We prove security of our code using Lemma 3.2.2, i.e., by showing that (i) for




s1 , and (ii) for any s, Pr
[
Tamperfs /∈ {⊥, s}] ≤ negl(k),
where Tamperfs is defined in Lemma 3.2.2. For any f , s, the first experiment, Exp
f,s
0 ,
matches the experiment Tamperfs in the CRS model, where Σ is sampled by Tamper
f
s .
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• Expf,s1 : In the second experiment we define Zi, i ∈ [2|sk|], to be the set of codeword
indices in which the secret sharing zi is stored, |Zi| = m. The main difference from
the previous experiment is that the current one outputs ⊥, if there exists a bit of
sk or sk3 for which the tampering function reads all the shares of it, while accessing
at most αν bits of the codeword. Intuitively, and as we prove in Claim 3.3.3, by
permuting the location indices of z||e, this event happens with probability negligible
in k, and the attacker does not learn any bit of sk and sk3, even if it is given access
to (1− o(1))ν bits of the codeword.
• Expf,s2 : By the previous hybrid we have that for all i ∈ [2|sk|], the tampering function
will not access all bits of zi, with overwhelming probability. In the third experiment
we unfold the encoding procedure, and in addition, we substitute the secret sharing
procedure SSm with S̄S
f
m that computes shares z
∗
i that reveal no information about
sk||sk3; for each i, S̄Sfm simply “drops” the bit of zi with the largest index that is














and set z∗i ← zi, i ∈ [2|sk|].
2. For i ∈ [2|sk|], let li := maxd {d ∈ [m] ∧ Ind (zi[d]) /∈ I)}, where Ind returns the
index of zi[d] in c, i.e., li is the largest index in [m] such that zi[li] is not accessed
by f .





In Expf,s1 , z =
f2|sk|
i=1 zi, and each zi is an m-out-of-m secret sharing for a bit of sk or
sk3. From Claim 3.3.3, we have that for all i, |I ∩Zi| < m with overwhelming prob-
ability, and we can observe that the current experiment is identical to the previous
one up to the point of computing f(c|I ), as c|I and f(c|I ) depend only on z
∗, that
carries no information about sk and sk3.
Another difference between the two experiments is in the external “Else” branch:
Expf,s1 makes a call to the decoder while Exp
f,s
2 , before calling Dsk(ẽ), checks if the
tampering function has modified the shares in a way such that the reconstruction
procedure ((s̃k, s̃k
′
) ← Recm(z̃)) will give s̃k 6= sk or s̃k
′ 6= sk′. This check is done




j∈(I∩Zi) c̃[j]”, without touching sk or
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sk3.13 In case modification is detected the current experiments outputs ⊥. The
intuition is that an attacker that partially modifies the shares of sk and sk3, creates
shares of s̃k and s̃k
′




, with negligible probability in k. We prove
this by a reduction to the 1-IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme: any valid
modification over the inner encoding of the secret key gives us method to compute
the original original secret key sk, with non-negligible probability. The ideas are
presented formally in Claim 3.3.4.
• Expf,s3 : The difference between the current experiment and the previous one is that
instead of executing the decryption, Dsk(ẽ), we first check if the attacker has modified
the ciphertext, in which case the current experiment outputs ⊥, otherwise it outputs
same∗. By the previous hybrid, we reach this newly introduced “Else” branch of
Expf,s3 , only if the tampering function didn’t modify the secret key. Thus, the indis-
tinguishability between the two experiments follows from the authenticity property
of the encryption scheme in the presence of z∗: given that s̃k = sk and s̃k
′
= sk′, we
have that if the attacker modifies the ciphertext, then with overwhelming probability
Dsk(ẽ) = ⊥, otherwise, Dsk(ẽ) = s, and the current experiment correctly outputs ⊥
or same∗ (cf. Claim 3.3.5).
• Finally, we prove that for any f ∈ Fα, and message s, Expf,s3 is indistinguishable from
Expf,03 , where 0 denotes the zero-message. This follows by the semantic security of the
encryption scheme, and gives us the indistinguishability property required by Lemma
3.2.2. The manipulation detection property is derived by the indistinguishability
between the hybrids and the fact that the output of Expf,s3 is in the set {same∗,⊥}.
In what follows, we prove indistinguishability between the hybrids using a series of claims.
Claim 3.3.3. For k, m ∈ N, assume (1 − α)m = ω(log(k)). Then, for any f ∈ Fα and
any message s, we have Expf,s0 ≈ Exp
f,s
1 , where the probability runs over the randomness
used by Init, Enc.
Proof. The difference between the two experiments is that Expf,s1 outputs ⊥ when the
attacker learns all shares of some bit of sk or sk3, otherwise it produces output as Expf,s0
does. Let E be the event “∃i : |(I ∩ Zi)| = m”. Clearly, Expf,s0 = Exp
f,s
1 conditioned on
¬E, thus the statistical distance between the two experiments is bounded by Pr[E]. In
the following we show that Pr[E] ≤ negl(k). We define by Ei the event in which f learns
13Recall that our operations are over GF(2poly(k)).
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We have n = αν and assuming α = 1− ε for ε ∈ (0, 1], we have










which is negligible when (1−α)m = ω(log(k)), and the proof of the claim is complete.
Claim 3.3.4. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is 1-IND-CPA secure, for any f ∈ Fα and any
message s, Expf,s1 ≈ Exp
f,s
2 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by Init,
Enc.
Proof. In Expf,s2 we unfold the encoding procedure, however instead of calling SSm, we
make a call to S̄S
f
m. As we have already stated above, this modification does not induce
any difference between the output of Expf,s2 and Exp
f,s
1 , with overwhelming probability,
as z∗ is indistinguishable from z in the eyes of f . Another difference between the two
experiments is in the external “Else” branch: Expf,s1 makes a call on the decoder while
Expf,s2 , before calling Dsk(ẽ), checks if the tampering function has modified the shares in
a way such that the reconstruction procedure will give s̃k 6= sk or s̃k′ 6= sk′. This check




j∈(I∩Zi) c̃[j]”, without touching sk or
sk3 (cf. Claim 3.3.3).14 We define the events E, E′ as follows





Clearly, conditioned on ¬E′ the two experiments are identical, since we have s̃k = sk and
s̃k
′
= sk′, and the decoding process will output Dsk(ẽ) in both experiments. Thus, the
statistical distance is bounded by Pr[E′]. Now, conditioned on E′ ∧¬E, both experiments
output ⊥. Thus, we need to bound Pr[E∧E′]. Assuming Pr[E∧E′] > p, for p = 1/poly(k),
we define an attacker A that simulates Expf,s2 , and uses f , s to break the 1-IND-CPA
security of (KGen,E,D) in the presence of z∗, with probability at least 1/2 + p′′/2, for
p′′ = 1/poly(k).
14Recall that our operations are over GF(2poly(k)).
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First we prove that any 1-IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, remains secure even
if the attacker receives z∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, sk), as z∗ consists of m − 1 shares of each bit of sk
and sk3, i.e., for the entropy of sk we have H(sk|z∗) = H(sk). Towards contradiction,
assume there exists A that breaks the 1-IND-CPA security of (KGen,E,D) in the presence
of z∗, i.e., there exist s, s0, s1 such that A distinguishes between (z∗,Esk(s),Esk(s0)) and
(z∗,Esk(s),Esk(s1)), with non-negligible probability p. We define an attackerA′ that breaks
the 1-IND-CPA security of (KGen,E,D) as follows: A′, given (Esk(s),Esk(sb)), for some b ∈
{0, 1}, samples ŝk ← KGen(1k), ẑ∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, ŝk) and outputs b′ ← A(z∗,Esk(s),Esk(sb)).
Since (z∗,Esk(s),Esk(sb)) ≈ (ẑ∗,Esk(s), Esk(sb)) the advantage of A′ in breaking the 1-
IND-CPA security of the scheme, is equal to the advantage of A in breaking the 1-IND-
CPA security of the scheme in the presence of z∗, which by assumption is non-negligible,
and this completes the current proof. We note that, the proof idea presented in the current
paragraph also applies for proving that other properties that will be used in the rest of the
proof, such as semantic security and authenticity, of the encryption scheme, are retained
in the presence of z∗.
Now we prove our claim. Assuming Pr[E ∧ E′] > p, for p = 1/poly(k), we define an
attacker A that breaks the 1-IND-CPA security of (KGen,E,D) in the presence of z∗, with
non-negligible probability. A receives the encryption of s, which corresponds to the oracle
query right before receiving the challenge ciphertext, the challenge ciphertext e← Esk(sb),
for uniform b ∈ {0, 1} and uniform messages s0, s1, as well as z∗. A is defined below.
A
(
z∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, sk), e′ ← Esk(s), e← Esk(sb)
)
:
1. (Define the shares that will be accessed by f): For i ∈ [2|sk|], define wi :=
(z∗i )|[m]\{li}
and for i ∈ [m− 1] define Ci =
f|sk|
j=1wj [i], Di =
f2|sk|
j=|sk|+1wj [i].
2. (Apply f) Set c ← PΣ(z∗||e), compute c̃[I] ← fΣ(c|I ) and let C̃i, D̃i, i ∈ [m], be
the tampered shares resulting after the application of f to c|I .
3. (Guessing the secret key) Let U =
∑m−1
i=1 Ci, V =
∑m−1
i=1 Di, i.e., U , V denote
the sum of the shares that are being accessed by the attacker (maybe partially), and
Ũ =
∑m−1
i=1 C̃i, Ṽ =
∑m−1
i=1 D̃i, are the corresponding tampered values after applying
f on U , V . Define
p(X) := (U − Ũ)X2 + (U2 − Ũ2)X + (U3 − Ũ3 − V + Ṽ ),
and compute the set of roots of p(X), denoted as X , which are at most two. Then
set
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ŜK := {x+ U |x ∈ X} . (3.2)
4. (Output) Execute the following steps,
a) For ŝk ∈ ŜK, compute s′ ← Dŝk(e
′), and if s′ = s, compute s′′ ← Dŝk(e).
Return b′ such that sb′ = s
′′.
b) Otherwise, return b′ ← {0, 1}.
In the first step A removes the dummy symbol “∗” and computes the shares that will
be partially accessed by f , denoted as Ci for sk and as Di for sk
3. In the second step,
it simulates the codeword partially, applies the tampering function on it, and defines the
tampered shares, C̃i, D̃i. Conditioned on E
′, it is not hard to see that A simulates perfectly
Expf,s2 . In particular, it simulates perfectly the input to f as it receives e ← Esk(s) and
all but 2|sk| of the actual bit-shares of sk, sk3. Part of those shares will be accessed by
f . Since for all i, |I ∩ Zi| < m, the attacker is not accessing any single bit of sk, sk3.
Let Cm, Dm, be the shares (not provided by the encryption oracle) that completely define
sk and sk3, respectively. By the definition of the encoding scheme and the fact that sk,







3 = V +Dm. (3.3)
In order for the decoder to output a non-bottom value, the shares created by the attacker
must decode to s̃k, s̃k
′




, or in other words, if(
Ũ + Cm
)3
= Ṽ +Dm. (3.4)
From 3.3 and 3.4 we receive
(U − Ũ)C2m + (U2 − Ũ2)Cm + (U3 − Ũ3) = V − Ṽ . (3.5)















′ ∧ E′ ∧ (U 6= Ũ)
]
(3.5,3.2)
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and A manages to recover Cm, and thus sk, with non-negligible probability p′ ≥ p. Let W
be the event of breaking 1-IND-CPA security. Then,
Pr[W ] = Pr[W |sk ∈ ŜK] · Pr[sk ∈ ŜK]











and the attacker breaks the IND-CPA security of (KGen,E,D). Thus, we have Pr[E∧E′] ≤
negl(k), and both experiments output ⊥ with overwhelming probability.
Claim 3.3.5. Assuming the authenticity property of (KGen,E,D), for any f ∈ Fα and any
message s, Expf,s2 ≈ Exp
f,s
3 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by Init,
KGen and E.
Proof. Before proving the claim, recall that the authenticity property of the encryption
scheme is preserved under the presence of z∗ (cf. Claim 3.3.4). Let E be the event
s̃k = sk ∧ s̃k′ = sk3 and E′ be the event ẽ 6= e. Conditioned on ¬E, the two experiments
are identical, as they both output ⊥. Also, conditioned on E ∧ ¬E′, both experiments
output same∗. Thus, the statistical distance between the two experiments is bounded by
Pr[E∧E′]. Let B be the event Dsk(ẽ) 6= ⊥. Conditioned on E∧E′∧¬B both experiments
output ⊥. Thus, we need to bound Pr[E ∧ E′ ∧B].
Assuming there exist s, f , for which Pr[E∧E′∧B] > p, where p = 1/poly(k), we define
an attacker A = (A1,A2) that simulates Expf,s3 and breaks the authenticity property of
the encryption scheme in the presence of z∗, with non-negligible probability. A is defined
as follows: sample (s, st) ← A1(1k), and then, on input (z∗, e, st), where e ← Esk(s), A2,
samples Σ ← Init(1k), sets c̃ ← 0ν , c ← PΣ(z∗||e), computes c̃[I] ← f(c|I ), c̃[I
c] ← c|Ic ,
(z̃∗||ẽ)← P−1Σ (c̃), and outputs ẽ. Assuming Pr[E ∧ E′ ∧B] > p, we have that Dsk(ẽ) 6= ⊥
and ẽ 6= e, with non-negligible probability and the authenticity property of (KGen,E,D)
breaks.
Claim 3.3.6. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is semantically secure, for any f ∈ Fα and any
message s, Expf,s3 ≈ Exp
f,0
3 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by Init,
KGen, E. “≈” may refer to statistical or computational indistinguishability, and 0 denotes
the zero-message.
Proof. Recall that (KGen,E,D) is semantically secure even in the presence of z∗ ← S̄Sfm(Σ, sk)
(cf. 3.3.4), and towards contradiction, assume there exist f ∈ Fα, message s, and PPT
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distinguisher D such that∣∣∣Pr [D(Σ,Expf,s3 ) = 1]− Pr [D(Σ,Expf,03 )] = 1∣∣∣ > p,
for p = 1/poly(k). We are going to define an attacker A that breaks the semantic security
of (KGen,E,D) in the presence of z∗, using s0 := s, s1 := 0. A, given z∗, e, executes
Program.
Program(z∗, e) :
c← PΣ(z∗||e), c̃← 0ν , c̃[I]← f(c|I )









If ẽ = e:
s̃← same∗
Output s̃.
It is not hard to see that A simulates Expf,sb3 , thus the advantage of A against the semantic
security of (KGen,E,D) is the same with the advantage of D in distinguishing between
Expf,s03 , Exp
f,s1
3 , which by assumption is non-negligible. We have reached a contradiction
and the proof of the claim is complete.
From the above claims we have that for any f ∈ Fα and any s, Expf,s0 ≈ Exp
f,0
3 , thus
for any f ∈ Fα and any s0, s1, Expf,s00 ≈ Exp
f,s1
0 . Also, by the indistinguishability between
Expf,s0 and Exp
f,0
3 , the second property of Lemma 3.2.2 has been proven as the output of
Expf,03 is in {s,⊥}, with overwhelming probability, and non-malleability with manipulation




On the CRS. In the above, the tampering function, and consequently the codeword
locations that the function is given access to, are fixed before sampling the CRS and this
is critical for achieving security. However, by the proof of Theorem 3.3.2, we observe that
proving security in this setting is highly non-trivial. In addition, the tampering function
receives full access to the CRS when tampering with the codeword, which is in contrast
to the work by Faust et. al. [FMVW14] in the information-theoretic setting, where the
(internal) tampering function receives partial information over the CRS.
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In addition, the proposed scheme tolerates adaptive selection of the codeword locations,
with respect to the CRS, in the following way: each time the attacker requests access to
a location, he also learns if it corresponds to a bit of z or e, together with the index of
that bit in the original string. In this way, the CRS is gradually disclosed to the adversary
while picking codeword locations.
Finally, our CRS sustains a substantial amount of tampering that depends on the code-
word locations chosen by the attacker: an attacker that gets access to a sensitive codeword
bit is allowed to modify the part of the CRS that defines the location of that bit in the
codeword. The attacker is allowed to modify all but O(k log(|s|+k)) bits of the CRS, that
is of length O(k2 log k log(|s| + k)). To our knowledge, this is the first construction that
tolerates, even partial modification of the CRS. In contrast, existing constructions in the
CRS model are either using NIZKs [LL12, FN17, FMNV14, DKS18], or they are based on
the knowledge of exponent assumption [KLT16], thus tampering access to the CRS would
compromise security.
3.4 Removing the CRS
In the present section we show how to construct an MD-NMC for partial functions, in the
standard model.
A first approach would be to store the CRS of Construction 3.3.1, inside the codeword
together with PΣ(z||e), and give to the attacker read/write access to it. However, the
tampering function, besides getting direct (partial) access to the encoding of sk, it also
gets indirect access to it by (partially) controlling the CRS. Then, it can modify the CRS
in a way such that, during decoding, ciphertext locations of its choice will be treated as
bits of the inner encoding, z, increasing the tampering rate against z significantly. This
makes the task of protecting sk hard, if not impossible (unless we restrict the access rate
significantly).
To handle this challenge, we embed a structure recovering mechanism inside the code-
word and we emulate the CRS effect by increasing the size of the alphabet, giving rise to
a block-wise structure.15 Notice that, non-malleable codes with large alphabet size (i.e.,
poly(k) + |s| bits) might be easy to construct, as we can embed in each codeword block
the verification key of a signature scheme together with a secret share of the message, as
15Bigger alphabets have been also considered in the context of error-correcting codes, in which the
codeword consists of symbols.
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well as a signature over the share. In this way, partial access over the codeword does not
compromise the security of the signature scheme while the message remains private, and
the simulation is straightforward. This approach however, comes with a large overhead,
decreasing the information rate and access rate of the scheme significantly. In general,
and similar to error correcting codes, we prefer smaller alphabet sizes – the larger the size
is, the more coarse access structure is required, i.e., in order to access individual bits we
need to access the blocks that contain them. The present thesis aims at minimizing this
restriction by using small alphabets, as described below.
Our approach on the problem is the following. We increase the alphabet size to O(log k)
bits, and we consider two types of blocks: (i) sensitive blocks, in which we store the inner
encoding, z, of the secret key, sk, and (ii) non-sensitive blocks, in which we store the
ciphertext, e, that is fragmented into blocks of size O(log k). The first bit of each block
indicates whether it is a sensitive block, i.e., we set it to 1 for sensitive blocks and to 0,
otherwise. Our encoder works as follows: on input message s, it computes z, e, as in the
previous scheme and then uses rejection sampling to sample the indices, ρ1, . . . , ρ|z|, for
the sensitive blocks. Then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , |z|}, Cρi is a sensitive block, with contents
(1||i||z[i]), while the remaining blocks keep ciphertext pieces of size O(log k). Decoding
proceeds as follows: on input codeword C = (C1, . . . , Cbn), for each i ∈ [bn], if Ci is a
non-sensitive block, its data will be part of e, otherwise, the last bit of Ci will be part of
z, as it is dictated by the index stored in Ci. If the number of sensitive blocks is not the
expected, the decoder outputs ⊥, otherwise, z, e, have been fully recovered and decoding
proceeds as in the previous scheme. The proposed scheme is depicted in Figure 3.3.
The security of our construction is based on the fact that, due to our shuffling technique,
the position mapping will not be completely overwritten by the attacker, and we prove later
in this section, this suffices for protecting the inner encoding over sk. We prove security
of the current scheme (cf. Theorem 3.4.8) by a reduction to the security of the scheme in
the CRS model. Our instantiation yields a rate 1− 1/Ω(log k) MD-NMC in the standard
model, with access rate 1 − 1/Ω(log k) and codewords of length |s|(1 + 1/O(log k)) +
O(k2 log2 k), assuming one-way functions.
It is worth pointing out that the idea of permuting blocks containing sensitive and
non-sensitive data was also considered by [SS16] in the context of list-decodable codes,
however the similarity is only in the fact that a permutation is being used at some point
in the encoding process, and our objective, construction and proof are different.













Figure 3.3: Description of the scheme in the standard model.
In what follows, we consider alphabets of size O(log(k)) and we provide a computa-
tionally secure, rate 1 − 1/Ω(log k) encoding scheme in the standard model, tolerating
modification of (1− o(1))ν blocks, where ν is the total number of blocks in the codeword.
The projection operation will be also used with respect to bigger alphabets, enabling the
projection of blocks.
Our construction is defined below.
Construction 3.4.1. Let k, m ∈ N, let (KGen,E,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme
and (SSm,Recm) be an m-out-of-m secret sharing scheme. We define an encoding scheme
(Enc∗,Dec∗), as follows:





– (Secret share) Sample z ← SSm(sk||sk3), where z =
f2|sk|
i=1 zi, z ∈ {0, 1}2m|sk|,
and for i ∈ [|sk|], zi (resp. z|sk|+i) is an m-out-of-m secret sharing of sk[i]
(resp. sk3[i]).
– (Construct blocks & permute) Set l ← 2m|sk|, bs← log l + 2, d← |e|/bs,
bn ← l + d, sample ρ := (ρ1, . . . , ρl)
rs← {0, 1}log(bn) and compute C ← Πρ(z||e)
as follows:
1. Set t← 1, Ci ← 0bs, i ∈ [bn].
2. (Sensitive blocks) For i ∈ [l], set Cρi ← (1||i||z[i]).
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3. (Ciphertext blocks) For i ∈ [bn], if i 6= ρj, j ∈ [l], Ci ← (0||e[t :
t+ (bs− 1)]), t← t+ (bs− 1).16
Output C := (C1|| . . . ||Cbn).
• Dec∗(1k, ·): on input C, parse it as (C1|| . . . ||Cbn), set t ← 1, l ← 2m|sk|, z ← 0l,
e← 0, L = ∅ and compute (z||e)← Π−1(C) as follows:
– For i ∈ [bn],
∗ (Sensitive block) If Ci[1] = 1, set j ← Ci[2 : bs − 1], z [j] ← Ci[bs],
L ← L ∪ {j}.
∗ (Ciphertext block) Otherwise, set e[t : t + bs − 1] = Ci[2 : bs], t ←
t+ bs− 1.
– If |L| 6= l, output ⊥, otherwise output (z||e).
If Π−1(C) = ⊥, output ⊥, otherwise, compute (sk||sk′)← Recm(z), and if sk3 = sk′,
output Dsk(e), otherwise output ⊥.
The set of indices of the blocks in which zi is stored will be denoted by Zi.
We prove security for the above construction by a reduction to the security of Con-
struction 3.3.1. We note that our reduction is non-black box with respect to the coding
scheme in which security is reduced to; a generic reduction, i.e., non-malleable reduction
[ADKO15], from the standard model to the CRS model is an interesting open problem
and thus out of the scope of the present thesis.
In the following, we consider Γ = {0, 1}O(log(k)).17 The straightforward way to prove
that (Enc∗,Dec∗) is secure against FαΓ by a reduction to the security of the bit-wise code
of Section 3.3, would be as follows: for any α ∈ [0, 1), f ∈ FαΓ and any message s, we
have to define α′, g ∈ Fα′ , such that the output of the tampered execution with respect
to (Enc∗,Dec∗), f , s, is indistinguishable from the tampered execution with respect to
(Init,Enc,Dec), g, s, and g is an admissible function for (Init,Enc,Dec). However, this
approach might be tricky as it requires the establishment of a relation between α and α′
such that the sensitive blocks that f will receive access to, will be simulated using the
sensitive bits accessed by g. Our approach is cleaner: for the needs of the current proof
we leverage the power of Construction 3.3.1, by allowing the attacker to choose adaptively
16Here we assume that bs−1, divides the length of the ciphertext e. We can always achieve this property
by padding the message s with zeros, if necessary.
17Recall that, whenever Γ is omitted from the notation, we assume that Γ = {0, 1}.
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the codeword locations, as long as it does not request to read all shares of the secret key.
Then, for every block that is accessed by the block-wise attacker f , the bit-wise attacker
g requests access to the locations of the bit-wise code that enable him to fully simulate
the input to f . We formally present our ideas in the following sections. In Section 3.4.1
we introduce the function class Fad that considers adaptive adversaries with respect to the
CRS and we prove security of Construction 3.3.1 in Corollary 3.4.3 against a subclass of
Fad, and then, we reduce the security of the block-wise code (Enc∗,Dec∗) against FαΓ to
the security of Construction 3.3.1 against Fad (cf. Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Security against adaptive adversaries
In the current section we prove that Construction 3.3.1 is secure against the class of
functions that request access to the codeword adaptively, i.e., depending on the CRS,
as long as they access a bounded number of sensitive bits. Below, we formally define
the function class Fad, in which the tampering function picks up the codeword locations
depending on the CRS, and we consider Γ = {0, 1}.
Definition 3.4.2 (The function class Fνad (or Fad)). Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be an (κ, ν)-coding
scheme and let  be the range of Init(1k). For any g = (g1, g2) ∈ Fνad, we have g1 :  →





. For brevity, the function class will be denoted as Fad.
Construction 3.3.1 remains secure against functions that receive full access to the ci-
phertext, as long as they request to read all but one shares for each bit of sk and sk3. The
result is formally presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.3. Let k, m ∈ N. Assuming (SSm,Recm) is an m-out-of-m secret sharing
scheme and (KGen,E,D) is 1-IND-CPA secure authenticated encryption scheme, the code
of Construction 3.4.1 is an MD-NMC against any g = (g1, g2) ∈ Fad, assuming that for
all i ∈ [2|sk|], (Zi ∩ g1(Σ)) < m, where sk ← KGen(1k) and Σ← Init(1k).
Proof. Let g = (g1, g2) be as stated above. For any message s, the tampered execution
with respect to g and (Init,Enc,Dec), is defined as follows.
Tampergs :=

Σ← Init(1k), c← Enc(Σ, s), I ← g1(Σ)
c̃← gΣ2 (c|I ), s̃← Dec(Σ, c̃)
If s̃ = s, output same∗, otherwise, output s̃.

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The proof is along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.3.2, i.e., we prove that for any g





and the output of the tampered execution is either the original message, or ⊥, with over-
whelming probability. Below, we revisit the hybrids of Theorem 3.3.2 and we prove that
the indistinguishability between adjacent hybrids, holds with respect to g.
• Expg,s0 : For any f , s, the first experiment, Exp
g,s
0 , is identical to the experiment
Tampergs.
• Expg,s1 : In the second experiment we have Zi, i ∈ [2|sk|], to be the set of indices
in which zi is stored, |Zi| = m. The main difference from the previous experiment
is that the current one outputs ⊥, if there exists a bit of sk or sk3 for which the
tampering function reads all shares of it. However, by the definition of g we know
that this happens with zero probability, thus we have that the following claim holds,
Claim 3.4.4. Let k, m ∈ N. For any g = (g1, g2) ∈ Fad, assuming that for all
i ∈ [2|sk|], (Zi ∩ g1(Σ)) < m and any message s, we have Expg,s0 = Exp
g,s
1 , where
sk ← KGen(1k), Σ← Init(1k).
• Expg,s2 : In the current experiment we unfold the encoding procedure, and in addition,




m is defined as
S̄S
f
m does with respect to f , in Claim 3.3.4 of Theorem 3.3.2. From the above claim
we have that for all i, |I ∩ Zi| < m, and we observe that the current experiment is
identical to the previous one up to the point of computing g(c|I ), as c|I carries no
information about sk and sk3. Thus, the transition between the current experiment
and the previous one is identical to that of Theorem 3.3.2: an attacker that partially
modifies the shares of sk and sk3, creates shares of s̃k and s̃k
′





with negligible probability in k, which is proved by a reduction to the 1-IND-CPA
security of the encryption scheme in the presence of z∗. Thus, we have the following
claim.
Claim 3.4.5. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is 1-IND-CPA secure (cf. Definition 2.1.6),
for any g ∈ Fad and any message s, Expg,s1 ≈ Exp
g,s
2 , where the probability runs over
the randomness used by Init, Enc.
• Expg,s3 : As in Theorem 3.3.2, the indistinguishability between the two experiments
follows from the authenticity property of the encryption scheme in the presence of
z∗. Thus, the following holds.
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Claim 3.4.6. Assuming the authenticity property of (KGen,E,D), for any g ∈ Fad
and any message s, Expf,s2 ≈ Exp
f,s
3 , where the probability runs over the randomness
used by Init, KGen and E.
• Finally, since g learns nothing about sk, we have that for any g ∈ Fad, and message
s, Expg,s3 is indistinguishable from Exp
g,0
3 , where 0 denotes the zero-message. This
follows by the semantic security of the encryption scheme (Definition 2.1.6). Formally,
we prove the following claim.
Claim 3.4.7. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is semantically secure, for any g ∈ Fad and any
message s, Expg,s3 ≈ Exp
g,0
3 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by
Init, KGen, E, “≈” may refer to statistical or computational indistinguishability, and
0 is the zero-message.
From the above claims we have that for any g ∈ Fad and any s0, s1, assuming that for all
i ∈ [2|sk|], (Zi ∩ g1(Σ)) < m, Expg,s00 ≈ Exp
g,s1
0 , and non-malleability with manipulation
detection follows by Lemma 3.2.2, since Expg,s0 is identical to Tamper
g
s of Lemma 3.2.2, and
by the indistinguishability between Expg,s0 and Exp
g,s
3 , the second property of Lemma 3.2.2
has been proven as the output of Expg,s3 is in {s,⊥}, with overwhelming probability.
3.4.2 MD-NMC security of the block-wise code
In the current section we prove security of Construction 3.4.1 against FαΓ , for Γ = {0, 1}O(log(k)).
Theorem 3.4.8. Let k, m ∈ N, Γ = {0, 1}O(log(k)) and α ∈ [0, 1). Assuming (SSm,Recm)
is an m-out-of-m secret sharing scheme and (KGen,E,D) is a 1-IND-CPA secure authen-
ticated encryption scheme, the code of Construction 3.4.1 is an MD-NMC against FαΓ ,
for any α, m, such that (1− α)m = ω(log(k)).





s1 , and for any s, Pr
[
Tamperfs /∈ {⊥, s}
]
≤ negl(k), where Tamper
denotes the experiment defined in Lemma 3.2.2 with respect to the encoding scheme of
Construction 3.4.1, (Enc∗,Dec∗). Our proof is given by a series of hybrids depicted in
Figure 3.7. We reduce the security (Enc∗,Dec∗), to the security of Construction 3.3.1,
(Init,Enc,Dec), against Fad (cf. Corollary 3.4.3). The idea is to move from the tam-
pered execution with respect to (Enc∗,Dec∗), f , to a tampered execution with respect to
(Init,Enc,Dec), g, such that the two executions are indistinguishable and (Init,Enc,Dec) is
secure against g.
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Let Ib be the set of indices of the blocks that f chooses to tamper with, where |Ib| ≤ αν,
and let l← 2m|sk|, bs← log l+2, bn← l+ |e|/bs. Below we describe the hybrids of Figure
3.7.
• Expf,s0 : The current experiment is the experiment Tamper
f
s , of Lemma 3.2.2, with
respect to (Enc∗,Dec∗), f , s.




1 , is that in the latter
one, we introduce the tampering function (g1, g2), that operates over codewords of
(Init,Enc,Dec) and we modify the encoding steps so that the experiment creates
codewords of the bit-wise code (Init,Enc,Dec). (g1, g2) simulates partially the block-
wise codeword C, while given partial access to the bit-wise codeword c ← Enc(s).
As we prove in Claim 3.4.9, it simulates perfectly the tampering effect of f against
C ← Enc∗(s).
g1 operates as follows (cf. Figure 3.4): it simulates perfectly the randomness for the
permutation of the block-wise code, denoted as ρ, and constructs a set of indices I,
such that g2 will receive access to, and tamper with, c|I . The set I is constructed
g1(Σ = (r1, . . . , rl)) :
– (Simulate block shuffling):
Sample ρ := (ρ1, . . . , ρl)
rs← {0, 1}log(bn)
– (Construct I): Set I = ∅,
∗ (Add ciphertext locations to I):
For j ∈ [|e|+ l], if j /∈ {ri|i ∈ [l]}, I ← (I ∪ j).
∗ (Add sensitive bit locations to I according to Ib):
For j ∈ [bn], if j ∈ Ib and ∃i ∈ [l] such that j = ρi, I ← (I ∪ ri).
– Output: Output I.
Figure 3.4: The function g1 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7.
with respect to the set of blocks Ib, that f chooses to access, as well as Σ, that
reveals the original bit positions, i.e., the ones before permuting (z||e). g2 receives
c|I , reconstructs I, simulates partially the blocks of the block-wise codeword, C, and
applies f on the simulated codeword. The program of g2 is given in Figure 3.5. In
Claim 3.4.9, we show that g2, given c|I , simulates perfectly C|Ib
, which implies that
gΣ2 (c|I ) = f(C|Ib
), and the two executions are identical.
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gΣ2 (c|I ):
t← 1, C∗i ← 0bs, i ∈ [bn].
– (Reconstruct I): Compute I ← g1(Σ).
– (Simulate ciphertext blocks):
For i ∈ [bn], if i 6= ρj for j ∈ [l], C∗i ← (0||e[t : t+ (bs− 1)]), t← t+ (bs− 1).
– (Simulate sensitive blocks):







∗ Set C∗ := (C∗1 || . . . ||C∗bn) and C̃∗ := C∗.
– (Apply f): compute C̃∗[Ib]← f(C∗|Ib ).
– (Output): Output C̃∗|Ib
.
Figure 3.5: The function g2 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7.
• Exp(g1,g3),s2 : In the current experiment, we substitute the function g2 with g3, and
Dec∗ with Dec, respectively. By inspecting the code of g2 and g3 (cf. Figures 3.5,3.6,
respectively), we observe that latter function executes the code of the former, plus
the “Check labels and simulate c̃[I]” step. Thus the two experiments are identical up
to the point of computing f(C∗|Ib
). The main idea here is that we want the current
gΣ3 (c|I ):
t← 1, C∗i ← 0bs, i ∈ [bn].
– (Reconstruct I): Compute I ← g1(Σ).
– (Simulate ciphertext blocks):
For i ∈ [bn], if i 6= ρj , j ∈ [l], C∗i ← (0||e[t : t+ (bs− 1)]), t← t+ (bs− 1).
– (Simulate sensitive blocks):







∗ Set C∗ := (C∗1 || . . . ||C∗bn) and C̃∗ := C∗.
– (Apply f): compute C̃∗[Ib]← f(C∗|Ib ).
– (Check labels and simulate c̃[I]): For i ∈ {ρj |j ∈ [l]}\Ib, C∗i ← (1||i||0). If
Π−1(C̃∗) = ⊥, set d← 1, otherwise set (z̃∗||ẽ)← Π−1(C̃∗), c̃∗ ← PΣ(z̃∗||ẽ).
– (Output): If d = 1 output ⊥, otherwise output c̃∗|I .
Figure 3.6: The function g3 that appears in the hybrid experiments of Figure 3.7.
3.4. Removing the CRS 56
execution to be with respect to (Init,Enc,Dec) against (g1, g3). Thus, we substitute
Dec∗ with Dec, and we expand the function g2 with some extra instructions/checks
that are missing from Dec. We name the resulting function as g3 and we prove that
the two executions are identical.





2 /∈ {⊥, s}
]
≤ negl(k).
We do so by proving that (g1, g3) is admissible for (Init,Enc,Dec, ), i.e., (g1, g3) ∈ Fad,
and g3 will not request to access more that m− 1 shares for each bit of sk, sk3 (cf.
Corollary 3.4.3). This implies security according to Lemma 3.2.2.
In what follows we prove indistinguishability between the hybrids.






Proof. The main difference between Exp0 and Exp1, is that in Exp1, we introduce the tam-
pering function g = (g1, g2), that operates over codewords of (Init,Enc,Dec), and simulates
partially the block-wise code. We observe that g1 simulates perfectly the randomness of the
permutation for the block-wise code, denoted as ρ. Thus, the computation C ← Πρ(z||e)
does not induce any statistical difference between the two experiments. By the definition
of g1 we have that c|I consists of all ciphertext bits, as well as the indices ri, for which
ρi ∈ Ib, i ∈ [l], i.e., if f requests access to the sensitive block with index ρi, containing
z[i], g1 will request access to the ri-th bit of c, which is z[i]. Thus, g2 will receive as input
the entire ciphertext and all the sensitive bits that f will request access to, with respect
to Ib, thus it can fully simulate C|Ib
while being consistent with the distribution of blocks
in C|Ic
b
, as ρ is generated by g1. Thus we have that g
Σ
2 (c|I ) is identical to f(C|Ib
), and the
proof of the claim is complete.





Proof. In Exp2 we substitute the function g2 with g3, and Dec
∗ with Dec, respectively.
By inspecting the code of g2 and g3, we observe that latter function executes the code of
the former, plus the “Check labels and simulate c̃[I]” step. Thus the two experiments are
identical up to the point of computing f(C|Ib
). We unfold the code of the two experiments
from that point of the computation and on (cf. Figure 3.8). They idea is that the consis-
18For random variables X, Y , X = Y denotes that the random variables are identical.








ρ := (ρ1, . . . , ρl)
rs← {0, 1}log(bn)
C ← Πρ(z||e), C̃ ← C
C̃[Ib]← f(C|Ib )
s̃← Dec∗(C̃)










Σ← Init(1k), c← PΣ(z||e)
I ← g1(Σ)
C ← Πρ(z||e), C̃ ← C
C̃[Ib]← gΣ2 (c|I )
s̃← Dec∗(C̃)











c← PΣ(z||e), c̃← c
I ← g1(Σ)
c̃[I]← gΣ3 (c|I )
s̃← Dec(Σ, c̃)
Output same∗ if s̃ = s and s̃ otherwise.
Figure 3.7: The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 3.4.8.
tency check on the labels of the block-wise code is transferred from Dec∗ in Exp1 to g3 in
Exp2, and Dec
∗ is substituted by Dec, so that Exp
(g1,g3),s
2 is the tampering experiment of
Lemma 3.2.2 with respect to (Init,Enc,Dec) and (g1, g3).




2 , is suffices to prove that Dec
∗(C̃) =
Dec(c̃). By inspecting Exp
(g1,g3),s
2 , we have that c̃ = ⊥ if and only if Π−1(C̃∗) = ⊥. By
the definition of Π−1 (cf. Construction 3.4.1), Π−1(C̃∗) = ⊥, if and only if the tampering
function creates an inconsistent set of labels, an effect that can be decided by g3 by only
partially accessing C, since it fully simulates the labels for the block-wise code. By Claim


































If d = 1: output ⊥
Else: output c̃∗|I

: gΣ3 (c|I )



















, which implies that Π−1(C̃∗) = ⊥ if and only if
Π−1(C̃) = ⊥. We conclude that c̃ = ⊥ if and only if Π−1(C̃) = ⊥. Let E be the event
in which c̃ 6= ⊥. Clearly, conditioned on ¬E the two experiments are identical, as both
output ⊥. It remains to prove the same conditioned on E.

























is independent of the
blocks of C̃ that Exp2 does not have access to. Moreover,















where the last equality follows from the fact that c̃|Ic is not being accessed by the tampering




, thus P−1Σ (c̃) = Π
−1(C̃),
and the two executions are identical conditioned on E.
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2 /∈ {⊥, s}
]
≤ negl(k),
over the randomness of Exp2.
Proof. Assuming (1 − α)m = ω(log(k)), it suffices to prove that for any f ∈ FαΓ , the
function (g1, g3) ∈ Fad is admissible for (Init,Enc,Dec, ), i.e., g1 will not request to access
more that m − 1 shares for each bit of sk, sk3, and the proof of the claim will follow by
Corollary 3.4.3 and Lemma 3.2.2. We prove that for any f ∈ FαΓ , the corresponding (g1, g3)
will not access the entire zi, for all i ∈ [|2sk|], with overwhelming probability. Such an
event takes place if and only if ∃i : |(Ib ∩ Zi)| = m. We define by Ei the event in which f
request access to all blocks in which zi is stored. Assuming f reads n blocks, we have that

























which is negligible when (1− α)m = ω(log(k)).
The security of the block-wise code follows from the above claims and the MD-NMC
security of (Init,Enc,Dec).
3.5 Continuous MD-NMC with light updates
In this section, we enhance the block-wise scheme of Section 3.4 with an update mech-
anism, that uses only shuffling and refreshing operations. The resulting code is secure
against continuous attacks, for a notion of security that is weaker than the original one
[FMVW14], as we need to update the codeword after each round of execution. However, our
update mechanism is using cheap operations, avoiding the full decoding and re-encoding
of the message, which is the standard way to achieve continuous security [LL12, DPW10]
using a one-time NMC. In addition, our solution avoids the usage of a self-destruction
mechanism that produces ⊥ in all subsequent rounds after the first round in which the
attacker creates an invalid codeword, which was originally proposed by [FN17]. Avoiding
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the self-destruction mechanism, was originally proposed by [FN17], and it is an important
step towards practicality, as (i) the mechanism is subjective to denial of service attacks,
and (ii) it renders the device useless in the presence of non-adversarial hardware faults.
Our solution enables normal use of the device in the presence of such faults and provides
security against malicious attacks.19
The update mechanism of the proposed scheme, works as follows: in each round, it
randomly shuffles the blocks and refreshes the randomness of the inner encoding of sk.
The idea here is that, due to the continual shuffling and refreshing of the inner encoding
scheme, in each round the attacker learns nothing about the secret key, and every attempt
to modify the inner encoding, results to an invalid key, with overwhelming probability.
Our update mechanism can be made deterministic if we further encode the seed of a PRG
together with the secret key, which is similar to the technique presented in [LL12].
Below we define the update mechanism, which is denoted as Update∗.
Construction 3.5.1. Let k, m ∈ N, and let (KGen,E,D), (SSm,Recm), Enc∗, Dec∗, be as
in Construction 3.4.1. We define the update procedure, Update∗, for the encoding scheme
of Construction 3.4.1, as follows:
• Update∗(1k, ·): on input C, parse it as (C1|| . . . ||Cbn), set l ← 2m|sk|, L̂ = ∅, and
set Ĉ := (Ĉ1|| . . . ||Ĉbn) to zeros.




, where z =
f2|sk|
i=1 zi, z ∈
{0, 1}2m|sk|, and for i ∈ [2|sk|], zi is an m-out-of-m secret sharing of the 0
bit.
– (Shuffle & Refresh): Sample ρ := (ρ1, . . . , ρl)
rs← {0, 1}log(bn). For i ∈ [bn],
∗ (Sensitive block) If Ci[1] = 1,
· (Shuffle): Set j ← Ci[2 : bs− 1], Ĉρj ← Ci.
· (Refresh): Set Ĉρj [bs]← Ĉρj [bs]⊕ z[j].
∗ (Ciphertext block)
If Ci[1] = 0, set j ← minn
{
n ∈ [bn]
∣∣n /∈ L̂, n 6= ρi, i ∈ [l]}, and Ĉj ← Ci,
L̂ ← L̂ ∪ {j}.
Output Ĉ.
19We assume that the attacks against the memory are non-persistent.
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The following definition of security is along the lines of the one given in [FMVW14],
adapted to the notion of non-malleability with manipulation detection. Also, after each
invocation the codewords are updated, where in our case the update mechanism is only
using shuffling and refreshing operations. In addition, there is no need for self-destruct
after detecting an invalid codeword [FN17].
Definition 3.5.2 (Continuous MD-NMC with light updates). Let CS = (Enc,Dec) be an
encoding scheme, F be a function class and k, q ∈ N. Then, CS is a q-continuously non-
malleable code with manipulation detection (q-MD-CNMC) with light updates, if for every,










C ← Enc(1k, s), s̃← 0
For τ ∈ [q] :
f ← A(s̃), C̃ ← f(C), s̃← Dec(C̃)
If s̃ = s : s̃← same∗
C ← Update∗(1k, C)
out← A(s̃)
Return : out
and for each round the output of the decoder is not in {s,⊥} with negligible probability in
k, over the randomness of TamperAs .
Below we prove that the scheme of Construction 3.5.1 is continuously non-malleable
with manipulation detection and light updates.
Theorem 3.5.3. Let q, k, m, ∈ N, Γ = {0, 1}O(log(k)) and α ∈ [0, 1). Assuming
(SSm,Recm) is an m-out-of-m secret sharing scheme and (KGen,E,D) is a 1-IND-CPA,
authenticated encryption scheme, the scheme of Construction 3.5.1 is a MD-CNMC with
light updates, against FαΓ , for any α, m, such that (1− α)m = ω(log(k)).
Proof. Let A be any adversary playing against TamperAs , for any s. Let Ib be the set of
indices chosen by the attacker in each round and Ic = [ν]\I. The tampered components of
the codeword will be denoted using the symbol “˜” on top of the original symbol. Our proof
follows the strategy of the one given in Theorem 3.3.2, using a series of hybrid experiments
that are depicted in Figure 3.9. Below, we describe the hybrids.
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ExpA,s,q0 :
C ← Enc(s), s̃← 0, C̃ ← C
For τ ∈ [q] :
f ← A(s̃)
C̃|Ib
← f(C|Ib ), s̃← Dec(C̃)
If s̃ = s :
s̃← same∗




C ← Enc(s), s̃← 0, C̃ ← C
For τ ≤ [q] :
f ← A(s̃), s̃← ⊥
If ∀i : |(Ib ∩ Zi)| < m:
C̃|Ib
← f(C|Ib ), s̃← Dec(C̃)
If s̃ = s :
s̃← same∗






sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s)
s̃← 0
For τ ∈ [q] :
f ← A(s̃), s̃← ⊥
z∗ ← S̄Sf,ρm (sk), C ← Πρ(z∗||e)









If ∀i : wi = w̃i:
s̃← Dsk(ẽ)
If s̃ = s :
s̃← same∗






sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s)
s̃← 0
For τ ∈ [q] :
f ← A(s̃), s̃← ⊥
z∗ ← S̄Sf,ρm (sk), C ← Πρ(z∗||e)
If ∀i : |(Ib ∩ Zi)| < m:







If ∀i : wi = w̃i :
If ẽ = e:
s̃← same∗
C ← Update∗(1k, C)
out← A(s̃)
Return : out
Figure 3.9: Hybrids for the proof of Theorem 3.5.3. The gray part signifies the portion of
the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one.
• ExpA,s,q0 : For any A, s, q, the experiment Exp
A,s,q
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• ExpA,s,q1 : In the second experiment and for each round of the execution, we define
Zi, i ∈ [2|sk|], to be the set of indices in which zi is stored, |Zi| = m. Intuitively, in
each round, by calling the Update∗ procedure that permutes the blocks using a fresh
permutation key and updates the shares of sk and sk3, we achieve the following:
in each round, the attacker finds all shares for a bit of sk, and sk3, with negligible
probability in k, thus the tampering function is not accessing any bit of sk and
sk3, even if it is given access to (1 − o(1))ν blocks of the codeword. Thus, the
indistinguishability between the current experiment and the previous one comes from
a claim analogous to Claim 3.3.3, made in the proof of Theorem 3.3.2. In particular,
we have the following claim.
Claim 3.5.4. For k, q, m ∈ N, assume (1 − α)m = ω(log(k)). Then, for any A
that chooses its tampering strategy from FαΓ , and any message s, we have Exp
A,s,q
0 ≈
ExpA,s,q1 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by Enc
∗, Update∗.
• ExpA,s,q2 : In the third experiment we define by Z̃i to be the set of indices in which
z̃i is stored, |Z̃i| = m. The main difference with the previous experiment is that
we unfold the encoding procedure, and in addition, we substitute the secret sharing
procedure SSm with S̄S
f,ρ















2. For i ∈ [2|sk|]:
li := max
d
{d ∈ [m] ∧ Ind (zi[d]) /∈ Ib)} ,
where Ind returns the index of zi[d] in C, i.e., li is the largest index in [m] such
that the codeword block containing zi[li], is not accessed by f .





In ExpA,s,q1 , we have z =
f2|sk|
i=1 zi, and each zi is an m-out-of-m secret sharing for a
bit of sk or sk3. From the first transition we have that for all i, |Ib ∩ Zi| < m with
overwhelming probability, and the current experiment is identical to the previous one
up to the point of computing f(C|Ib
), as C|Ib
and f(C|Ib
) depend only on z∗, that
gives no information about sk and sk3.
Another difference between the two experiments is that, after applying the tampering
function, ExpA,s,q1 makes a call on the decoder while Exp
A,s,q
2 , checks if the tampering
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function has modified the shares in a way such that the reconstruction procedure will
give s̃k 6= sk or s̃k′ 6= sk′. In case modification is detected the current experiments
sends ⊥ to the attacker. The main idea here is that, a tampering function that
modifies the shares of sk and sk3, creates shares of s̃k and s̃k
′





with negligible probability in k. We prove this by a reduction to the 1-IND-CPA
security of the encryption scheme in the presence of z∗, that as we have already stated,
it gives no information about the secret key. The indistinguishability between the
two experiments comes from the following claim, whose proof is similar to the one
given in Claim 3.3.4.
Claim 3.5.5. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is 1-IND-CPA secure (cf. Definition 2.1.6),
for any A choosing its tampering strategy from FαΓ , and any message s, Exp
A,s,q
1 ≈
ExpA,s,q2 , where the probability runs over the randomness used by Enc
∗, Update∗.
• ExpA,s,q3 : In the final experiment, in each round of the execution, instead of calling
the decryption Dsk(ẽ), we first check if the attacker has modified the ciphertext,
in which case the current experiment outputs ⊥, otherwise it outputs same∗. This
part of the program is reached only if the tampering function does not modify the
secret key. Thus, the indistinguishability between the two experiments follows from
the authenticity property of the encryption scheme in the presence of z∗, which is
updated in each round depending on the set Ib. Clearly, requesting z
∗ adaptively in
each round does not compromise the security of the encryption scheme, as z∗ carries
no information about sk. Thus, in each round, given that s̃k = sk and s̃k
′
= sk′, we
have that if the attacker modifies the ciphertext, then with overwhelming probability
Dsk(ẽ) = ⊥, otherwise, Dsk(ẽ) = s, and the current experiment correctly sends
s̃ = same∗ to the attacker. Thus, we have the following claim.
Claim 3.5.6. Assuming the authenticity property of (KGen,E,D), for any A choosing




3 , where the
probability runs over the randomness used by KGen, E and Update∗.
• Finally, we have that for any A choosing its tampering strategy from FανΓ , and any
message s, ExpA,s,q3 is indistinguishable from Exp
A,0,q
3 , where 0 denotes the zero-
message. This follows by the semantic security of the encryption scheme in the
presence of z∗, for the multi-round case.
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Claim 3.5.7. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is semantically secure, for any A choosing its




3 , where the probability runs over the
randomness used by KGen, E, Update, “≈” may refer to statistical or computational
indistinguishability, and 0 denotes the zero-message.
The above claims conclude our proof. Clearly, the manipulation detection property follows
from the fact that the output of Exp3 is in {same∗,⊥}, with overwhelming probability.
In the above theorem, q can be polynomial (resp. exponential) in k, assuming the
underlying encryption scheme is computationally (resp. unconditionally) secure.
3.6 Instantiations
Below, we define a rate 1, computationally secure authenticated encryption scheme.
Instantiation 3.6.1 (IND-CPA secure authenticated encryption (computational)). Let
Fr be a pseudo-random function, Fr : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k, let PRG be a pseudo-random gen-
erator, PRG : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}|s|, and let (MKGen,Mac,Vrfy) be a message authentication
code that outputs tags of length k (cf. [KL14]). We define a symmetric encryption scheme
(KGen,E,D), as follows:
• KGen(1k): sample r ← {0, 1}k, mk ← Mac(1k) and output sk = (r,mk).
• Esk(·): On input s, sample τ ← {0, 1}k, set e = (PRG(Fr(τ))⊕ s, τ), t = Macmk(e),
and output (e, t).
• Dsk(·): On input (e, t), if Vrfymk(e, t) = 1, parse e as (e′, τ) and output s = (PRG(Fr(τ))⊕ e′),
otherwise output ⊥.
It is not hard to see that the scheme defined above is a rate 1, computationally secure
authenticated encryption scheme [KL14]. By instantiating Construction 3.3.1 with the
above scheme, Theorem 3.3.2, for m = k log k, α = 1 − 1/Ω(log k), yields a rate 1 MD-
NMC, with access rate 1− 1/Ω(log k) and codewords of length |s|+O(k2 log k), assuming
one-way functions. In addition, by instantiating Constructions 3.4.1, 3.5.1 with the above
scheme, Theorems 3.4.8, 3.5.3, for m = k log k, α = 1−1/Ω(log k), yield rate 1−1/Ω(log k)
MD-NMC, with access rate 1− 1/Ω(log k) and codewords of length |s|(1 + 1/O(log k)) +
O(k2 log2 k), assuming one-way functions.
Below we define a generic, one-time secure, information theoretic construction.
3.6. Instantiations 66
Instantiation 3.6.2 (1-IND-CPA secure authenticated encryption (information theo-
retic)). Let H, H̄, be pair-wise independent hash function families, such that for any
h ∈ H, h : {0, 1}O(|s|) → {0, 1}|s| and for any h̄ ∈ H̄, h̄ : {0, 1}O(|s|) → {0, 1}|s|. We
define a symmetric encryption scheme (KGen,E,D), as follows:
• KGen(1k): sample h← H, h̄← H̄ and set sk = (h, h̄).
• Esk(·): On input s, sample r ← {0, 1}|s|, set e = (r||(h(r) + s)) and output (e, h̄(e)).
• Dsk(·): On input (e, t), if h̄(e) = t, parse e as (r||e′) and output s = h(r) + e′,
otherwise output ⊥.
The security of the above scheme comes from the pair-wise independence of H, H̄. By
instantiating Construction 3.3.1 with the above scheme, Theorem 3.3.2, for m = |s| log |s|,
α = 1 − 1/O(log(|s|)), yields an unconditionally secure MD-NMC in the CRS model,
with concrete information rate 1/O(|s| log(|s|)), access rate 1 − 1/Ω(log(|s|)) and code-
words of length O(|s|2 log |s|). In addition, by instantiating Constructions 3.4.1, 3.5.1 with
the above scheme, Theorems 3.4.8, 3.5.3, for m = |s| log |s|, α = 1−1/O(log(|s|)), yield un-
conditionally secure, rate 1/O(|s| log2(|s|)) MD-NMC in the standard model, with access
rate Ω(1− 1/ log(|s|)) and codewords of length O(|s|2 log2 |s|).
Chapter 4
Extractable hash function families
4.1 Introduction
The notion of extractable collision-resistant hash functions (ECRHs) was originally pro-
posed by [BCCT12, GLR11, BCC+14] as a tool for building efficient succinct non-interactive
arguments of knowledge (SNARKs). Informally, a family of functions, H, is extractable,
if for a uniform h ∈ H, sampling an element v ∈ Image(h) without actually evaluating
the function on a pre-image s, i.e., by computing h(s) = v, is infeasible. This concept is
formalized in the following way: for any algorithm A that produces some v ∈ Image(h),
there exists an extractor that, possibly depending on the code of A, outputs a preimage
s, such that h(s) = v. Typically, such families are interesting only if they posses some
sort of hardness property, like one-wayness, or otherwise the problem can be trivial. In
[BCC+14] the authors propose two constructions for ECRH: the first one is based on a
variant of the Knowledge of Exponent assumption, called t-KEA(cf. Assumption 2.1.7),
and the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (cf. Definition 2.1.5), while the latter
uses a lattice based knowledge assumption, called Knowledge of Knapsack [BCCT12].
An important observation regarding the setting described above is that ECRHs provide
no guarantee against attackers that receive access to precomputed hash values, prior to
producing their own. However, there are applications of the primitive that can deviate
from the above setting. For instance, the attacker might be given access to a number
of valid hash values for which it does not know the pre-images, prior to delivering its
own hash value. In this setting, creating a new valid hash value could be achieved by
mauling the received ones without knowing the pre-image. To tackle this issue, the present
thesis introduces the notion of `-more extractable hash functions. Briefly speaking, `-more
extractable hash function families capture the following idea: if an adversary is given access
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to ` ∈ N precomputed hash values v1, . . . , v`, and produces a new valid hash value ṽ, then
it must know a pre-image of ṽ. As we prove later, this notion is not implied by the one by
Bitansky et al. [BCCT12] and Goldwasser et al. [GLR11], which considers adversaries that
get no access to precomputed hash values prior to producing their own value, assuming
the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Moreover, by requiring the attacker not
only to produce some ṽ ∈ Image(h) but also to come up with a valid pre-image for ṽ,
we prove that `-more extractable hash functions are feasible under the same assumptions
used in [GLR11, BCCT12]. This puts forth a weaker form of extractability (we refer to
is as wECRH) in the sense that the extractor is allowed to fail in case a pre-image exists
but is not somehow efficiently computable based on the view of the adversary. It should
be noted that there is no contradiction in terms here: this extra requirement does not
trivialize the notion of `-more wECRH, since the extractor is required to depend only on
the adversarial program that produces ṽ and is independent of the program that produces
the valid pre-image for ṽ.
In this chapter, we show how to construct efficient, leakage-resilient `-more wECRHs,
and in subsequent chapters, we show that this weaker form of extractability is sufficient
for constructing efficient, computationally secure, non-malleable codes (cf. Chapter 5) and
continuous non-malleable codes (cf. Chapter 6), against split-state attackers, as well as
efficient non-interactive, non-malleable commitments, with respect to opening (cf. Chapter
7). The next section summarizes (informally) our results on `-more wECRH.
4.1.1 Results
In this chapter, a new cryptographic primitive is introduced and constructed, called `-
more extractable hash function families. Briefly speaking, `-more extractable hash function
families capture the idea that, if an adversary, that given ` ∈ N precomputed hash values
v1, . . . , v`, manages to produce a new valid hash value ṽ, then it must know a pre-image
of ṽ. This is a generalization of the notion of extractable hash functions by Bitansky et
al. [BCCT12] and Goldwasser et al. [GLR11], which corresponds to the ` = 0 case (i.e.,
the adversary gets no access to valid hash values, prior to producing its own value), and
is somewhat reminiscent of the strengthening of simulation-soundness in the context of
zero-knowlege proofs [Sah99].
The proposed generalization is strict, as the following, informally stated theorem, is
proved later in this chapter.
Theorem 4.1.1 (Informal). Extractable hash 6=⇒ 1-more extractable hash.
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The subtlety comes from the fact that the `-more attacker might get an “unfair advan-
tage” in producing a valid hash value, for which it does not possess a pre-image, because
of the ` additional inputs; e.g., by modifying the vi’s in some suitable way. Indeed, as it
is proven below, the hash function family of Bitansky et al. [BCCT12] is easily malleable,
and thus exploitable by “1-more” attackers. This demonstrates that `-more extractability
is strictly stronger than the original notion [BCCT12].
The next step is to construct this notion. We prove that, by requiring the attacker
not only to produce a valid hash ṽ, but also to come up with a valid pre-image for ṽ, `-
more extractability can be achieved under the same assumptions used by the construction
of Bitansky et al. [BCCT12], i.e., a variant of the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption
KEA and DLOG. As a conclusion, KEA and DLOG are still sufficient to achieve `-more
extractable hash functions with a weaker form of extractability (wECRH). In detail, the
following, informally stated theorem can be derived.
Theorem 4.1.2 (Informal). DLOG and t-KEA imply `-more wECRH.
At this point, it should be noted that KEA is non-falsifiable (cf. [Nao03]), and it is in-
deed a strong assumption. However, one can argue that non-falsifiability might be inherent
for extractable hash functions, and thus for `-more extractability, by recalling the results
of Bitansky et al. [BCCT12] and Gentry and Wichs [GW11]: in [BCCT12] the authors
showed that extractable hash function families imply succinct non-interactive arguments
of knowledge (SNARKs), while Gentry and Wichs [GW11] showed that SNARKs are un-
likely to be constructed based on falsifiable assumptions. Thus, non-falsifiable assumptions
are likely to be inherent for achieving (`-more) extractability. It should be also noted that
some variants of KEA were shown to contradict (public-coin) differing-inputs obfuscation
and indistinguishability obfuscation [BCPR14, BP15], however the variant used in the
present thesis is suitably defined to circumvent this contradiction.
Next, we prove that any hash function that is modeled as a random oracle, is an `-more
wECRH, receiving the following informal theorem.
Theorem 4.1.3 (Informal). Let h be a hash function. If h is modeled as a random oracle,
then it is an `-more wECRH.
We note that, even though any function h that is modeled as a random oracle is an
`-more wECRH, it cannot be extractable according to [BCCT12, BCC+14], as the range
of the function is dense, thus an attacker can just output a random element in the range
4.1. Introduction 70
of the hash, and then there is no knowledge to extract, as the extractor needs to invert a
uniform valid hash value [BCCT12].
Finally, as an extension of the notion of `-more wECRH, we formalize the notion of
leakage-resilient, `-more, weakly extractable hash function families, considering attackers
that, in addition to receiving access to ` precomputed hash values, they also receive bounded
leakage over the randomness used to compute those values. Then, we prove security for the
construction of the Informal Theorem 4.1.2, in the presence of leakage over the randomness
that is used to compute the hash. In particular, we prove the following, informally stated,
theorem.
Theorem 4.1.4 (Informal). DLOG and t-KEA imply leakage-resilient `-more wECRH.
For the construction of the Informal Theorem 4.1.3, leakage-resilience is straightfor-
ward, as the adversary receives black box access to the hash function.
4.1.2 KEAs and previous work
In [Dam92], Damg̊ard introduces KEA to construct a CCA-secure encryption scheme.
In [HT98, BP04], the authors extend the assumption of [Dam92], and construct three-
round, zero-knowledge arguments. Abe and Fehr [AF07] construct the first perfect NIZK
for NP with adaptive soundness, by extending the assumption of [BP04]. Prabhakaran and
Xue [PX09] constructed statistically-hiding sets for trapdoor DDH groups, by introducing a
new knowledge assumption. Gennaro et al. [GKR10] proved that a modified version of the
Okamoto-Tanaka key-agreement protocol [Oka88] satisfies perfect forward secrecy against
fully active attackers, by introducing a new knowledge assumption. In [BCCT12, BCC+17,
Gro10, BCCT13, GGPR13], the authors construct succinct, non-interactive, arguments of
knowledge (SNARKs), and NIZKs, while in [CD08, CD09], Canetti and Dakdouk provide
an extensive study on extractable functions. In [PHGR13], Parno et al. show how to
perform verifiable computation, efficiently.
In [BCPR14, BP15], the authors show that, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation
[BGI+01], extractable one-way functions, and thus ECRHs, do not exist against adver-
saries receiving arbitrary, polynomial-size, auxiliary input, if the code of the extractor is
fixed before the attacker’s auxiliary input. On the other hand, they show that, under
standard assumptions, extractable one-way functions, may exist against adversaries with
bounded auxiliary input.
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In this work, and as it is suggested by [BCPR14], we consider individual auxiliary input,
i.e., we allow the auxiliary input of the extractor to depend on the attacker’s auxiliary
input, and therefore, we do not contradict the impossibility results of [BCPR14, BP15].
4.2 `-more weakly extractable hash function families
In this section we define the notion of `-more weakly extractable hash function families,
and we provide a general discussion on the primitive.
Definition 4.2.1 (`-more weakly extractable hash function families). For ` ∈ N, an ef-
ficiently samplable hash function ensemble H = {Hk}k∈N, is `-more extractable, if for
any PPT algorithm Av and any zv ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), there exist a PPT extractor EHAv and
zE ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), such that for all PPT algorithms As, any large k ∈ N and any vector of










(`, zv, zE) :
∀i ∈ [`], τi ← U{0,1}poly(k) , vi ← h(si; τi) ( hash computation )
t := (τ1, . . . , τ`),v := (v1, . . . , v`)
(ṽ, st)← Av(h,v, zv) ( hash tampering )
(τ̂ , ŝ)← EHAv(h,v, zE) ( pre-image extraction )
(τ̃ , s̃)← As (h, t, s, st) ( pre-image tampering )
If h(s̃; τ̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi ∧ h(ŝ; τ̂) 6= ṽ, return 1
otherwise, return 0
The main steps in the above experiment are the following. Initially, we sample the ran-
domness that is required for computing the hashes, and we perform the hash computation
over ` ∈ N, pre-images. For deterministic hash function families we just omit randomness
sampling, and we compute the hashes directly over the messages. The challenge for the
adversary Av, is to produce a valid hash value ṽ, given ` has values, denoted as v, and
auxiliary information zv; it also produces state information, denoted as st. Then, the
extractor EHAv is executed, given v and its own auxiliary input zE . Notice, that, we allow
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the auxiliary input of the extractor to depend on the attacker’s auxiliary input, thus our
definition is not contradicting the impossibility results of [BCPR14, BP15]. Finally, the
adversary As is required to produce a valid pre-image for ṽ, while given all information
generated during the execution. The output of the experiment is 1, if Av produces a valid
hash value ṽ, As produces a valid pre-image for ṽ, while the extractor fails.
Leaving aside the fact that the above definition considers randomized function families,
the major difference between the current definition and the one given by Bitansky et al.
[BCCT12, BCC+14] (cf. Definition 2.1.8), is two-fold: first the “`-more” generalization
that allows the attacker to have access to ` ∈ N precomputed hash values for which it does
not know the corresponding randomness, prior to delivering its own hash value. Second,
the introduction of the algorithm As, that takes the place of the existential quantifier that
appears in the original definition. This is in fact a weakening of the original definition, in
the sense that the extractor is allowed to fail in case a pre-image exists but is not efficiently
computable based on the view of the adversary, which would not be allowed in the original
definition.
Note that, weaker extractability does not hurt the applicability of the primitive, as
there are many settings in which the attacker, is not only required to produce a valid hash
value ṽ, but also to provide a valid pre-image for it. For instance, in our application on
non-malleable codes later in the thesis, our codeword stores a secret key and its hash value,
and any attacker that modifies the hash value, also needs to come up with a valid pre-
image, otherwise it creates an invalid codeword, assuming the collision resistance property
of the hash function family. In addition, the existence of As does not trivialize the problem
for the extractor since the extractor is challenged to produce a valid pre-image for ṽ, given
only the code of Av and its own auxiliary input, and in particular it lacks access to the
state and the program of As.
It is easy to see that, constructing `-more extractable hash function families that are
non-compressing, can be achieved using existing tools, such as robust NIZKs [DDO+01].
In the present thesis, we construct `-more weakly extractable, collision resistant, hash
function families (wECRH), achieving length-efficiency comparable to that of a regular
hash function.
In the following lemma we prove that, for any `-more wECRH function family, the
output of the extractor should match the output of As, in case both of them output valid
pre-images, otherwise we break collision resistance.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let H = {Hk}k∈N be a collision resistant, `-more weakly extractable,
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efficiently samplable, hash function ensemble. Then, for any Av, zv, EHAv , zE , As, s =
(s1, . . . , s`), `, as they were defined in Definition 4.2.1, we have
Pr
h←Hk
 Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv (`, zv, zE) = 0, h(s̃; τ̃) = ṽ, ṽ 6= vi, i ∈ [`] :
(τ̂ , ŝ) 6= (τ̃ , s̃)
 ≤ negl(k).
Proof. We are given that the output of Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(`, zv, zE) is 0, and As succeeds in
producing a valid pre-image (τ̃ , s̃) for a new hash, ṽ. Since the output of the experiment
is 0, we know that EHAv produces a valid pre-image (τ̂ , ŝ) for ṽ. Assuming, (τ̂ , ŝ) 6= (τ̃ , s̃),
we break the collision resistance property of Hk.
Concretely, assume there exist Av with auxiliary input zv, extractor EHAv with auxiliary
info zE , algorithm As, and vector of messages s, such that
Pr
h←Hk
 Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv (`, zv, zE) = 0, h(τ̃ , s̃) = ṽ, ṽ 6= vi, i ∈ [`] :
(τ̂ , ŝ) 6= (τ̃ , s̃)
 > ε,
(4.1)
for ε = 1/poly(k). We define a PPT adversary A who simulates Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(`, zv, zE)
while playing against the collision finding experiment HcollA,Hk (cf. Definition 2.1.4):
A, after receiving the key of the hash function, it simulates Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(`, zv, zE), and
outputs x1 = (τ̃ , s̃) and x2 = (τ̂ , ŝ), i.e., x1 is the output of As and x2 is the output of
EHAv , computed while executing the experiment. Then, assuming Relation 4.1 holds, we
have h(x1) = h(x2), and the collision resistance property of h breaks, with non-negligible
probability.
Next, we show a separation between extractability and general `-more extractability,
as we discussed in earlier. In particular, we prove that the extractable hash of [BCCT12]
is not 1-more (weakly) extractable. Before doing so, we first revisit their construction, and
t-KEA (Assumption 2.1.7), upon which the constructions is based.
Assuming a group G, of prime order p, the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption KEA,
introduced by Damg̊ard [Dam92], states the following: any adversary that is given a gener-
ator, g, of G, and a random group element ga, produces the pair (gs, gas), only if it “knows”
the exponent s. The assumption was later extended by [HT98, BP04], by requiring that,
given gr1 , gar1 , gr2 , gar2 , it is infeasible to produce v = gr1s1+r2s2 and va, without “know-
ing” s1, s2. This assumption, generalized for t = poly(log |G|) pairs gri , gari , is referred to
as t-KEA by [BCCT12].
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An element from the hash function family of [BCCT12] is described by the pair (gr, gar),
for uniformly random vector r, and element a. Note that, gr denotes the value (gr1 , . . . , grt),
where r = (r1, . . . , rt). The hash of a message s = (s1, . . . , st), is the pair (g
〈r,s〉, ga〈r,s〉),
where 〈r, s〉 denotes the inner product of r, s. It is not hard to see that the hash value can
be computed efficiently given the message and the description of the hash function, and
assuming the t-KEA, the above hash function family is extractable according to [BCCT12].
We formally define the construction below.
Construction 4.2.3 (Extractable hash from t-KEA [BCCT12]). Let G be a group-generation
algorithm. An instance of a (kt, 2k)-compressing, hash function family, H∗ = (Gen∗, h∗),
with respect to G, is defined as follows:
1. Gen∗(1k): sample (G, g, p)← G(1k), p ∈ (2k−1, 2k), (a, r)← Zp × Ztp, where p = |G|,
and output z := (G, gr, gar).
2. Hashing computation: on input s, compute h∗z(s) := (g
〈r,s〉, g〈ar,s〉).
For brevity, in what follows G will be omitted from the description of the hash, and
we will use h∗ to refer both to the program of the hash and the key of a specific element
(gr, gar), i.e., z is omitted.
In [BCCT12] the authors prove that Construction 4.2.3 is collision resistant, which is
revisited in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.4 (Collision resistance for Construction 4.2.3 [BCCT12]). Assuming the hard-
ness of the discrete logarithm problem, with respect to a group G, Construction 4.2.3 is
collision resistant, with respect to G.
The intuition behind the fact that Construction 4.2.3 is not 1-more extractable, is the
following. Suppose the adversary receives a hash value v := h(s) = (g〈r,s〉, ga〈r,s〉), for some
unknown message s, and then computes v′ := vx = (g〈r,xs〉, ga〈r,xs〉), for some non-zero
x, of its choice. Clearly, the new hash value v′ equals h(xs), and thus, it is valid. Then,
assuming an extractor for the current family, under the “1-more” setting, the original
message s can be retrieved, by first extracting xs and then dividing each coordinate of s
by x. This idea can be turned into a DLOG solver, and thus, assuming the hardness of
DLOG with respect to G, it is shown in Lemma 4.2.5, that the above construction is not
1-more extractable.
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Lemma 4.2.5 (Construction 4.2.3 is not 1-more extractable). Let H∗ be the hash func-
tion family of Construction 4.2.3, with respect to a group generation algorithm G. Then,
assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem for G (Definition 2.1.5), H∗ is not
1-more weakly extractable.
Proof. Let k ∈ N, t = O(poly(k)), and let G be a group-generation algorithm, for which
the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Assuming the hash function family H∗ is 1-more
extractable with respect to G, we define a PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) that breaks the
hardness assumption on the discrete logarithm problem, with non-negligible probability in
k. A executes the following steps
1. (Define Av, zv): Av(h∗, v, zv) = (vx, st), where x is a fixed, non-zero, element in Zp,
and zv, st, are zero-length strings.
2. (Define As): As(h∗, s, st) = xs.
3. A executes the following steps while playing against DLogA,G :
a) On input (G, g, p, w), where w = gs
′
and s′ is uniform over Zp, sample (a, r, s)←
Zp×Ztp×Zt−1p , s = (s1, . . . , st−1), i.e., it sample a hash function from H∗ and a






(1, zv, zE), where s′ = (s′, s1, . . . , st−1), without accessing
s′. Here, EH∗Av and zE are totally defined by Av and zv, since we assume that H
∗
is 1-more extractable.
b) Compute h∗(s′, s1, . . . , st−1) while not having access to s
′, i.e., compute v =
((gs
′
)r1 · gd, (gs′)ar1 · gad), where d = 〈[r](2:t), s〉.
c) Sample (ṽ, st)← Av(h∗, v, zv), where by definition











d) Sample ŝ← EH∗Av (h
∗, v, zE), and output s = r−11 (x
−1〈r, ŝ〉 − d).
It is not hard to see that v and ṽ are valid hash values with respect to H∗, and the
execution of As(h∗, s′, st) would yield xs′ = (xs′, xs1, . . . , xst−1), which is a valid pre-






(1, zv, zE), since the extractor, EH
∗
Av , does not depend on As. In other words,





(1, zv, zE), As would
output the right pre-image for ṽ while having access to s′, still this event does not need to
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be triggered in order for EH∗Av to output a valid pre-image for ṽ. Concretely, and assuming
H∗ is 1-more extractable we have
Pr
h∗←H∗k














= Pr[< r, ŝ >= x(r1s
′ + d)]
= Pr[r−11 (x
−1 < r, ŝ > −d) = s′] = Pr[s = s′]. (4.3)
By Relations (4.2) and (4.3) we have
Pr[s = s′] ≥ 1− negl(k),
and DLogA,G(k) = 1, i.e., g
s = gs
′
, with non-negligible probability in k.
From the above lemma, we derive that the notion of extractability according to [BCCT12],
does not imply 1-more, weak extractability. By inspecting the above proof, we can also
derive a similar relation between extractability [BCCT12] and 1-more extractability (not
the weaker form), i.e., for the general notion of 1-more extractability that does not require
As. This is due to the fact that, in the above proof, the attacker against the hardness
of DLOG does not require access to As, thus a similar proof holds for proving that ex-
tractability [BCCT12] does not imply 1-more extractability, and thus the latter notion is
strictly stronger than the one by [BCCT12]. Later in the thesis, we present a construction
which is 1-more weakly extractable, but it is not extractable according to [BCCT12], which
gives us a separation between the notions.
4.3 Constructing 1-more weakly extractable hash functions
from KEA
In the current section we construct 1-more wECRH under t-KEA, but before doing so, we
present the main idea behind our technique. Having in mind Lemma 4.2.5 and its proof,
the main observation is that, even though the hash function family of Construction 4.2.3
is malleable, the modified hash value, ṽ, has some structure: it is the hash value of the
message yielded after applying an affine transformation on the original message, s (in the
above case, the affine transformation was xs). Interestingly, we prove later in this section,
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that under t-KEA, applying an affine transformation is the only thing the adversary can
do! In particular, it is shown that, if the adversary outputs a valid, new hash value, ṽ, then
there exists an extractor that extracts an affine transformation on the underlying message.
So, in order to make the hash function family non-malleable (and then 1-more extractable),
first we encode the message s (i.e., we compute c← Enc(s)), using a non-malleable encoding
scheme, (Enc,Dec), against affine functions, and then v = (g〈r,c〉, ga〈r,c〉) is computed as
the output of the hash function. This approach can be viewed as a computational analogue
of a non-malleable reduction, as previously used by [ADL14], and then formally presented
by [ADKO15] (both works are in the information-theoretic setting).
It turns out that, in order to apply the methodology described above, a slightly stronger
flavor of non-malleability is required for the underlying code, formalized in the present the-
sis as randomness simulatable non-malleable codes (RSS-NMC). The results of the present
section are presented as follows: (1) we first construct 1-more wECRH assuming any ran-
domness simulatable non-malleable encoding scheme, against affine tampering functions,
and (2) we show how to construct such a code. Finally, we present Corollary 4.3.10 to
summarize our overall construction, by putting all things together in a single statement.
4.3.1 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from RSS-NMC codes
against affine functions
In this section we construct a collision resistant, 1-more extractable hash function family
(wECRH). Before doing so, we present the notion of randomness simulatable, strongly
non-malleable codes (RSS-NMC). This notion is stronger than strong non-malleability
(cf. Definition 2.3.3) in the sense that besides simulating the tampered message, s̃, the
simulator also needs to produce the randomness of the encoder, s̃r, such that the encoding of
s̃ with randomness s̃r, produces the tampered codeword. To ease the presentation of RSS-
NMC, we modify the syntax of non-malleable codes, so that the decoder, Dec, returns,
not only the decoded message, s̃, but also the randomness string, s̃r, for the encoder Enc.
1
Definition 4.3.1 (Randomness simulatable, strongly non-malleable code). Let (Enc,Dec)
be a (κ, ν)-coding scheme and F be a family of functions f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν . For every
1It is possible to define RSS-NMC without modifying the operation of Dec at the expense of slightly
complicating the definition of non-malleability. Due to the fact that our RSS-NMC construction conforms
to the modified syntax, we opt for the simpler alternative.
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f ∈ F and s ∈ {0, 1}κ, define the tampering experiment
Tamperfs :=
{
c← Enc(s), c̃← f(c), (s̃r, s̃)← Dec(c̃)
Output same∗ if c̃ = c, and (s̃r, s̃) otherwise.
}
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc and Dec. An encoding scheme
(Enc,Dec) is randomness simulatable, strongly non-malleable (RSS-NM), with respect to










Here, “≈” may refer to statistical, or computational, indistinguishability. For encoding
schemes in the common reference string model, the definition is analogous.
Next we present our construction.
Construction 4.3.2 (1-more weakly extractable hash). Let G be a group-generation al-
gorithm and let (Enc,Dec) be a (kt, kt′)-encoding scheme, t, t′ = poly(k). An instance of a
(kt, 2k)-compressing hash function family H = (Gen, h) is defined as follows:
1. Gen(1k): sample (G, g, p) ← G(1k), (a, r) ← Zp × Zt
′
p , where p = |G|, and output
z := (G, gr, gar).
2. Hashing computation: on input message s = (s1, . . . , st), sample sr ← U{0,1}poly(k),
and compute hz(s; sr) := (g
〈r,c〉, g〈ar,c〉), where c← Enc(s; sr).
For encoding schemes (Init,Enc,Dec) in the CRS model, Gen(1k) outputs (z,Σ), where
Σ← Init(1k).
For brevity, in what follows G will be omitted from the description of the hash, and
we will use h to refer both to the program of the hash and the key of a specific element
(gr, gar), i.e., z is omitted. Also, notice that, the description of the hash function family
defined above matches the one of Construction 4.2.3.
In what follows, we prove that Construction 4.3.2, which is a composition of an encoding
scheme (Enc,Dec), with construction 4.2.3 (the extractable hash function by Bitansky et
al. [BCCT12]), is a 1-more wECRH, assuming that (Enc,Dec), satisfies certain properties.
Then, in Section 4.3.2, we instantiate (Enc,Dec) with the desired properties. Below, we
prove that Construction 4.3.2 is collision resistant.
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Lemma 4.3.3. Let G be any group generation algorithm. Then, assuming the hardness
of the discrete logarithm problem on G, and the underlying encoding algorithm is injective,
Construction 4.3.2 is collision resistant with respect to G.
Proof. In [BCCT12], the authors prove that the hash function family of Construction 4.2.3,
H∗, is collision resistant, assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. We
recall that Construction 4.3.2 is a composition of Enc(·) and H∗. Following a simple fact
that any injective function composed with a collision resistant hash function still results in a
collision resistant hash function (composition in any order), we can conclude that the hash
function family of Construction 4.3.2 is collision resistant, under the same assumption.
In the following theorem, we prove that, under certain assumptions, Construction 4.3.2,
is a 1-more wECRH.
Theorem 4.3.4. Let t(k), t′(k) = poly(k) and let (Enc,Dec) be an RSS-NMC (kt, kt′)-
encoding scheme, against Faff (cf. Definition 2.2.2), such that that for any message s,
H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ k + ω(log k). Then, assuming (t′ + 1)-KEA and the hardness of DLOG,
the hash function family of Construction 4.3.2, H, is 1-more weakly extractable, with respect
to (Enc,Dec).
Proof. For k ∈ N, let (Enc,Dec) be an RSS-NMC (kt, kt′)-coding scheme, against Faff ,
t(k), t′(k) = poly(k), and let H be the (kt, 2k)-compressing, collision-resistant, hash func-
tion family of Construction 4.3.2, with respect to (Enc,Dec). Following Definition 4.2.1, we
need to prove that for any PPT algorithm Av with auxiliary input zv, there exist extractor
EHAv and auxiliary input zE , such that for any PPT algorithm As, any large k and every





(1, zv, zE) = 1
]
≤ negl(k). (4.4)
Clearly, if Av fails to produce a new valid hash value, or, if As fails to produce a valid pre-
image for the new hash value, the experiment simply outputs 0, and there is no challenge
for the extractor. Therefore, the interesting case is when Av produces a valid hash value,
say ṽ, while having access to an element in the range of the hash, say v, and As produces
a valid pre-image for ṽ, while having access to the message s,2 the randomness used to
compute the hash, s̃r, and any other state information produced by Av, denoted as st.
Hence, for the rest of the proof we assume ṽ 6= v, and (s̃r, s̃) is a valid pre-image for ṽ, i.e.,
h(s̃; s̃r) = ṽ.
2Since we prove 1-extractability, s denotes a single message, which is a vector over Ztp.
4.3. Constructing 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from KEA 80
The description of an element in H is h = (gr1 , . . . , grt′ , gar1 , . . . , gart′ ), while a hash




), for some r′ ∈ Zp; Av receives as
input (h, v) and the auxiliary input zv. Having these in mind, the main steps in our proof
are the following: (1) we prove that, by appending appropriately v to the description h, we
receive a description h∗ which is statistically close to an element in H∗ (cf. Construction
4.2.3), for messages with t′+ 1 coordinates, (2) given Av we define an attacker Āv against
H∗, (3) since H∗ is an extractable hash function family [BCCT12] assuming (t′+ 1)-KEA,
we can use the extractor of H∗ against Āv, to extract a valid pre-image of ṽ with respect
to H∗, (4) we prove that the extracted pre-image yields an affine transformation, which is
the one that Av applied to the original pre-image in order to construct ṽ, and we use the
RSS-NMC simulator to extract a valid pre-image for ṽ, this time with respect to H.
First we define an adversary, Āv, against the hash function family H∗, of Construction
4.2.3, for vector messages with t′ + 1 coordinates. Concretely, we have,
Āv (h∗ = (gr1 , . . . , grt′+1 , gar1 , . . . , gart′+1), zv):
1. Set h := (gr1 , . . . , grt′ , gar1 , . . . , gart′ ) and v := (grt′+1 , gart′+1).
2. Output: Execute Av(h, v, zv) and output Av’s output.
Here, Āv, first interprets the description of the hash function h∗, as (h, v), i.e., as a descrip-
tion of a hash function and hash value, with respect to H, and then executes Av(h, v, zv).
Under (t′+1)-KEA, H∗ is an extractable hash function family [BCCT12]. Then, assuming
h∗ is indistinguishable from an element in H∗ (we prove it below), there exists an extractor
ĒH∗Āv with its auxiliary input zE , that extracts a valid pre-image for ṽ, with respect to h
∗
(see Claim 4.3.5). We define the auxiliary input zE := zĒ .
The extractor is defined below.
The extractor EHAv :









). Here, we interpret h∗ as a description of hash function
h∗ ∈ H∗, for vector messages with t′ + 1 coordinates.
2. Sample (b1, . . . , bt′ , d)← ĒH
∗
Āv (h
∗, zE) and set f := ((b1, . . . , bt′), d) = (b, d) ∈ Zt
′
p ×Zp.
4.3. Constructing 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from KEA 81
3. Interpret f as an affine function that on input (x1, . . . , xt′) outputs (dx1 + b1, dx2 +
b2, . . . , dxt′ + bt′), and then sample (ŝr, ŝ)← Dafff , where Dafff is the simulator of the
underlying RSS-NMC, (Enc,Dec), parameterized by the affine function f .3
4. Output: (ŝr, ŝ).
The extractor is defined with respect to any input v, still by the definition of the `-
more experiment, v is always a valid hash value, i.e., v = h(s) = (g〈r,c〉, ga〈r,c〉), where
c← Enc(s), for some message s. Then, for any As, and message s, we are going to analyze
the execution of Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE). We first prove that with overwhelming probability,
the following events happen:
• E1: h∗(b1, . . . , bt′ , d) = ṽ, where ṽ is the output of Av on input (h, v).
• E2: Enc(s̃; s̃r) = f(c), where (s̃r, s̃) is the output of As.
We formalize those ideas in the following claims.
Claim 4.3.5. Let h, Av, zv, EHAv and zE , be as they where defined above. Then, for any
As and message s, assuming (t′ + 1)-KEA and H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ k + ω(log k), we have that
Pr[¬E1] < negl(k), over the randomness of the experiment Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE).
Proof. We recall that the experiment selects a uniform element h = (gr, gar) ∈ H, and
then computes v = h(s) = (g〈r,c〉, ga〈r,c〉), where c ← Enc(s; sr). In order to show
that (b1, . . . , bt′ , d) is a valid pre-image for ṽ with respect to h
∗, we prove that h∗ :=
(gr, g〈r,c〉, gar, ga〈r,c〉) is indistinguishable from an element in H∗. Concretely, by assump-
tion we have that H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ k+ω(log k). Since the randomness of the encoder is inde-
pendent of Z = (zv, h), (those values are fixed before sampling randomness for the hash),
we have H∞ (Enc(s) | Z) ≥ k + ω(log k), and therefore, H̃∞(Enc(s) | Z) ≥ k + ω(log k).
By the above argument, the Left-Over Hash Lemma (Lemma 2.1.11) and the universality
of the inner product function (Lemma 2.1.13), the distribution 〈r, c〉 is statistically close
to uniform, under the partial execution of the “1-more” experiment, i.e., up to the point
we execute the extractor. This implies that the distribution (gr, g〈r,c〉, gar, ga〈r,c〉) is sta-




), for a uniformly random r′, and thus Pr[E1] differs by a
negligible quantity under the two distributions, denoted as D1 and D2, respectively.
3Given that the underlying encoding scheme is an RSS-NMC, defining the simulator is straightforward:
given f , the simulator executes Tamperf0 , where 0 denotes the zero message, and outputs the output of the
experiment.
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In [BCCT12] the authors showed that H∗ is extractable assuming (t′+ 1)-KEA, which
implies that the extractor ĒH∗Āv extracts a pre-image for ṽ, with respect to h
∗, i.e., the
event E1 happens with overwhelming probability, under the distribution D2. Therefore,
by the statistical closeness between D1 and D2, we conclude that the event E1 happens
with overwhelming probability, under the distribution D1. This completes the proof of the
claim.
Claim 4.3.6. Let h, Av, zv, EHAv and zE , be as they where defined above. Then, for any As
and message s, Pr[¬E2] < negl(k) over the randomness of the experiment Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE).
Proof. We have Pr[¬E2] = Pr[¬E2 ∧ E1] + Pr[¬E2 ∧ ¬E1], and by the previous claim we
have Pr[¬E1] < negl(k). Therefore, it suffices to show that Pr[¬E2 ∧E1] < negl(k). Thus,
below we focus on the event ¬E2 ∧ E1.
Let h̄∗ := (gr, gar) = h. We treat h̄∗ as an element in H∗ operating over in Zt′p , i.e.,
for any message s ∈ Zt′p , h̄∗(s) = (g〈r,s〉, ga〈r,s〉). By the definition of H and H∗, for any
message s ∈ Zt′p , we have that,
h(s; sr) = h̄
∗(Enc(s; sr)). (4.5)
Now, recall that, in order to exclude the trivial cases, we have assumed that the output
of As, (s̃r, s̃), is a valid pre-image for ṽ, i.e., h(s̃; s̃r) = ṽ, which by Equation 4.5 implies
that h̄∗(Enc(s̃; s̃r)) = ṽ. Whenever E1 takes place we have that h
∗(b1, . . . , bt′ , d) = ṽ, and







= ṽ. From the last relation we receive that h̄∗(f(c)) = ṽ. Now,
recall that, by Lemma 4.2.4, the family H∗ is collision resistant, assuming the hardness
of DLOG. Assuming that Pr[¬E2 ∧ E1] happens with non-negligible probability, we have
that Enc(s̃; s̃r) 6= f(c), while h̄∗(Enc(s̃r, s̃)) = h̄∗(f(c)), with non-negligible probability.
Thus, by simulating the 1-more experiment, we find such a collision with non-negligible
probability, as long as ¬E2 ∧E1 happens. This reaches a contradiction and completes the
proof of the claim.
Finally, we argue that, with overwhelming probability the output of the extractor,
(ŝr, ŝ), is a valid pre-image for ṽ, i.e., h(ŝ; ŝr) = ṽ. Here, recall that (ŝr, ŝ) is the output
of the simulator Dafff , of the underlying RSS-NMC. Concretely, we prove the following
claim.
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Claim 4.3.7. Let h, Av, zv, EHAv and zE , be as they where defined above, and assume
that (Enc,Dec) is an RSS-NMC. Then, for any As and message s, Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)] <
negl(k), over the randomness of the experiment Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE).
Proof. As above, we can upper bound Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)], by Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)∧E1∧E2]+
Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)∧¬E1∧E2]+Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)∧E1∧¬E2]+Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)∧¬E1∧¬E2].
By the above claims, we have Pr[¬E1],Pr[¬E2] < negl(k). Therefore, in order to show the
current claim, it suffices to prove that Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ)∧E1∧E2] < negl(k). Thus, in the
rest of the proof we focus on the event (s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ) ∧ E1 ∧ E2.
By Claims 4.3.5, 4.3.6, we have that Enc(s̃; s̃r) = f(c) and h̄
∗(f(c)) = ṽ, with over-
whelming probability. Moreover, in order to exclude the trivial cases with respect to the
task that needs to accomplished by the extractor, we have assumed that ṽ 6= v = h̄∗(c).
Since v 6= ṽ, we have c 6= f(c); since f(c) = Enc(s̃; s̃r), f(c) is a valid codeword. Thus, by
the previous observations we have that Dec(f(c)) 6= ⊥. Moreover, by the security of the
RSS-NMC scheme, we know that with overwhelming probability Pr[Enc(ŝr; ŝ) 6= f(c)] <
negl(k). Since Enc is injective, this implies that Pr[(s̃r, s̃) 6= (ŝr, ŝ) ∧ E1 ∧ E2] < negl(k),
and the proof of the claim is complete.
Note, that, for any As and message s, the experiment Exps,hAv ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE) outputs 1
if h(s̃; s̃r) = ṽ ∧ ṽ 6= v ∧ h(ŝ; ŝr) 6= ṽ. By the above claims, h(ŝ; ŝr) 6= ṽ, with negligible





(1, zv, zE) = 1
]
≤ negl(k).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
4.3.2 Constructing RSS-NM codes
In the present section, we construct an RSS-NMC as required by the 1-more wECRH of
Construction 4.3.2. A simplified version of the proposed construction is presented in the
next paragraph.
For any message s, our encoder secret shares s into (s1, s2), using a two-out-of-two,




2). Then, for any codeword








i, for i ∈ {1, 2}, the decoder
outputs s1 + s2, otherwise, it outputs ⊥. An affine tampering function, f , against the
code is described by the pair (b, d), where b = (b1, b2, b3, b4), and the application of f
on a codeword c, yields the codeword d · c + b. Briefly, security of the scheme is proven
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by considering the following cases. If d = 0, then the tampered codeword is completely
overwritten by b, and clearly, the output of the decoder depends only on b. If d 6= 0,
then, we prove that, either the attack leaves the codeword intact, i.e., d = 1,b = 0, or the
decoding of the tampered codeword is equal to ⊥, with overwhelming probability.
Construction 4.3.8 (An RSS-NMC against Faff). For any k ∈ N, t = poly(k), we define
a (kt, (2t+ 4)k)-encoding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec) in the CRS model,4 as follows:
• Init(1k): sample a k-bit prime p ∈ (2k−1, 2k) and set Σ := p.
• Enc(Σ, ·): let s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ Ftp be the input to Enc. Sample two random field
elements v, r ← Fp, and then output
c =
(
v, v2, r, r2, u1, u
2





where ui = si − r for i ∈ [t].
• Dec(Σ, ·): on input c = (v, v̄, r, r̄, u1, ū1, . . . , ut, ūt), the decoder checks whether v̄ =
v2, r̄ = r2, and ūi = u
2
i for all i ∈ [t]. If so, then it outputs (v, r, u1 +r, u2 +r, . . . , ut+
r), otherwise, outputs ⊥.
All operations are performed modulo p. We also consider the deterministic version of Enc
by allowing the randomness to be given on the input. In that case we have c← Enc(Σ, sr, s),
where sr = (v, r).
Notice, that, the randomness employed by the above construction is 2k, independently
of the message length.
Theorem 4.3.9. The code of Construction 4.3.8 is randomness simulatable, strongly non-
malleable (Definition 4.3.1), against Faff . In addition, for any message s, H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥
k + ω(log k).
Proof. Let f ∈ Faff be a tampering function against the code, defined by the pair (b, d) ∈
F2t+4p × Fp, where b = (bv, b′v, br, b′r, b1, b′1, . . . , bt, b′t) and f(c) = dc + b. Following the










4Note that the CRS is not essential for this encoding, but for simplicity we describe the code in this
model.
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i.e., the output of the tampering experiment is independent of the message and decidable
only by inspecting the function f .
Now, recall that any codeword has the following form
c =
(
v, v2, r, r2, u1, u
2





We then consider the following cases:
1. (d = 0): such an attack completely overwrites c with b, which is independent of the
original message, s. Therefore, for any of the two messages s0 and s1, the tampering
experiment outputs Dec(c̃) = Dec(b), independently of the message.
2. (d = 1 and b = 0): this attack leaves the codeword intact for both experiments, and
the output of the experiment should be same∗, independently of the message.
3. (d = 1 and b 6= 0): assume that (bz, b′z) 6= (0, 0) for some z ∈ [t] ∪ {v, r}.5 We
know that the tampering experiment outputs a non-bottom value only if the follow-
ing equation is satisfied: (duz+bz)
2 = du2z+b
′
z. (For simplicity, and in order to cover
the cases of r, v, we denote ur := r, uv := v). We argue that this happens with negli-
gible probability, which implies that both experiments output ⊥, with overwhelming
probability.
By expanding the equation and plugging in d = 1, we have 2bzuz + b
2
z − b′z = 0. We
consider two cases with respect to (bz, b
′
z): (a) bz 6= 0; (b) bz = 0, b′z 6= 0. For case
(b), clearly, the output in both experiments is ⊥. Regarding case (a), the equation
is linear, and therefore, it possesses at most one solution. By our choice of uz (recall
that uz = sz − r where r is a random field element), we know that its marginal
distribution is uniform, and thus the probability that the equation is satisfied is at
most 1/p.
4. d ∈ Fp \ {0, 1}: as above, we argue that the two experiments output ⊥ with
overwhelming probability. As we discussed above, the tampering experiments out-
put non-bottom values only if (duz + bz)
2 = du2z + b
′
z is satisfied, for all z ∈
[t] ∪ {r, v}. This probability can be upper bounded by the probability that a par-
ticular equation is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we consider the equation
d(d − 1)u21 + 2db1u1 + b21 − b′1 = 0. Since a ∈ Fp \ {0, 1}, the above equation is of
degree 2, and by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, it possesses at most two solutions. As
5Here, we treat v, r, as special symbols, not as integers.
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we argued above, the marginal distribution of u1 is uniformly random. Thus, the
probability that the equation is satisfied is at most 2/p.
The above case analysis covers all possibilities for (b, d), and the proof of the first
part of the theorem is complete. For the second part, by construction we have that
any codeword consists of two random field elements (r, v), having length 2k, and thus
H∞ (Enc(s)) = 2k > k + ω(log k). This completes the proof of the theorem.
4.3.3 Our resulting instantiation
By plugging Construction 4.3.8, as the underlying encoding scheme to Construction 4.3.2,
we receive the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.10. Under the DLOG assumption and t-KEA, there exists an explicit
1-more wECRH.
Proof. Let (Init,Enc,Dec) be the (kt, (2t+4)k) RSS-NMC of Construction 4.3.8. Then we
construct Hk by plugging in (Init,Enc,Dec), as the underlying encoding scheme to the hash
function family of Construction 4.3.2. Clearly, by Lemma 4.3.3, Hk is collision resistant as
the underlying encoder is injective. By Theorem 4.3.9, the underlying encoding scheme is
an RSS-NMC against Faff , and moreover, for any message s, H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ k+ω(log k).
Thus, by Theorem 4.3.4, Hk is a 1-more wECRH. This concludes the proof of this
corollary.
4.3.4 Constructing `-more weakly extractable hash under KEA
In the “`-more” setting, the attacker is given v1, . . . , v`, precomputed hash values, and
produces a new hash value ṽ. Having the techniques from the “1-more” setting, we can
argue that any attack against ṽ (in the `-more setting), can be reduced to an affine attack
against the codewords c1, . . . , c`, that are related to v1, . . . , v`, respectively. In order to
construct `-more wECRH, for ` > 1, we generalize the notion of RSS-NMC, for multiple
codewords. The generalization is a straightforward extension of Definition 4.3.1, where
the tampering function receives ` ∈ N codewords and the simulator needs to recover the
message and the randomness, in case the output of the tampering function is not among
the given codewords. The formal is definition is given below.
Definition 4.3.11 (Multi-codeword RSS-NMC). Let (Enc,Dec) be a (κ, ν)-coding scheme
and F be a family of functions f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν . For every f ∈ F and s = (s1, . . . , s`) ∈
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({0, 1}κ)`, define the tampering experiment
MultiTamperfs :=
{
ci ← Enc(si), i ∈ [`], c̃← f(c1, . . . , c`), (s̃r, s̃) = Dec(c̃)
Output same∗ if ∃i : c̃ = ci, and (s̃r, s̃) otherwise.
}
which is a random variable over the randomness of Enc and Dec. An encoding scheme
(Enc,Dec) is multi-codeword, randomness simulatable, strongly non-malleable, with respect










Here, “≈” may refer to statistical, or computational, indistinguishability. For encoding
schemes in the common reference string model, the definition is analogous.
Clearly, for ` = 1, the notion of multi-codeword RSS-NMC matches the one presented in
Definition 4.3.1. In order to construct, `-more wECRH, for ` > 1, we need an RSS-NMC,
for the following function class.
Definition 4.3.12 (The function class F̄ `aff). We define the following function class
F̄ `aff = {f(x1, . . . , x`) = f1(x1) + . . .+ f`(x`) | fi ∈ Faff}.
We present the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.13. The encoding scheme of Construction 4.3.8, (Enc,Dec), is a multi-
codeword RSS-NMC against F̄ `aff , for ` > 1.
Proof. Recall that, any f ∈ Faff produces a valid, new codeword, c̃, with respect to
(Enc,Dec), only when c̃ is independent of the original codeword. Moreover, the output
of Tamperfs is same
∗, only if f = (0, 1), where Tamper is the tampering experiment of
Definition 4.3.1 (for brevity we omit the CRS). Based on those facts and using similar
arguments with the proof of Theorem 4.3.9, it is not hard to see that when consider-
ing multiple codewords/messages and the encoding (Enc,Dec) against Faff , any tampering
function f = (f1, . . . , f`) ∈ F̄ `aff , makes the tampering experiment of Definition 4.3.11 to
output same∗, only if a single fm = (bm, dm) is the identity function, i.e., bm = 0, dm = 1,
while the remaining functions are the zero-functions, i.e., bj = 0, dj = 0, j ∈ [`]\{m}. We
will refer to such a tampering function using the term projection function. Now, given a
tampering function f = (f1, . . . , f`) ∈ F̄ `aff , and messages s = (s1, . . . , s`), we can easily
construct f ′ ∈ Faff , s′, for which MultiTamperfs = Tamper
f ′
s′ , where MultiTamper is the tam-
pering experiment of Definition 4.3.11. If f ′ is a projection function with respect to index
4.3. Constructing 1-more weakly extractable hash functions from KEA 88
m, we set f ′ = (0, 1) and s′ = sm, and clearly, both experiments output same
∗. Otherwise,
assuming f1 = (b1, d1), we compute b =
∑`
i=2 fi(Enc(si)) and we set f
′ = (b + b1, d1),
s′ = s1, and we can prove, exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.9, that either the tam-
pered codeword is independent of the original, and the outputs for both experiments are
decidable by inspecting the tampering function, or both experiments output ⊥. Thus,
assuming that we can distinguish between MultiTamperfs0 and MultiTamper
f
s1 , for some







, breaking the security of the RSS-NMC of Construction 4.3.8.
In the “`-more” setting the attacker receives vi = (g
〈r,ci〉, ga〈r,ci〉), i ∈ [`], and constructs
a valid hash ṽ. The proof of Theorem 4.3.4 easily extends to the “`-more” setting by








, where (f1, . . . , f`) ∈ F̄ `aff , and we achieve
extractability using the simulator of the underlying RSS-NMC, for multiple codewords.
Thus, we are able to show the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.14. Under the DLOG assumption and t-KEA, Construction 4.3.2, instan-
tiated with the encoding scheme of Construction 4.3.8, is an `-more wECRH.
The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 4.3.4, as we discussed above.
4.3.5 Leakage-resilient `-more wECRH under KEA
In the current section, we present the notion of leakage-resilient `-more wECRH and we
prove that Construction 4.3.2 satisfies this notion. The proposed definition is along the
lines of Definition 4.2.1.
Definition 4.3.15 (`-more weakly extractable, leakage-resilient hash function families).
Let `, λ ∈ N and let g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ. An efficiently samplable hash function ensemble
H = {Hk}k∈N, is `-more weakly extractable against λ bits of leakage, if for any PPT algo-
rithm Av and any zv ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), there exist a PPT extractor EHAv and zE ∈ {0, 1}
poly(k),
such that for all PPT algorithms As, any large k ∈ N and any vector of messages s =





(`, λ, zv, zE) = 1
]
≤ negl(k),
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where,
Exps,hAv ,As,EAv
(`, λ, zv, zE) :
τi ← {0, 1}poly(k), vi = h(si; τi), i ∈ [`] ( hash computation )
t = (τ1, . . . , τ`),v = (v1, . . . , v`)
(ṽ, st)← Av(h,v, g(t), zv) ( hash tampering )
(τ̂ , ŝ)← EAv(h,v, zE) ( pre-image extraction )
(τ̃ , s̃)← As (h, t, s, st) ( pre-image tampering )
If h(s̃; τ̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi ∧ h(ŝ; τ̂) 6= ṽ, return 1
otherwise, return 0
The main requirement for proving security of Construction 4.3.2, is that, the underlying
encoding scheme, (Enc,Dec), is an RSS-NMC against affine functions, and Enc(s) has
sufficient entropy. Given a scheme that satisfies such properties, we prove that Construction
4.3.2 is an `-more wECRH under the t-KEA and DLOG (cf. Theorem 4.3.2).
In the following theorem, we reduce the `-more extractability in the presence of leak-
age, to standard, i.e., `-more extractability without leakage, under the same assumptions.
Briefly, the main idea behind the proof presented below, is that if Enc(s; τ) has sufficient
entropy even given bounded leakage over τ , then v is indistinguishable from uniform due
to the universality property (cf. Definition 2.1.13) of the inner product, and we manage to
reduce `-more extractability in the presence of leakage, to `-more extractability without
leakage, using a series of hybrids. Our result is formally presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.16. For k ∈ N, let H be the `-more wECRH family of Construction 4.3.2
instantiated with an RSS-NMC encoding scheme, (Enc,Dec), such that for any message
s, H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ λ + k + ω(log k). Then, H is an `-more wECRH against λ bits of
non-adaptive leakage.
Proof. We prove the needed for the 1-more case (the `-more case is identical) using a series
of hybrid experiments that we describe below and they are depicted in Figure 4.1.
• For any g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, PPT Av with auxiliary input zv, any As, any message s
and h ∈ H, Exp0 is the `-more experiment under leakage, Exp
s,h
Av ,As,EAv
(`, λ, zv, zE), of
Definition 4.3.15. In order to fully define the experiment we need to define E , zE : for
any g, Av, zv, we define the non-leakage attacker A′v, such that A′v(h, v, zv) samples
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independent randomness τ ′ ← {0, 1}poly(k) and executes (ṽ, st)← Av(h, v, g(τ ′), zv).
By the 1-more extractability of H (without leakage) there exists extractor EHA′v with
hardcoded auxiliary information zE , for A′v, and we define E := EHA′v . We prove that
for any Av, zv, As and any message s, Pr[Exp0 = 1] ≤ negl(k), otherwise we break
1-more extractability, without leakage, of H, with non-negligible probability.
• In Exp1 we modify Exp0 in two ways. First the leakage is computed over the in-
dependent randomness τ ′, instead of τ , which is used to compute v. As we prove,
if the adversary is not leaking more than λ bits in total, v is statistically close
to a uniform element in the range of the hash, even if the attacker receives leak-
age over τ , and this modification does not induce any statistical difference be-
tween the two experiments. Thus, Av cannot distinguish between the two ex-
periments. However, As might do so since for some leakage query g we might
have g(τ) 6= g(τ ′). Hence, for any As, we define an A′s, that given τ , s, com-
putes the output of As, exactly as it happens in Exp0, i.e., A′s (h, τ, s, st) computes
(i) v ← h(s; τ), (ii) (ṽ, st) ← Av(h, v, g(τ), zv), (iii) outputs (τ̃ , s̃) ← As (h, τ, s, st),
and clearly, the output of As in Exp0, matches the output of A′s in Exp1.
• In Exp2, for any Av, we substitute Av with A′v such that A′v(h, v, zv) samples τ ′ ←
{0, 1}poly(k) and outputs (ṽ, st) ← Av(h, v, g(τ ′), zv). Exp2 is the original `-more
experiment (without leakage) and it is not hard to see that Exp1 ≈ Exp2.
In the following claims we prove statistical indistinguishability between the hybrids.
The statistical distance between Exp0 and Exp1 is bounded by the distance of the in-
put/output variables to Av, As, A′s and E .
Claim 4.3.17. For any any leakage function g, any s, Av, As, zv, (h(s; τ), g(τ)) ≈
(h(s; τ), g(τ ′)), over the randomness of Exp0, Exp1.
Proof. By assumption we have that for any s, H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ λ+ k + ω(log k). Moreover,
each leakage query g can leak at most λ bits of τ (as all queries cannot leak more than λ
bits, in total). Since the randomness of the encoder is independent of zv, h, we have that for
Z = (zv, h, g(h)), H∞ (Enc(s) | Z) ≥ k + ω(log k). Thus, H̃∞(Enc(s) | Z) ≥ k + ω(log k).
By the Left-Over Hash Lemma (Lemma 2.1.11) and the universality of the inner product
function (Lemma 2.1.13), the distribution 〈r,Enc(s; τ)〉 is statistically close to uniform over
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Exp0 :
τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), v = h(s; τ)
(ṽ, st)← Av(h, v, g(τ), zv)
(τ̂ , ŝ)← E(h, v)
(τ̃ , s̃)← As (h, τ, s, st)




τ, τ ′ ← {0, 1}poly(k) , v = h(s; τ)
(ṽ, st)← Av(h, v, g(τ ′) , zv)
(τ̂ , ŝ)← E(h, v)
(τ̃ , s̃)← A′s (h, τ, s, st)




τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), v = h(s; τ)
(ṽ, st)← A′v(h, v, zv)
(τ̂ , ŝ)← E(h, v)
(τ̃ , s̃)← A′s (h, τ, s, st)
If h(s̃; τ̃) = ṽ ∧ ṽ 6= v ∧ h(ŝ; τ̂) 6= ṽ :
return 1
otherwise, return 0
Figure 4.1: The hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 4.3.16. The gray part signifies
the portion of the code of an experiment that differs from the previous one.
Zp and we have






≈ ((gr, gar), g(τ)) ,
for uniform r, τ . Since τ , τ ′, r, are uniform and independent we have ((gr, gar), g(τ))
≈ ((gr, gar), g(τ ′)), and thus (h(s; τ), g(τ)) ≈ (h(s; τ), g(τ ′)). This concludes the proof of
the claim and the input and output distributions for Av and E in both experiments are
the same.
By the above claim and the fact that the input and output distributions of As and A′s
are the same (by the definition of A′s), we have that Exp0 ≈ Exp1.
Finally, in Exp2, A′v is just sampling τ ′ internally and then executes Av. Again the
output distributions of Av and A′v are the same, thus Exp1 ≈ Exp2.
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From the above we have that Exp0 ≈ Exp2 and |Pr[Exp0 = 1]−Pr[Exp2 = 1]| ≤ negl(k).
Thus, assuming Pr[Exp0 = 1] > ε, for ε = 1/poly(k), we receive that Pr[Exp2 = 1] >
ε′ = ε− negl(k), and the 1-more extractability of H breaks with non-negligible probability
(recall that Exp2 is the 1-more experiment without leakage). Thus, Pr[Exp0 = 1] ≤ negl(k),
and 1-more extractability under leakage for H follows.
By plugging the non-malleable encoding scheme, (Init,Enc,Dec), against affine func-
tions (cf. Construction 4.3.8), with |p| = k + λ, as the underlying encoding scheme to
Construction 4.3.2, we have that for any message s, H∞ (Enc(s)) ≥ λ+ k + ω(log k), and
Construction 4.3.2 is an `-more wECRH against λ bits of leakage (cf. Definition 4.3.15).
4.4 `-more weakly extractable hash functions in the
random oracle model
In the current section, we prove that any hash function is an `-more wECRH (cf. Defi-
nition 4.2.1) when it is modeled as a random oracle. Since in the random oracle model,
the randomness comes from the oracle, we do not hash the message using independent
randomness, τ , and in addition, the adversary and the extractor receive black box ac-
cess to the hash function, h. In this setting, leakage resilience (cf. Definition 4.3.15) is
straightforward.
In what follows, we briefly discuss the main idea behind the proof of Theorem 4.4.1,
presented below. Any adversary, (Av,As), against the `-more extractability, is required
(i) to produce a new valid hash value ṽ (this value is produced by Av) and (ii) to produce
a valid pre-image for ṽ (this value is produced by As). The extractor, who is given access
only to the queries made by Av, checks if there is any query (pre-image) that hashes to ṽ,
and if so, it correctly outputs that pre-image, otherwise it outputs ⊥. In the latter case,
the extractor fails only if As manages to output a valid pre-image for ṽ, which happens
with negligible probability, as for any s̃ output by As, when querying the oracle with s̃,
the probability of receiving ṽ as a reply, is negligible. This idea is formally presented in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let k, ` ∈ N and let h be a function, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k. Assuming h
is modeled as a random oracle, then h is an `-more wECRH (cf. Definition 4.2.1).
Proof. Let h be a random function that will be accessed by the extractor and the attacker in
a black-box way. For any Av with auxiliary input zv we define zE := zv and Eh(·) as follows:
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Eh(·)(v, zE):
1. (Initialization): Set Qv := ∅.
2. (Execute Av): Execute Av(v, zv) and for each oracle query q of Av, query the oracle
with q, set Qv = Qv ∪ {q} and send h(q) to Av. At the end of the execution receive
ṽ from Av.
3. (Output): If there exists q ∈ Qv, such that h(q) = ṽ, set ŝ := q, otherwise, set
ŝ := ⊥. Output ŝ.
Clearly, the running time of Eh(·) is linear in the running time of Av. According to Defini-
tion 4.2.1, we need to prove that for any any PPT algorithm Av, any zv ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), all








Exps,hAv ,As,E(`, zv, zE) :
vi = h(si), i ∈ [`]
v = (v1, . . . , v`)
(ṽ, st)← Ah(·)v (v, zv)
ŝ← Eh(·)(v, zE)
s̃← Ah(·)s (s, st)
If h(s̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi ∧ h(ŝ) 6= ṽ, return 1
otherwise, return 0
Let Q = {si | i ∈ [`]}. We define the following events,
B: Exps,hAv ,As,E(`, zv, zE) = 1, E: h(s̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi.
Clearly, Pr[B ∧ ¬E] = 0, thus we only need to bound Pr[B ∧ E].
Pr[B ∧ E] = Pr[h(s̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi ∧ h(ŝ) 6= ṽ]
= Pr[h(s̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : s̃ 6= si ∧ ŝ = ⊥]




where the last inequality follows from the fact that s̃ does not belong to the set of queries
made to h, thus h(s̃) is completely random over {0, 1}k. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
Chapter 5
Non-malleable codes in the
split-state model
5.1 Introduction
The split-state model was originally introduced and studied in the context of non-malleable
codes, by Dziembowski et al. [DPW10] and Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12], that considered
the case of two split states. Briefly speaking, in the split-state model with two states,
private memory is split into two parts, c0, c1, and the attacker may apply any function
f = (f0, f1) that results in a tampered memory equal to (f0(c0), f1(c1)). The critical point
here is that each fi, for i ∈ {0, 1}, tampers with ci independently of c1−i. This is a plausible
model to assume since there are many scenarios in which sensitive data may be split into
two storage devices that are physically separated for security reasons. In this setting, an
adversary that receives tampering access over the two devices modifies the contents of each
memory independently of the contents of the other. Note that, the model can generalize to
multiple split states, with the two-state variant being the hardest to achieve. In the present
chapter, we consider the problem of constructing practically efficient non-malleable codes
against split-state attackers with two states, and any reference to the split-state model is
with respect to the two-state variant. Before presenting the contributions of the present
chapter, the state of the art of split-state non-malleable codes is reviewed.
Broadly speaking, explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in the split-state model
can be categorized into information-theoretic and computational.1 In a recent break-
1The work of [DPW10] showed that in the random oracle model, there exist efficient non-malleable
codes against split-state tampering functions. However, their approach uses a probabilistic argument thus
providing only a proof of existence and not an explicit construction.
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through result, Aggarwal et al. [ADL14], provide the first polynomial-time, information-
theoretic, non-malleable code for multi-bit messages, significantly improving over the work
by Dziembowski et al. [DKO13], which only supports single-bit messages. The encoder
of [ADL14] produces codewords of length O((|s|+k)7), where |s| denotes the length of the
encoded message, s, and k is the security parameter. Later, Aggarwal et al. [ADKO15] pro-
posed another construction that achieves codeword length roughly O(|s|), for sufficiently
large |s|, however as the authors point in the conclusion of their work, the hidden constants
may be “astronomical”, as they depend on results from additive combinatorics.
The first computationally secure non-malleable code is presented by the work of Liu and
Lysyanskaya [LL12], that construct an efficient non-malleable code for split-state attackers,
using cryptographic tools such as leakage resilient public-key encryption [NS09], and robust
non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [DDO+01]. The rate of their construction is
not provided in the original paper and a textbook instantiation with public-key encryption
combined with NIZKs, does not yield a rate 1 code, since the length of the NIZK proof is
proportional to the message length. However, using state of the art tools, a better instan-
tiation of [LL12] could be provided, by combining the results of [LL12] together with the
compiler of [AAG+16], the public-key leakage resilient encryption of [NS09] and the effi-
cient NIZKs of [GS08], yielding a scheme with codeword length |s|+O(k2) (cf. Table 5.1).
In another work, Aggarwal et al. [AAG+16] presented a compiler that transforms any low
rate, non-malleable code, to a rate 1, computationally secure, non-malleable code. The
underlying encoding must satisfy a notion, strictly stronger than non-malleability, called
augmented non-malleability, which, as it is stated in [AAG+16], can be satisfied by the con-
struction of [ADL14]. By instantiating the compiler of [AAG+16] with the construction of
[ADL14], the codeword’s length becomes |s|+O(k7).
Although the above constructions achieve rate 1 asymptotically, i.e., the ratio of mes-
sage to codeword length is 1, as the message length, |s|, goes to infinity, in practice, the
induced overhead can still be too large when considering short messages, e.g., a 160-bit
cryptographic key, even without counting the potentially large hidden constants in the
asymptotic notation. Thus, even though the problem of “optimal-rate” has been solved
in theory, it is still unclear what the practical implications of those constructions are.
Given the current state of the art, as discussed above, constructing codes with very small
overhead, including the hidden constant, remains still one of the most important open
questions in the area. Note, that the natural lower bound for code length is merely |s|+k,




In the present chapter we tackle the problem of constructing truly efficient non-malleable
codes in the split-state model, based on the notion of `-more weakly extractable hash func-
tion families (wECRH), that was presented in Chapter 4. Recall that, `-more extractable
hash function families capture the idea that, if an adversary, that given ` ∈ N precomputed
hash values v1, . . . , v`, manages to produce a new valid hash value ṽ, then it must know a
pre-image of ṽ.
The main result, which is informally presented in the next theorem, states that non-
malleable codes against split-state attackers are implied from `-more weakly extractable
hash functions. The crux of the underlying methodology is to adapt the “public-key-
encrypt-and-prove” method of [LL12], using the notion of `-more weakly extractable hash
function families, yielding effectively a “(one-time-symmetric-key-encrypt)-and-hash” ap-
proach for obtaining non-malleable codes. In particular, the following, informally stated
theorem is proved:
Theorem 5.1.1 (Informal). Assuming 1-more wECRH, DLOG, and one-time leakage-
resilient authenticated encryption, there exists an explicit, information rate 1, non-malleable
code in the split-state model.
Assuming the KEA-based 1-more wECRH of Section 4.3.1, the proposed scheme pro-
duces codewords of length |s|+ 9k+ 2 log2(k) (or |s|+ 18k depending on the instantiation,
while for the random oracle based one, the codeword length is |s| + 6k + 2 log2(k) (cf.
Section 5.3). In Table 5.1, a comparison of the new scheme with the current state of
the art on the split-state setting, is provided. The new construction is truly efficient in
terms of codeword length, and it is one order of magnitude better than the combination
of [LL12] + [AAG+16] + [NS09] + [GS08], which is the most competitive scheme that can
be constructed,2 based on the current state of the art. It should be noted that, existing
constructions in the information-theoretic setting, such as [ADL14, ADKO15], and the
works built on top of them, e.g., [AAG+16], might require very large constants, inherited
by the results in additive combinatorics (cf. the conclusion of [ADKO15]).
2For the sake of this comparison, [LL12] is instantiated with the efficient zero-knowledge proofs of [GS08]
and the leakage resilient public-key encryption of [NS09]; moreover it can be observed that the resulting
encoding scheme is compatible with the compiler of [AAG+16] (it satisfies “augmented non-malleability”,
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Scheme Codeword length Model Assumption
[ADL14] O
(
(|s|+ k)7 log7(|s|+ k)
)
IT N/A
[ADKO15]3 O(max{|s|, k}) IT N/A











Comp., CRS4 LR-PKE + robust NIZK
This thesis |s|+ 9k + 2 log2(k) Comp., CRS 1-time LR-AE + KEA
This thesis |s|+ 6k + 2 log2(k) Comp., RO 1-time LR-AE
Table 5.1: Comparison of multi-bit NMCs in the split-state model. k is the security
parameter, “IT” stands for information-theoretic security, “Comp.” for computational
security, “AE” for authenticated encryption, and “LR” for leakage-resilient, respectively.
In the information-theoretic setting, typically security breaks with probability ε = 2−Ω(k);
in the computational setting, we have ε = negl(k), e.g., ε = k−ω(1) or 2−Ω(k), depending on
how strong the underlying computational assumption is.
5.1.2 Technical overview
The proposed NMC construction against split-state attackers is inspired by the one of
Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12], so we first revisit their construction. To encode a message
s, the encoder of [LL12] outputs (sk, (pk,Epk(s), π)), where E is the encryption algorithm
of a leakage-resilient, semantically secure, public-key encryption scheme (KGen,E,D), sk,
pk, denote the secret key and public key, respectively, and π is a non-interactive proof of
knowledge (robust NIZK), that proves the existence of a valid secret key, decrypting the
ciphertext to the message s.
The construction proposed in the present thesis significantly improves the efficiency of
[LL12] by refining their approach in two ways: (1) by replacing the leakage-resilient public-
key encryption scheme, with a one-time, symmetric-key, leakage-resilient authenticated
encryption scheme, and (2) by replacing the (robust) NIZK proof with a 1-more wECRH,
which was introduced in Chapter 4. The encoder works as follows: to encode a message
s, the encoder outputs
(
(τ, sk), (e = Esk(s), v = h(sk; τ))
)
, where E is the encryption
algorithm of a symmetric, leakage-resilient, authenticated encryption scheme, sk is the
corresponding secret key, h is a randomized 1-more wECRH, and τ denotes its randomness.
Here the reader can observe that, using a function h that is extractable according to
[BCCT12], i.e., not 1-more extractable, is not a good idea. Since generic authenticated
encryption schemes guarantee security only if the secret key remains the same, it is possible
a property defined in the latter paper) and thus the resulting system is of rate 1. This provides codeword
length |s|+O(k2), cited in Table 5.1.
4The size of the CRS is O(k), see [GS08]. The size of the CRS in the constructions presented in the
current chapter, is roughly 32k bits, cf. Section 5.2, and it is independent of |s|.
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to break security if the adversary modifies sk as well. In fact, it is possible to construct
an authenticated encryption scheme such that it becomes insecure if the secret key is
modified. Therefore, if the hash function family is malleable, then the tampering function
may compute (ẽ = Es̃k(s + 1), ṽ = h(s̃k)), where s̃k is a bad key that does not provide
security. In this setting, the tampered codeword decodes to a related message, and non-
malleability is impossible to prove. The 1-more extractability property resolves this issue:
even if the attacker is given access to a valid hash value v, it cannot produce a valid hash
value ṽ, unless it knows a valid pre-image. Proving security for the above construction
requires to handle multiple subtleties, and the reader is referred to Section 5.2 for further
details.
The proposed one-time, symmetric, leakage-resilient authenticated encryption scheme,
in order to sustain 2k + log2 k bits of leakage, it requires key and ciphertext length |s| +
5k + 2 log2(k) (cf. Section 5.3). In addition, the KEA based 1-more wECRH satisfies
|τ | = |v| = 2k (see Constructions 4.3.8 and 4.3.2). Therefore, the total codeword length is
|s|+ 9k + 2 log2(k) (or |s|+ 18k, cf. Section 5.3). The encoding and decoding procedures
require 128 group operations (64 exponentiations plus 64 multiplications), independently
of the message length, plus the cost of one-time authenticated encryption and decryption,
respectively. The random oracle-based construction produces codewords of length |s|+6k+
2 log2(k), while the encoding and decoding procedures require the computation of a hash
function, plus the cost of one-time authenticated encryption and decryption, respectively.
5.1.3 Related work on split-state NMC
The first explicit non-malleable code in the split-state model, for the information-theoretic
setting was proposed by [DKO13], yet their scheme can only encode single-bit messages.
Subsequent constructions for multi-bit messages are discussed in the previous section.
Non-malleable codes for other function classes have been extensively studied, e.g., bit-wise
independent tampering [DPW10], bounded-size function classes [FMVW14], the k-split
setting [CZ14], block-wise tampering [CKM11, CGM+15], and bounded depth and fan-in
circuits [BDKM16]. The work of [ADKO15] develops beautiful connections among different
function classes.
Other aspects of non-malleable codes have also been studied, such as rate-function class
tradeoff, in the information-theoretic setting [CG14]. Other variants of non-malleable
codes have been proposed, such as continuous non-malleable codes [FMNV14, JW15],
augmented non-malleable codes [AAG+16], locally decodable/updatable non-malleable
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codes [DLSZ15, DKS17b, FMNV15, CKR16], which were used to secure the implementa-
tion of RAM computation, and non-malleable codes with split-state refresh [FN17]. Leak-
age resilience was also considered as an additional feature, e.g., [LL12, DLSZ15, CKR16,
FN17].
A related line of work in tamper resilience aims to protect circuit computation against
tampering attacks on circuit wires [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14] or gates [KT13]. In this
setting, using non-malleable codes for protecting the circuit’s private memory is an option,
still in order to achieve security the encoding and decoding procedures should be protected
against fault injection attacks using the techniques from [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14,
KT13].
5.2 A non-malleable code against split-state tampering
In this section, we present our construction of non-malleable codes against split-state
tampering functions. Our construction requires (i) a one-time, authenticated, symmetric-
key encryption scheme that is also leakage resilient, and (ii) a 1-more wECRH.
Construction 5.2.1. Let Hk = (Gen, h) be a hash function family, and let (KGen,E,D)
be a symmetric encryption scheme. We define a coding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec), as follows:
• Init(1k): sample z ← Gen(1k) and set Σ := z.
• Enc(Σ, ·): let s be the input to the encoder. The encoder samples sk ← KGen(1k),
τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), e← Esk(s), and outputs
(
τ, sk, e, hz(sk; τ)
)
. In particular, the left
part of the codeword is (τ, sk), while the right part is (e, hz(sk; τ)).
• Dec(Σ, ·): let (τ, sk, e, v) be the input to Dec. If hz(sk; τ) = v, the decoder outputs
Dsk(e), otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
Since the input message to hz, sk, possesses sufficient entropy, it is possible to omit τ
in the above construction, still for the sake of clarity we stick to the formulation provided
in Definition 4.2.1 and we use independent randomness for hashing sk. Also, for brevity we
will use h to refer both to the program of the hash function and the key, i.e., z is omitted.
In what follows we prove that Construction 5.2.1 is strongly non-malleable (cf. Defi-
nition 2.3.3) against the class of split-state functions Fss (cf. Definition 2.2.3), assuming
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that for any f = (f0, f1) ∈ Fss, f0, f1, tamper with (τ, sk) and (e, v), respectively, i.e., we
assume the strings r||sk, e||v, are of length ν/2, where ν is the length the codeword.5
Before formally analyzing the security of the construction presented above, we first
discuss the ideas on why our construction is secure. Consider a split-state tampering
function (f0, f1), where f0 is applied to (τ, sk) and f1 is applied to (e, v). To prove non-
malleability, one of the primitives that we rely on, is leakage-resilient semantically secure
encryption. In our proof, the simulator is provided with the ciphertext, e, and the hash,
v, where the latter is treated as leakage over the secret key sk, and clearly, the simulator
can compute (ẽ, ṽ) ← f1(e, v). However, in case ṽ 6= v, the simulator needs to be able
to produce the decoding of the codeword, and this is where 1-more weak extractability
will be used as the tool for obtaining a valid preimage, (τ̂ , ŝk), for ṽ. It might be very
tempting to conclude the simulation by outputting the decrypted message Dŝk(ẽ) (where
ẽ is the modified ciphertext). However, this may not be consistent with the real-world
experiment, as the values produced by the extractor (τ̂ , ŝk) might not be consistent with
the output of f0. To check consistency, the simulator would want to check the output of
f0, yet such a simulation would be impossible to prove since it depends on sk, and the
semantic security of the encryption does not hold in the presence of it. To go around this,
we use a similar technique to Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12], who observed that, the equality
test between f0(τ̂ , ŝk) and f0(τ, sk) can be performed via leakage of over sk, i.e., by leaking
the output of a universal hash function (cf. Definition 2.1.10) with log2 k bits of output,
over sk. Putting this to our setting, by requiring the encryption scheme (KGen,E,D) to
be one-time semantically secure, symmetric-key authenticated encryption, that is secure
under 2k + log2 k bits of leakage, is sufficient to facilitate the simulation. We also note,
that the case where ṽ is not modified by f1, can be easily taken care of by the security
of the authenticated encryption and the collision resistance property of h: if v = ṽ, then
with overwhelming probability sk = s̃k, and any attempt to modify the ciphertext results
in an invalid ciphertext, with overwhelming probability.
Below we prove strong non-malleability for Construction 5.2.1.
Theorem 5.2.2. Let k be the security parameter, Hk be a 1-more wECRH that outputs
β(k) bits, β(k) = poly(k), and let (KGen,E,D) be an authenticated, semantically secure,
symmetric encryption scheme, that is leakage resilient against λ(k) := ω(log k)+β(k), bits
of leakage. Then, Construction 5.2.1 is strongly non-malleable against Fss.
5This can always be achieved using padding.
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Proof. Following the definition of strong non-malleability (Definition 2.3.3), we need to
prove that for any f = (f0, f1) ∈ Fss and any pair of messages s0, s1, (Σ,Tamperf,Σs0 ) ≈c
(Σ,Tamperf,Σs1 ), where Σ ← Init(1
k). We introduce a series of hybrid experiments (see
Figure 5.1), and non-malleability can be derived directly from the indistinguishability
between adjacent hybrids. We first explain the hybrids and define the notation used in
those experiments.
• Given a tampering function f = (f0, f1) and message s, the first experiment, Expf,Σ,s0 ,
is exactly the original tampering game, Tamperf,Σs , of Definition 2.3.3, and Σ ←
Init(1k).
• In Expf,Σ,s1 , we slightly modify the previous hybrid by checking whether the function
f1 has modified the hash value v. Intuitively, by the collision resistance property of
the hash function family Hk, if f1 does not modify v, then the attack produces a valid
codeword, c̃, only if the parts of c̃ that constitute the preimage of ṽ, are kept intact,
i.e., (τ, sk) = (τ̃ , s̃k), otherwise there is a collision. In addition, assuming sk = s̃k,
we have that, if ẽ 6= e, then the output of the decoder should be ⊥, otherwise we
break the authenticity under leakage (v is considered as leakage over sk) property
of the encryption scheme. On the other hand, if v 6= ṽ, the output of the current
experiment is produced as in Expf,Σ,s0 .
• In Expf,Σ,s2 , we modify the previous experiment for the case in which v is modified.
For this case, instead of using the real decoding procedure, we use the extractor of the
hash function family, to extract a preimage (τ̂ , ŝk), for ṽ, and then we compute the
output, s̃, with respect to that preimage. However, we cannot output s̃ directly as
we still need to check consistency with the output of f , i.e., we need to check whether
(τ̂ , ŝk) is equal to (τ̃ , s̃k). The indistinguishability between the current hybrid and
the previous one, follows by the 1-more weak extractability property of the hash
function, which, informally, guarantees that if c̃ is a valid codeword, then there exists
an extractor EHAv (denoted as E in Figure 5.1) that produces a valid preimage for ṽ,
with overwhelming probability. If the extracted preimage is consistent with the one
output by f , the current hybrid outputs a non-bottom value, equal to the one output
by the decoding procedure of Expf,Σ,s1 . On the other hand, if (τ̂ , ŝk) 6= (τ̃ , s̃k), the
collision resistance property of Hk (cf. Lemma 4.2.2) guarantees that (τ̃ , s̃k) is not
a valid preimage for ṽ, with overwhelming probability, and the current experiment
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properly outputs ⊥. Finally, it is straightforward to see, that if ṽ is invalid, both
experiments output ⊥.
In order to define the extractor EHAv (or E for brevity), introduced in Exp
f,Σ,s
2 , we first
need to define Av, zv, with respect to h, v, e, and f = (f0, f1). Formally, we define
the following:
1. (Define Av): Av(h, v, zv) := ([f1(zv, v)]2, st), where
st := (f1(zv, v), zv, v).
2. (Choose auxiliary info for Av): define zv := e.
3. (Existence of the extractor, EHAv , and auxiliary input, zv): Given Av and
zv, by the 1-more weak extractability property of Hk, there exists an extractor
EHAv , with hardwired auxiliary input, zE , that computes (τ̂ , ŝk)← E
H
Av(h, v). The
extractor EHAv is used in Exp
f,Σ,s
2 and all subsequent experiments (for brevity we
denote it as E).
We remind, that, for any vector x, [x]i, denotes the i-th coordinate of x.
• In Expf,Σ,s3 , we modify the consistency check procedure, so that we access the right
part of the codeword, only through leakage. Instead of checking consistency using
directly the output of f0, we do the check using a uniformly random hash function,
h̄, from a universal family (cf. Definition 2.1.10), applied to the output of f0; we also
leak an additional bit that indicates whether f0 has modified its input. Here, the
hash v is computed through leakage over the secret key, sk. The experiment differs
from the previous one only when there is a collision against h̄, which happens with
negligible probability, as h̄ is a universal hash function.
In what follows, we formalize the procedure described above. Let h̄ ← H̄λ−1 be a
uniformly random element from a universal hash function family, that outputs λ− 1
bits. We define the function gh̄,h(·) as follows:
gh̄,h(x, y) =
(0, h̄(f0(x, y)), h(x, y)), if f0(x, y) = (x, y),(1, h̄(f0(x, y)), h(x, y)), if f0(x, y) 6= (x, y).
We view gh̄,hz as a leakage function that outputs λ = ω(log k) + β(k) bits in total.
The experiment will then use the leaked value to check consistency, instead of using
the whole string output by f0. Concretely, we introduce the random variable b,
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which depends on the output of the leakage function, and we modify Expf,Σ,s2 , so
that the condition “If (b = 1)”, introduced in Expf,Σ,s3 , is exactly the same as the
condition “If (τ, sk, e) = (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ)”, in experiment Expf,Σ,s2 . This modification does
not induce any statistical difference. In the next modification, we check equality
between (τ̂ , ŝk), (τ̃ , s̃k), by checking if h̄(τ̂ , ŝk) = h̄(f0(r, sk)). Clearly, this part
induces a statistical difference only if there is a collision against h̄, which happens
with negligible probability, since h̄ is a universal hash function, chosen by the current
experiment, independently.
• Finally, we are going to show that Expf,Σ,s3 is indistinguishable from Exp
f,Σ,0
3 , for any
message s, where 0 denotes the zero-message. This follows by the semantic security
of the leakage resilient encryption scheme (Definition 2.1.6).
A concrete presentation of the hybrids, is given in Figure 5.1.
In the following claims we prove indistinguishability between the hybrids.
Claim 5.2.3. Assuming Hk is collision resistant and (KGen,E,D) is an authenticated
leakage-resilient scheme against β(k) bits of leakage, for any f = (f0, f1) ∈ Fss and any
message s, Expf,Σ,s0 ≈c Exp
f,Σ,s
1 , over the randomness of Init, Enc, where Σ follows Init(1
k).
Proof. We observe, that the only difference between the two experiments, is that Expf,Σ,s1
introduces the following branches of conditions: (1) (v = ṽ) ∧ (τ, sk, e) = (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ), (2)
(v = ṽ)∧ (τ, sk, e) 6= (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ), and (3) v 6= ṽ. It follows directly that for the conditions (1)
and (3), the two experiments are identical. Denote as B the event in which (2) happens





conditioned on ¬B. By a standard analysis, we know that the statistical distance between
the two experiments is bounded by Pr[B].
Let E be the event in which (τ, sk) = (τ̃ , s̃k). Then we have Pr[B] = Pr[B∧E]+Pr[B∧
¬E]. We will prove that Pr[B ∧E],Pr[B ∧¬E] ≤ negl(k). Towards contradiction, suppose
there exist function f ∈ Fss and message s, such that Pr[B ∧ ¬E] > ε, for ε = 1/poly(k).
Then, there exists a PPT adversary, A, that breaks the collision resistance property of
Hk: the adversary A simulates the experiment Expf,Σ,s1 and outputs (τ, sk), (τ̃ , s̃k). The
function f is computable in polynomial time, so the adversary is also polynomial-time. The
adversary wins if the event B∧¬E happens, where by assumption we have Pr[B∧¬E] > ε.
Hence, the attacker breaks collision resistance with non-negligible probability. Similarly,
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Expf,Σ,s0 :
(τ, sk, e, v)← Enc(s), c← (τ, sk, e, v)
(τ̃ , s̃k)← f0(τ, sk), (ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v)
c̃← (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ, ṽ)
s̃← Dec(c̃)
Output same∗ if c̃ = c and s̃ otherwise.
Expf,Σ,s1 :
(τ, sk, e, v)← Enc(s)
(τ̃ , s̃k)← f0(τ, sk), (ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v)
c̃← (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ, ṽ)
If v = ṽ :
If (τ, sk, e) = (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ) : set s̃← same∗
Else : set s̃← ⊥




(τ, sk, e, v)← Enc(s)
(τ̃ , s̃k)← f0(τ, sk), (ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v)
If v = ṽ :
If (τ, sk, e) = (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ) : set s̃← same∗
Else : set s̃← ⊥
If v 6= ṽ :
(τ̂ , ŝk)← E(h, v)
set s̃← ⊥
If (τ̂ , ŝk) = (τ̃ , s̃k) :
If h(ŝk; τ̂) = ṽ, set s̃← Dŝk(ẽ)
Output s̃.
Expf,Σ,s3 :
sk ← KGen(1k), e← Esk(s)
τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), h̄← H̄λ−1
(lmod, lhash, v)← gh̄,h(τ, sk) , (ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v)
b← (lmod = 0 ∧ e = ẽ)
If v = ṽ :
If (b = 1) : set s̃← same∗
Else : set s̃← ⊥
If v 6= ṽ :
(τ̂ , ŝk)← E(h, v)
set s̃← ⊥
If h̄(τ̂ , ŝk) = lhash :
If h(ŝk; τ̂) = ṽ, set s̃← Dŝk(ẽ)
Output s̃.
Figure 5.1: Hybrid experiments for the proof of Theorem 5.2.2. Their programs are based
on the encoding scheme, (Init,Enc,Dec), the encryption scheme, (KGen,E,D), and the
extractor that is specified in the proof, E . The gray part signifies the portion of the code
of an experiment that differs from the previous one.
assuming there exist function f ∈ Fss and message s, such that Pr[B ∧ E] > ε, for some
non-negligible ε, we have an attacker against the authenticity, under leakage, property
of the encryption scheme: the attacker samples h ← Hk, τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), and issues a
leakage query gh(x) := h(x; τ), against the secret key of the encryption scheme. Then, it
receives v = h(sk; τ) and e← Esk(s), executes (ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v), and outputs ẽ. Assuming
Pr[B ∧ E] > ε, we have that ẽ 6= e, and ẽ is a valid ciphertext with respect to the secret
key sk. Thus, the authenticity under leakage property of the encryption scheme breaks
with non-negligible probability ε.
Claim 5.2.4. Assuming Hk is a 1-more wECRH, for any f = (f0, f1) ∈ Fss and any
message s, we have that Expf,Σ,s1 ≈c Exp
f,Σ,s
2 , over the randomness of Init, Enc, E, where
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Σ follows Init(1k).
Proof. Expf,Σ,s2 differs from Exp
f,Σ,s
1 , in the following way: instead of using the real decod-
ing procedure, it produces output using the extractor of the 1-more weakly extractable
hash function family, Hk. Below we show that the two experiments are computationally
indistinguishable.
We first notice that if (τ̂ , ŝk) = (τ̃ , s̃k), i.e., if the extracted value matches the corre-
sponding value output by f , then, the two experiments are identical. So, it remains to ana-
lyze the case where the values are not the same, i.e., the case in which (τ̂ , ŝk) 6= (τ̃ , s̃k). We
denote such an event with E. Then, we partition E into three cases: (1) E∧
(





h(s̃k; τ̃) = h(ŝk; τ̂) = ṽ
)
; and (3) E ∧
(
h(s̃k; τ̃) = ṽ ∧ h(ŝk; τ̂) 6= ṽ
)
. We denote
those events by E1, E2, E3, respectively, and we analyze them as follows:
• First, we observe that, whenever E1 takes place, the two experiments are identical,
as both output ⊥. Thus, the statistical distance between those two experiments can
be upper bounded by Pr[E2] + Pr[E3].
• Next, we observe, that E2 happens exactly when there is a collision against Hk, i.e.,
(r̂, ŝk) 6= (r̃, s̃k), and their hash values collide. By Lemma 4.2.2, we have Pr[E2] <
negl(k).
• Finally, we argue that Pr[E3] < negl(k), based on the 1-more extractability property
of Hk. In order to exploit that property, we need to relate Expf,Σ,s2 , with the ex-
periment of Definition 4.2.1, Exps
′,h
Av ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE), for some message s′, algorithms
Av, As, EHAv , and strings zv, zE . Recall, that, Av, zv, E
H
Av and zE , have already been
defined with respect to h, v, sk, e, and f = (f0, f1), in the beginning of the proof.
For the remaining we have:
1. (Define As): on input τ , s, st, As(h, τ, s, st), samples (τ̃ , s̃) ← f0(τ, s) and
outputs (τ̃ , s̃).
2. (Define message s′): set s := sk.







(1, zv, zE) = 1
]
≤ negl(k),
and notice, that whenever E3 happens, we also have Exp
s′,h
Av ,As,EHAv
(1, zv, zE) = 1,
since Av produces a valid, new hash, ṽ, As, produces a valid preimage for ṽ, still the
extractor fails. Thus, Pr[E3] < negl(k).
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Therefore, we have Pr[E2] + Pr[E3] < negl(k), and the two experiments are computa-
tionally indistinguishable.
Claim 5.2.5. Assuming H̄λ−1 is a universal hash function family that outputs λ− 1 bits,
where λ = ω(log k), we have that Expf,Σ,s2 ≈c Exp
f,Σ,s
3 , over the randomness of Init,Enc, E,
where Σ← Init(1k).
Proof. In Expf,Σ,s3 we unfold the encoding procedure and we treat v as leakage over sk (those
modifications do induce any statistical difference). The main difference between Expf,Σ,s2
and Expf,Σ,s3 is in the way we check the “if” statements of the program that indicate whether
the preimage has been modified. We note that the first condition, “If (b = 1)”, is exactly
the same as the condition “If (τ, sk, e) = (τ̃ , s̃k, ẽ)”, since the first bit output by the leakage
function indicates weather f0 has modified (τ, sk). Therefore, this modification does not
induce any statistical difference. Then, we analyze the next condition and we observe that
there is a difference only when h̄(τ̂ , ŝk) = lhash, still (τ̂ , ŝk) 6= (τ̃ , s̃k). This happens when
the following event, denoted as B, takes place: h̄(τ̂ , ŝk) = h̄(τ̃ , s̃k) ∧ (τ̂ , ŝk) 6= (τ̃ , s̃k).
Clearly, the statistical difference between the two experiments is bounded by Pr[B]. Now,
since the universal hash function h̄ is chosen independently from its inputs, the collision
probability is bounded by 2λ−1 = negl(k). The event B, is exactly the collision event,
therefore we have Pr[B] ≤ negl(k). The proof of the claim is complete.
Claim 5.2.6. Assuming (KGen,E,D) is semantically secure against λ bits of leakage, we
have that for any f ∈ Fss and any message s, Expf,Σ,s4 ≈c Exp
f,Σ,0
4 , over the randomness
of Init, Enc, E, where Σ← Init(1k) and 0 denotes the zero message.
Proof. Towards contradiction, assume there exist f ∈ Fss, message s, and PPT distin-
guisher D such that |Pr[D(Σ,Expf,Σ,s4 ) = 1] − Pr[D(Σ,Exp
f,Σ,0
4 )] = 1| > ε, for ε =
1/poly(k). We are going to define an attacker A that breaks the semantic security against
one-time leakage of (KGen,E,D).
A has hardwired the leakage function g′
τ,h̄,h
(sk) := gh̄,h(τ, sk) where τ ← {0, 1}poly(k), h̄←
H̄λ−1, h← Hk, and two messages, s0 := s, s1 := 0. Then, on input(
e← Esk(sb), (lmod, lhash, v) = g′τ,h̄,h(sk)
)
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it sets q = Program(h, h̄, e, v, lmod, lhash), Σ = h, and outputs D(Σ, q), where Program is
defined as follows
Program(h, h̄, e, v, lmod, lhash) :
(ẽ, ṽ)← f1(e, v)
b← (lmod = 0 ∧ ẽ = e)
If v = ṽ :
If (b = 1) : set s̃← same∗
Else : set s̃← ⊥
If v 6= ṽ :
(τ̂ , ŝk)← E(h, v)
set s̃← ⊥
If h̄(τ̂ , ŝk) = lhash :
If h(ŝk; ŝ) = ṽ, set s̃← Dŝk(ẽ)
Output s̃.
It is straightforward to see that A simulates Expf,Σ,sb3 , so the advantage of A in breaking
the semantic security of the leakage-resilient encryption scheme matches the advantage of
D in distinguishing between Expf,Σ,s03 and Exp
f,Σ,s1
3 , which by assumption is non-negligible.
This leads to a contradiction and the proof of the claim is complete.
From the above claims we have that for any function f and any message s, TamperΣ,fs ≈c
Expf,Σ,03 , which implies that for any f and any pair of messages s0, s1, Tamper
Σ,f
s0 ≈c
TamperΣ,fs1 , and the proof is complete.
Length of the CRS. For our KEA based construction, the length of the CRS is roughly
32k bits, as we need to hash a 6k-bit key of an authenticated encryption scheme and then
encrypt the message using that key; this would require the parameters for the 16-KEA to
be on the CRS, yielding a CRS with 32k bits.
5.3 Instantiating authenticated encryption
In the following we provide an instantiation for a one-time leakage-resilient, authenticated,
semantically secure symmetric encryption (Definition 2.1.6), against λ bits of leakage.
The idea is to combine a leakage-resilient pseudorandom generator [Pie09] with a message
authentication code that outputs k bits.
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Construction 5.3.1 (Authenticated encryption). Let PRG be a pseudo-random generator,
PRG : {0, 1}2λ → {0, 1}|s|+k, and let (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) be a message authentication code
that outputs tags of length k (cf. [KL14]). We define a symmetric encryption scheme
(KGen,E,D), as follows:
• KGen(1k): sample sk ← {0, 1}2λ.
• Esk(·): On input message s, compute (r0||r1) = PRG(sk), where |r0| = |s| and |r1| =
k, e = r0 + s, t = Macr1(e), and outputs (e, t).
• Dsk(·): On input (e, t), compute (r0||r1) = PRG(sk), and if Vrfyr1(e, t) = 1, output
s = r0 − e, otherwise output ⊥.
The PRG of [Pie09] considers |sk| = 2λ/α, and sustains αλ bits of leakage (cf. [SPY+10]),
where α ∈ [0, 1] depends on how strong the underlying assumption is. In the above con-
struction we use the strongest assumption, i.e., α = 1, which yields |sk| = 2λ, assuming
weak pseudorandom functions against exponential adversaries. The ciphertext length is
|s| + k, and by setting λ = 2k + log2 k, which is sufficient for our needs, we receive
|sk|+ |e|+ |t| = 5k + 2 log2 k + |s|. By plugging the above instantiation to our split-state
non-malleable code, the total codeword length with respect to the KEA-based `-more
wECRH (cf. Section 4.3.4) is |s|+ 9k + 2 log2(k), since the hash and the randomness for
computing it, are of size 2k, each, while with respect to the random oracle-based wECRH
(cf. Section 4.4), the total codeword length is |s|+ 6k + 2 log2(k).
In what follows, we provide an instantiation that uses regular PRG, but first we present
a useful lemma.
Lemma 5.3.2. Any ε-secure one-time message authentication code Π = (Gen,Mac,Vrfy)
is 2λε-secure against λ bits of leakage.
Proof. (proof sketch) Towards contradiction, assume an attacker A = (A1,A2,A3), issu-
ing a single leakage query g with λ bits of output, against the secret key sk of Π, and
breaking its security with probability greater than 2λε. We build an attacker A′ that acts
as follows: it samples g ← A1(1k), makes a guess g on g(sk), and executes the rest of the
LRMAC− forge experiment with (A2,A3). Clearly, the probability of wining is equal to the
probability of making a correct guess on g(sk), say p1, times the probability that A breaks
Π in the presence of leakage, say p2, which by assumption is greater then 2
λε. Assuming
H∞(g(sk)) ≤ λ, the winning probability of A′ is p1 · p2 > ε, which is a contradiction.
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Construction 5.3.3 (One-time MAC). Let Hpi be a pair-wise independent hash function
family, Hpi = {h : K×M→ T }. A one-time message authentication code (Gen,Mac,Vrfy)
is defined as follows:
• Gen: sample z ← K, and output hz.
• Mac(z, ·): on input message s, output t := hz(s).
• Vrfy(z, ·): on input s, t, if hz(s) = t, output 1, otherwise output 0.
It is not hard to see that by instantiating the above construction with ha,b(s) = a ·s+ b
mod p, where p is a k-bit prime, (a, b) is a 2k-bit key and M = T = Zp, we receive an
1/2k-secure message authentication code (this is standard one-time information theoretic
MAC). By combining that code with a semantically secure, leakage resilient encryption
scheme, we construct an authenticated, semantically secure encryption scheme against λ
bits of leakage.
Construction 5.3.4 (Authenticated one-time LR-encryption against λ bits of leakage).
Let H̄ be a hash function family, that outputs k bits, let PRG be a pseudo-random gener-
ator, PRG : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}|s|, where |s| denotes the length of the message. We define a
symmetric encryption scheme (KGen,E,D), as follows:
• KGen(1k): sample r ← {0, 1}(k+log2 k+λ), and two random integers a, b, over {0, 1}k+λ,
and output sk := (r, a, b).
• Esk(·): On input message s, the encryption algorithm computes h̄← H̄, e = PRG(h̄(r))+
s, t = ha,b(h̄||e) and outputs (h̄, e, t), where ha,b(s) := as + b mod p and p is a
k + log2 k + λ+ |s|-bit prime.
• Dsk(·): On input (h̄, e, t), if t = ha,b(h̄||e) output s = PRG(h̄(r))−e, otherwise output
⊥.
Theorem 5.3.5. Assuming H̄ is a universal hash function family, H is pairwise indepen-
dent (ha,b ∈ H), and one-way functions, Construction 5.3.4 is a one-time leakage-resilient,
semantically secure, authenticated encryption scheme against λ bits of leakage.
Proof. (proof sketch)
Clearly, the above scheme satisfies correctness. Regarding semantic security, by construc-
tion we have H∞(r|g(sk)) ≥ k + log2 k, for any g that outputs λ bits. Thus, by the
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LeftOver Hash Lemma (Lemma 2.1.11), h̄(r) is statistically close to uniform over {0, 1}k,
and PRG(h(r))+s, is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform element in {0, 1}|s|.
Since the tag, t, is computed over (h̄, e), it does not reveal any information about the mes-
sage s, and semantic security follows.
Now, since ha,b belongs to a pairwise independent hash function family (see above), any
attacker without leakage access on (a, b), makes a forgery against the above scheme with
probability at most 1/2(k+λ). Thus, by Lemma 5.3.2 unforgeability against λ bits of leakage
breaks with probability at most 2λ · 1/2(k+λ) = negl(k), and the unforgeability property of
the scheme breaks with negligible probability in k, even given λ bits of leakage.
In the above construction, the length of the secret key is 3k + 3λ + log2 k bits while
the length of the ciphertext is 2k + 2 log2 k + 2λ + 2|s| bits, giving a total of l(λ, s) :=
5k + 5λ+ 3 log2 k + 2|s| bits.
Clearly, the above scheme is not sufficient for getting a rate 1 non-malleable code,
thus we combine the above scheme with the following authenticated encryption scheme for
which we do not require leakage resilience.
Construction 5.3.6 (Authenticated encryption). Let PRG be a pseudo-random gener-
ator, PRG : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}|s|+k, where |s| denotes the length of the message, and let
(Gen,Mac,Vrfy) be a CBC message authentication code that outputs tags of length k (cf.
[KL14]). We define a symmetric encryption scheme (KGen′,E′,D′), as follows:
• KGen′(1k): sample r ← {0, 1}k, and output sk := r.
• E′sk(·): On input message s, the encryption algorithm computes (r0||r1) = PRG(sk),
where |r0| = |s| and |r1| = k, e = r0 + s, t = Macr1(e), and outputs (e, t).
• D′sk(·): On input (e, t), compute (r0||r1) = PRG(sk), and if Vrfyr1(e, t) = 1, output
s = e− r0, otherwise output ⊥.
It is not hard to see that the above construction is secure: r0 is indistinguishable from
random, thus e is indistinguishable from random over the message space. Moreover, the
unforgeability property of the message authentication code guarantees the authenticity of
the encryption scheme. In the above construction the length of secret key and ciphertext
is 2k + |s|.
The final construction is a combination between constructions 5.3.6 and 5.3.4, for λ =
2k + log2 k bits of leakage. In order to encrypt a message s, we execute sk′ ← KGen′(1k)
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and sk ← KGen(1k) and we output (e1 = Esk(sk′), e2 = E′sk′(s)), i.e., we encrypt the
secret key of an authenticated encryption scheme using leakage-resilient authenticated
encryption, and then we encrypt the message using the former scheme. The decryption
procedure is straightforward: if Dsk(e1) = sk
′′ 6= ⊥, output D′sk′′(e2), otherwise, output ⊥.
Correctness and semantic security follow directly by the correctness and semantic security
of the underlying schemes. Now, if the attacker modifies e1, then with high probability
sk′′ = ⊥ by the authenticity property of Construction 5.3.4. Assuming, the attacker does
not modify e1, if e2 is modified then, D
′
sk′′(e2) = ⊥, with overwhelming probability, by the
authenticity property of Construction 5.3.6. The final construction has ciphertext and key




The notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMCs) was introduced by Faust et
al. [FMNV14], as an extension to the original notion [DPW10], which considered a one-
time adversary. Informally, CNMCs provide simulation-based security, in a setting where
the adversary tampers repeatedly with the same codeword (a notion which is known as
non-persistent tampering), until the first time he produces an invalid one, in which case
the codeword is erased and the adversary looses access to it. The main advantage of
CNMCs over the original notion, is that they provide continuous security while avoiding
memory erasures, which, as we have already discussed in Chapter 1, is a feasible but highly
problematic process.
6.2 Contributions
In the present Chapter, we leverage the power of leakage-resilient `-more wECRH (cf.
Chapter 4) in the continuous setting, and we construct efficient, continuously non-malleable
leakage-resilient codes, against split-state adversaries [FMNV14]. Our result is summarized
in the following, informally stated theorem.
Theorem 6.2.1 (Informal). Assuming leakage resilient, 1-more wECRH, there exists an
explicit, leakage-resilient, continuously non-malleable code, against split-state functions.
By instantiating the above theorem with the leakage-resilient `-more wECRH of the
Informal Theorem 4.1.4, we receive continuous non-malleable codes in the CRS model
against non-adaptive leakage, and for at least poly-logarithmic (in the security parameter)
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number of rounds (cf. Corollary 6.4.13 and the discussion that follows). In addition, from
the Informal Theorem 3.1.2, we obtain leakage-resilient continuous non-malleable codes,
for polynomially many rounds, assuming random oracles. Our starting point is the con-
struction of [FMNV14], which combines leakage-resilient storage with non-interactive zero-
knowledge (NIZK). In our construction we combine leakage-resilient storage with leakage
resilient, 1-more wECRH, and as a result we improve the efficiency of [FMNV14] while
avoiding the need for trapdoor CRS.1 In addition, the simulator of [FMNV14] requires
leakage proportional to O(k log(q) + λ), while we only require O(k+ λ), where k is the se-
curity parameter, q is the number of rounds that the attacker tampers with the codeword,
and λ is the leakage requested by the tampering adversary. As a result, the size of the
code becomes independent of q.
6.3 Related work
In [FMNV14], the authors introduce the notion of continuous non-malleable codes and
construct computationally secure encoding schemes, for split-state adversaries. In addi-
tion to that, they provide an impossibility result for CNMC in the information-theoretic
setting, against the same class. Slightly later, Jafargholi and Wichs [JW15], propose an
unconditionally secure CNMC, for any class of functions F , such that for any f ∈ F ,
(i) the output of f has high entropy, and (ii) f has a limited number of fixed points.
The work of Aggarwal et al. [AKO17], builds information-theoretic CNMCs for split-state
functions, against persistent tampering, which considers adversaries that in round i, re-
ceive access to the tampered codeword of round i− 1, as opposed to the stronger model of
non-persistent tampering, in which the adversary always tampers with the original code-
word. In [OPVV18], the authors construct continuously secure CNMCs in the computa-
tional setting, using as a main ingredient a one-time, information-theoretic NMC, while
in [DKO+18], Damg̊ard et al., construct information-theoretic CNMC s, against permu-
tations and overwrites. In [FN17], Faonio et al., construct CNMCs for split-state adver-
saries, using NIZKs. Finally, in [CMTV15, CDTV16], the authors construct information-
theoretically secure, continuously non-malleable codes, for bit-wise independent tampering
adversaries.
1The construction of [FMNV14] requires four NIZK proofs, while we only require two hashes of size at
most 2k.
6.4. Continuous NMC from `-more wECRH 114
6.4 Continuous NMC from `-more wECRH
In the current section, we construct leakage-resilient continuous non-malleable codes from
any leakage-resilient, `-more weakly extractable, hash function family, and then, in Section
6.4.1, we provide instantiations. For the needs of the current section, we present a defini-
tion of leakage-resilient `-more wECRH, which is stronger than the notion presented in
Definition 4.3.15.
Definition 6.4.1 (`-more weakly extractable, leakage-resilient hash function families).
Let `, λ ∈ N. An efficiently samplable hash function ensemble H = {Hk}k∈N, is `-more
weakly extractable against λ bits of leakage, if for any PPT algorithm Av and any zv ∈
{0, 1}poly(k), there exist a PPT extractor EHAv and zE ∈ {0, 1}
poly(k), such that for all PPT








(`, λ, zv, zE) :
τi ← {0, 1}poly(k), vi = h(si; τi), i ∈ [`] ( hash computation )
t = (τ1, . . . , τ`),v = (v1, . . . , v`)
(ṽ, st)← AO
λ(t,·)
v (h,v, zv) ( hash tampering )
(τ̂ , ŝ)← EAv(h,v, zE) ( pre-image extraction )
(τ̃ , s̃)← As (h, t, s, st) ( pre-image tampering )
If h(s̃; τ̃) = ṽ ∧ ∀i : ṽ 6= vi ∧ h(ŝ; τ̂) 6= ṽ, return 1
otherwise, return 0
Below, we define the notion of leakage-resilient storage due to [DDV10, DF11, FMNV14],
which is one of the main building blocks of the proposed scheme.
Definition 6.4.2 (Leakage-resilient storage [FMNV14]). Let (LRSenc, LRSdec) be a coding
scheme. For any algorithm A, message m, θ ∈ {0, 1}, and k ∈ N we define
LeakθA,m(k) :=
{
(s0, s1)← LRSenc(1k,m); out← AO
λ(s0,·),Oλ(s1,·); Output: (sθ, out)
}
.
Then, (LRSenc, LRSdec) is a λ-leakage-resilient storage (λ-LRS), if for any algorithm A,
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Here, we follow the definition of [FMNV14], which is stronger than previous definitions
in the sense that the attacker is allowed to see one of the two shares, after the completion
of the leakage experiment. As the authors suggest in [FMNV14], the scheme of [DF11]
satisfies this stronger notion.
Our construction of non-malleable codes is inspired by [FMNV14], thus we first revisit
their construction. To encode a message m, the encoder of [FMNV14], computes (s0, s1)←
LRSenc(m) and outputs ((s0, v1, π1, π0), (s1, v0, π0, π1)), where LRSenc is the encoder of a
leakage-resilient storage (LRS) scheme, vi = h(si) and h is a member of a collision resistant
hash function family, and πi is a robust non-interactive zero knowledge proof, proving
knowledge of the witness (pre-image) si of vi, with label v1−i.
2
Our construction, which is defined below, improves the efficiency of [FMNV14] by
combining LRS with leakage-resilient 1-more wECRH.
Construction 6.4.3 (Continuous NMC from wECRH and LRS.). Let Hk, H̄k, be hash
function families and (LRSenc, LRSdec) be a leakage-resilient storage scheme. We define an
encoding scheme (Init,Enc,Dec) as follows:
• Init(1k): Sample h← Hk, h̄← H̄k, and set Σ := (h, h̄).
• Enc(Σ, ·): Let m be the input to the encoder. The encoder samples (s0, s1) ←
LRSenc(1
k,m), τ0, τ1 ← {0, 1}poly(k), computes v̄0 ← h̄(τ0||s0), v̄1 ← h̄(τ1||s1), and
outputs ((τ0, s0, v1), (τ1, s1, v0)), where v0 ← h(s0||v̄1; τ0), v1 ← h(s1||v̄0; τ1).






k, (s0, s1)), otherwise, output ⊥.
In what follows we will assume that H is a 1-more wECRH and this is essential for
proving security. Observe that, if H is 0-more extractable, then it can be malleable (as it is
proven in Chapter 4 and [KLT16]) and security cannot be proved, as generic LRS schemes
do not provide non-malleability, thus the attacker could create related codewords. The
1-more extractability property resolves this issue: even if the attacker is given access to a
valid hash value vi, it cannot produce a valid hash value unless it knows a valid pre-image.
In what follows, we briefly discuss the main ideas behind our proof, while highlighting
the differences from [FMNV14]. The security of our scheme relies on three primitives,
namely, on leakage-resilient 1-more wECRH, on the collision resistance property of H̄ and
2The labels are used to bind together the two parts of the memory.
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the security of LRS. Our adversary is denoted by A′ and is depicted in Figure 6.1, while its
main subroutine, TComp, is depicted in Figure 6.2. A′ simulates the tampering experiment
against the codeword, while given split-state leakage over (s0, s1) ← LRSenc(m), where m
denotes the message. In step 1, A′ samples the elements required for simulating the
codewords inside the leakage oracles, i.e., it samples hash functions h, h̄, and randomness
τi, for h. Then, it makes a guess, j
∗, on the index of the round in which the attacker
produces an invalid codeword. Such a round is called a “self-destruct” round.3 Then,
in step 2, the adversary leaks the actual hashes over s0, s1, and in this way it simulates
perfectly the codewords inside the leakage oracles without using a trapdoor CRS, i.e., for
i ∈ {0, 1}, ci = (τi, si, v1−i) is perfectly simulated inside Oλ(si, ·). This approach is in
contrast to [FMNV14], in which the authors use robust NIZKs, and simulate the codeword
inside the oracles using simulated proofs, that require a trapdoor CRS.
In step 3, A′ executes A inside the leakage oracles and verifies if j∗ is a correct guess for
the self-destruct round. As we prove, this holds, if for all rounds before j∗ the executions
inside the two oracles are identical, while they differ in round j∗. The challenge here, is to
execute A inside the oracles, as each Oλ(si, ·) gives access to ci = (τi, si, v1−i), but provides
no information about s1−i (recall that τ1−i, vi can be simulated), thus it is unclear how to
provide the adversary with c̃1−i. We discuss how to resolve this issue, by first considering
a non-leakage tampering adversary, A. The main idea behind step 3 of A′, is as follows:
A′ executes A inside Oλ(si, ·), and for each tampering query (f0, f1) of A, A′ computes
c̃i ← fi(ci), and uses the 1-more wECRH property of H to extract c̃1−i. When considering
adversaries that issue leakage queries, A′ replies to those queries by executing repeatedly
TComp (cf. Figure 6.2) against the two oracles (cf. step 3-(a) in Figure 6.1). In steps
3-(b),(c), A′ verifies if j∗ is a self-destruct round, by leaking the hashes of the replies sent
to A inside the oracles. We note that, our strategy is similar to [MSD16], but different than
[FMNV14] in which the adversary executes binary search to compute the exact value of the
index, requiring leakage proportional to O(k log(q)+λ), while we only require O(k+λ). In
Step 4, A′ learns s0 and simulates the tampered execution in the same way it does in Step
3. Finally, in contrast to [FMNV14], in which extractability is easily implied by the robust
NIZKs, proving extractability in the continuous setting using `-more wECRH, which is a
one-time primitive, is non-trivial.
For starters, we prove that the above construction satisfies the uniqueness property
3We can always assume that such a round exists, since for any A that is not producing an invalid
codeword, we can construct another adversary that does so and has the same advantage with A, cf.
[FMNV14].
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(cf. Definition 2.3.4), which is required for achieving non-malleability in the continuous
setting.
Lemma 6.4.4. Assuming Hk is a collision resistant hash function family, the split-state
code of Construction 6.4.3 satisfies the uniqueness property.
Proof. Let (h, h̄) ∈ Hk × H̄k, and let Hk be a collision resistant hash function family.
Towards contradiction, assume there exists a PPT attacker A that, given (h, h̄), it produces
two distinct, valid codewords, (c0, c1), (c0, c
′
1), with probability greater than ε = 1/poly(k),
i.e., A produces c0 = (τ0, s0, v1), c1 = (τ1, s1, v0), c′1 = (τ ′1, s′1, v′0), where c1 6= c′1,4 with
probability ε. We construct an adversary A′, that given h ← Hk, it breaks the collision
resistance property of Hk with non-negligible probability: A′ samples h̄← H̄k and











1). Let v̄0 ← h̄(τ0||s0). By the validity of the codewords and
Construction 6.4.3, we have that h(s1||v̄0; τ1) = v1 = h(s′1||v̄0; τ ′1). Conditioned on c1 6= c′1
we have that (τ1, s1) 6= (τ ′1, s′1): if (τ1, s1) = (τ ′1, s′1), we also have that v0 = v′0 and the
codewords are equal. Thus, conditioned on c1 6= c′1 we have that (τ1, s1) 6= (τ ′1, s′1) and A′
breaks the collision resistance property of Hk with non-negligible probability, ε.
Below we prove non-malleability of Construction 6.4.3 in the continuous setting with
respect to any 1-more wECRH.
Theorem 6.4.5. Let k, λ, λ′ ∈ N, and let b be polynomial in k. Assuming Hk is a
leakage-resilient 1-more wECRH function family against λ bits of leakage, that outputs
b(k) bits, H̄k, Ĥk, are collision resistant hash function families that output k bits, and
(LRSenc, LRSdec) is a λ
′-LRS, for λ′ ≥ 2λ + 2b(k) + 4k + 1. Then, the encoding scheme
(Init,Enc,Dec) of Construction 6.4.3 is a (q, λ)-CNMLR code (cf. Definition 2.3.7), for
q = poly(k).
Proof. Towards contradiction, assume there exists a pair of messages m0, m1, PPT adver-
sary A and PPT distinguisher D, such that for infinitely many k ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr [D(TampercnmlrA,m0(k)) = 1]− Pr [D(TampercnmlrA,m1(k)) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε,
for ε = 1/poly(k). Here, TampercnmlrA,mi(k) is the experiment of Definition 2.3.7 with respect
to A, mi. We will use m0, m1, A, D, to construct m′0, m′1, A′, D′, for which∣∣∣Pr [D′ (Leak0A′,m′0(k)) = 1]− Pr [D′ (Leak0A′,m′1(k)) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε′,
4The case where c0 6= c′0 is symmetric.
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for ε′ = 1/poly(k) and infinitely many k, where Leak0A′,m′i
(k) is the experiment of Definition
6.4.2, with respect to A′, m′i. The idea is that A′ will play in Leak
0
A′,m′b
(k), for b ∈ {0, 1},
interacting with Oλ(s0, ·), Oλ(s1, ·), where (s0, s1) follows LRSenc(mb), and it will simulate
TampercnmlrA,mb(k), through its access to the aforementioned oracles. A
′ executes A using
always the same randomness. Assume A issues q leakage/tampering queries and that
there is always a round in which self-destruct occurs, i.e., a round in which the output
of the decoder in the real experiment will be ⊥. This round is denoted by jd. We define
m′0 := m0, m
′
1 := m1 and A′ is defined in Figure 6.1.
The definition of the distinguisher D′ against Leak0A′,mb(k) follows.
Algorithm D′: D′ receives the output of A′, (out, d), and if d = 1 it outputs b′ ← D(out),
otherwise it outputs b′ ← {0, 1}.
Claim 6.4.6. For any message m and all sufficiently large k, A′ simulates perfectly
Enc(Σ,m) inside the leakage oracles by leaking 2k + 2b(k) bits during the execution of
Leak0A′,sb(k), where Σ← Init(1
k).
Proof. By Construction 6.4.3 and the definition of A′, it is not hard to see that c0 (resp.
c1) is perfectly simulated inside the oracle Oλ(s0, ·) (resp. Oλ(s1, ·)). A′ initially samples
h ← Hk, h̄ ← H̄k (the CRS), and τ0, τ1 ← {0, 1}poly(k). Then, by querying the leakage
oracles with (L0,L1), where Li(si) := h̄(τi||si), it receives v̄0, v̄1 and finally, by leaking
(L′0,L′1), where L′i(si) := h(si||v̄1−i; τi), it receives v0, v1. All the remaining leakage queries
against Oλ(s0, ·) (resp. Oλ(s1, ·)) depend on τ0, v1 (resp. τ1, v0), and the execution inside
the oracles takes place over (c0, c1).
Claim 6.4.7. Let lkReal and tReal be the vectors of the replies to the first j
∗ − 1 leakage
and tampering, respectively, queries made by A in TampercnmlrA,mb(k). Then, conditioned
on jd = j
∗, for any message m and all sufficiently large k, lk[1 : j∗ − 1] ≈c lkReal,
tReal ≈c ti[1 : j∗ − 1], for i ∈ {0, 1}, over the randomness of TampercnmlrA,mb(k), Leak
0
A′,mb(k).
Proof. Using strong induction, we prove that conditioned on jd = j
∗, lk[1 : j∗−1] ≈c lkReal,
tReal ≈c ti[1 : j∗−1], for i ∈ {0, 1}, assuming that jd > 1, otherwise the claim holds trivially.
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Algorithm A′
1. (Setup): Sample h← Hk, h̄← H̄k, ĥ← Ĥk, τ0, τ1 ← {0, 1}poly(k), j∗ ← [q].
2. (Hash leaking):
a) For i ∈ {0, 1}, define Li(si) := h̄(τi||si) and issue the leakage query (L0,L1)
against Oλ(s0, ·), Oλ(s1, ·). Let v̄0, v̄1, be the corresponding leaked values.
b) For i ∈ {0, 1}, define L′i(si) := h(si||v̄1−i; τi) and issue the leakage query
(L′0,L′1) against Oλ(s0, ·), Oλ(s1, ·). Let v0, v1, be the leaked values.
3. (Verifying j∗): Let lk be a q×2 zero matrix and for j ∈ [q], i ∈ {0, 1} define the
leakage function Lji (si, lk) that computes TCompq(i, τi, si, v1−i, lk, j) (cf. Figure
6.2) and outputs its first coordinate, i.e., lk.
a) For j = 1, . . . , q: (i) lk′ ← Lj0(s0, lk), lk
′′ ← Lj1(s1, lk
′), (ii) set lk← lk′′.
b) Let L̄0(·) be the leakage function that on input s0, it computes (∼, t0) ←
TCompq(0, τ0, s0, v1, lk, q), lk ← ĥ(t0[1 : j∗ − 1]), lk′ ← ĥ(t0[j∗]), and
outputs (lk, lk′). Send L̄0(·) to Oλ(s0, ·).
c) Define L̄1(s1) that,
i. Computes (∼, t1)← TCompq(1, τ1, s1, v0, lk, q).
ii. If lk = ĥ(t1[1 : j
∗ − 1]) and lk′ 6= ĥ(t1[j∗]), output 1, otherwise output
0.
L̄1(·) is executed against Oλ(s1, ·), and let d be the bit output by the leakage
query.
d) Receive s0 (the leakage queries have ended).
4. (Simulating tampering and leakage queries): Set c0 := (τ0, s0, v1).
Execute A and for j = 1, . . . , q:
Receive (gj0, g
j




1 ) from A and:
• if j ≥ j∗ send ⊥ to A,
• otherwise, compute c̃0 := (τ̃0, s̃0, ṽ1) = f j0 (τ0, s0, v1) and
a) If c̃0 = c0, send same
∗ to A.
b) If c̃0 6= c0:
If ṽ1 = v1, send ⊥ to A, otherwise, (τ̂1, ŝ1, v̂0)← E0,j(h, v1, zE0,j ).





, and c̃1 := (r̂1, ŝ1, v0). Send (c̃0, c̃1) to A.
– Otherwise, send ⊥ to A.
5. (Output): Let out be the output of A after the completion of the previous step.
A′ outputs (out, d).
Figure 6.1: The algorithm A′ playing in Leak0A′,mb(k).
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Algorithm TCompq
Input: i, τi, si, v1−i, lk, r.
Set ci := (τi, si, v1−i) and let t be the zero vector with q coordinates.
For j = 1, . . . , r:
• Receive (gj0, g
j
1) from A and
1. If j < r, send lk[j] to A and receive (f j0 , f
j
1 ) from it.
2. If j = r, set lk[j, i+ 1] = gji (si) and break.
• Compute c̃i := (τ̃i, s̃i, ṽ1−i) = f ji (τi, si, v1−i).
1. If c̃i = ci, set t[j] = same
∗ and send same∗ to A.
2. If c̃i 6= ci, then if ṽ1−i = v1−i, set t[j] = ⊥i and send ⊥ to A, otherwise,
sample (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i, v̂i)← Ei,j(h, v1−i, zEi,j ).
– If h̄(τ̃i||s̃i) = v̂i and h(ŝ1−i||v̂i; τ̂1−i) = ṽ1−i, set t[j] = (c̃0, c̃1), where c̃i





Send t[j] to A.
– Otherwise, set t[j] = ⊥i and send ⊥ to A.
Output (lk, t).
Figure 6.2: The algorithm TComp executed by A′.
Base, j = 1: By executing TCompq(i, τi, si, v1−i, lk, 1), for i ∈ {0, 1} (Step 3-a), it is
clear that A′ computes the replies to (g10, g11) as in the real execution. Thus, lk[1] =
lkReal[1]. Regarding, the replies to the tampering queries produced by the execution of
TCompq(i, τi, si, v1−i, lk, 1) inside Oλ(si, ·), we consider the following cases.
• ∃i : c̃i = ci: Assume that for some i ∈ {0, 1}, c̃i = ci. Then by assumption we
have that j is not a round in which self-destruct occurs, and in order for the tam-
pered codeword to be valid, it must be the case that c̃1−i = c1−i with overwhelming
probability, otherwise we can use (f10 , f
1
1 ) to break the uniqueness property of the
encoding scheme (cf. Lemma 6.4.4), by simulating the first round of execution. Thus,
for i ∈ {0, 1}, ti[j] = same∗, which matches the reply tReal[1] of the tampering oracle
in the real execution, since by Claim 6.4.6, ci is perfectly simulated inside Oλ(si, ·).
• ∀i : c̃i 6= ci ∧ ∃j : ṽj = vj : Let Ei be the event in which c̃i 6= ci∧ṽ1−i = v1−i, and E the
event of not having a round with self-destruct. We prove that Pr[Ei∧E] ≤ negl(k), for
i ∈ {0, 1}. Towards contradiction, assume that for some i in {0, 1}, Pr[Ei ∧ E] > ε′i,
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for ε′i = 1/poly(k). Then, we have a valid codeword for which (τi, si) 6= (τ̃i, s̃i) and
ṽ1−i = h(s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i||s̃i); τ̃1−i) = h(s1−i||h̄(τi, si); τ1−i) = v1−i, and we can use f j to
break the collision resistance property of h with non-negligible probability εi, by
simulating TampercnmlrA,mb(k). Thus, such an event never happens with non-negligible
probability during the execution of TampercnmlrA,mb(k) and Leak
0
A′,m(k).
• ∀i : ṽi 6= vi: In order to prove consistency between TampercnmlrA,mb(k) and Leak
0
A′,m(k),
we need to define two extractors, Ei,1, for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the corresponding auxiliary
inputs, and prove that the extracted values are consistent with TampercnmlrA,mb(k). For
this reason we relate (see below) the execution of TComp inside the oracles, with the
`-more experiment of Definition 6.4.1.
In the execution inside Oλ(si, ·), the adversary is given direct access to ci = (τi, si, v1−i)
and leakage access over c1−i, and tampers with the hash v1−i and some auxiliary values
(τi, si). We relate this adversary to Av of Definition 6.4.1 by defining a program Av,i with
auxiliary input zv,i, as follows:
1. Program AO
λ(τ1−i,·)
v,i (h, v1−i, zv,i):
• Sample (g10, g11)← A(h) and parse zv,i as (τi, si, s1−i).
• Query Oλ(τ1−i, ·) with gs1−i(x) := h̄(x||s1−i) and let v̄1−i be the answer.
• Set vi = h(si||v̄1−i; τi).
• Define gvi,s1−i(τ1−i) := g11−i(τ1−i, s1−i, vi), send gvi,s1−i to Oλ(τ1−i, ·) and let
w1−i be the answer.
• Compute wi ← g1i (τi, si, v1−i), send (w0, w1) to A and receive (f10 , f11 ).
• Output: ([f1i (τi, si, v1−i)]3, st), where st := (f
j
i (τi, si, v1−i), zv,i, v1−i).
2. (Auxiliary input for Av,i): set zv,i = (τi, si, s1−i).
3. (Existence of the extractor, Ei,1, and auxiliary input, zEi,1): Given Av,i and
zv,i, by the 1-more extractability property of Hk under leakage, there exists an
extractor Ei,1 for Av,i, with auxiliary input, zEi,1 , that computes (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i, v̂i) ←
Ei,1(h, v1−i, zEi,1).
Clearly, Av,i is an admissible attacker against Hk, that produces a tampered hash value
ṽ1−i, as A does in the first round of the execution inside Oλ(si, ·). Now we relate the
execution inside Oλ(s1−i, ·) with a program As,1−i that outputs a tampered pre-image,
and we define the message s of the experiment of Definition 6.4.1.
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1. Program As,1−i(h, τ, s, st):
• Parse s as s1−i||v̄i, and set τ1−i := τ .
• Compute vi := h(si||h̄(τi−1||si−1); τi),5 (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i, ṽi) = f11−i(τ1−i, s1−i, vi).
• Output: (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i, s̃i)).
2. (Define message s): set s := s1−i||h̄(τi||si).




Exps,hAv,i,As,1−i,Ei,1(1, λ, zv,i, zEi,1) = 1
]
≤ negl(k).
Let B be the event in which the extractor fails to produce a valid pre-image. Then, if
B happens, and since we are not in a self-destruct round (an event denoted as E), we
have that Av,i produces a valid hash and As,1−i, produces a valid pre-image, still the
extractor fails, i.e., we have Exps,hAv,i,As,1−i,Ei,1(1, λ, zv,i, zEi,1) = 1. Thus, by the above
relation we receive Pr[B ∧ E] ≤ negl(k), and the extractor outputs a valid pre-image for
ṽ1−i, i.e., h(ŝ1−i||v̂i; τ̂1−i) = ṽ1−i. Since the attacker creates a valid codeword, we also
have h(s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i||s̃i); τ̃1−i) = ṽ1−i. We prove that the extracted values are consistent with
the ones produced by the attacker in TampercnmlrA,mb(k), i.e., we prove that (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i||v̂i) =
(τ̃1−i, s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i||s̃i)), with overwhelming probability.
Let B′ be the event in which (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i||v̂i) 6= (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i||s̃i)). Then, assuming
there exist m, A, A′, for which Pr[¬B ∧ E ∧ B′] > ε′′, for ε′′ = 1/poly(k), we build an
attacker A′′ that breaks the collision resistance property of Hk, with non-negligible proba-
bility: given m, A′′ simulates Leak0A′,s(k) while having full access to (s0, s1)← LRSenc(m),
and outputs (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i||v̂i), (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i||s̃i)). We conclude that ti[1] ≈c tReal[1]. The
case of t1−i[1] is symmetric.
Inductive step:
Inductive hypothesis: For i ∈ {0, 1}, lk[1 : n] ≈c lkReal[1 : n], ti[1 : n] ≈c tReal[1 : n].
In particular, for j ∈ [n], i ∈ {0, 1}, there exist Ei,j with auxiliary inputs zEi,j , that output
valid pre-images in rounds 1, . . . , n.
Proving that lk[n+ 1] ≈c lkReal[n+ 1] is straightforward, as the tampering and leakage
queries are simulated correctly in the previous rounds: by leaking the first coordinate
5As knows (τi, si), (τ̃i, s̃i), since they are stored in st.
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of TCompq(i, τi, si, v1−i, lk, n + 1), for i ∈ {0, 1}, it is clear that A′ computes the replies
to (gn+10 , g
n+1
1 ) as in the real execution, as previous tampering and leakage queries are
simulated correctly. Thus, lk[n+1] ≈c lkReal[n+1]. Regarding, the replies to the tampering
queries the proof for the two cases, “∃i : c̃i = ci” and “∀i : c̃i 6= ci ∧ ∃j : ṽj = vj” are
identical to the base case. For the last case “∀i : ṽi 6= vi”, the proof slightly changes, as
the extractors Ei,n+1 for the round n+ 1 depend on all previous extractors, and A. As in
the base case, we define Av,i, zv,i and As,1−i.
1. Program AO
λ(τ1−i,·)
v,i (h, v1−i, zv,i):
Parse zv,i as (τi, si, s1−i), query Oλ(τ1−i, ·) with gs1−i(x) := h̄(x||s1−i) and let v̄1−i
be the answer. Compute vi ← h(si||v̄1−i; τi).
For j = 1, . . . , n+ 1:
• Sample (gj0, g
j
1)← A(h).
• Define gvi,s1−i(τ1−i) := g
j
1−i(τ1−i, s1−i, vi), send gvi,s1−i to Oλ(τ1−i, ·) and let
w1−i be the answer.
• Compute wi ← gji (τi, si, v1−i).
• Send (w0, w1) to A and receive (f j0 , f
j
1 ).
• Compute (τ̃i, s̃i, ṽ1−i)← f ji (τi, si, v1−i) and set c̃i := (τ̃i, s̃i, ṽ1−i).
• If j ≤ n:
– Sample (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i, v̂i)← Ei,j(h, v1−i, zEi,j ).




and set c̃1−i := (r̂1−i, ŝ1−i, vi).
– Send (c̃0, c̃1) to A.
Output: (ṽ1−i, st), where st = (τ̃i, s̃i, ṽ1−i, τi, si, v1−i).
2. (Auxiliary input for Av,i): set zv,i = (τi, si, s1−i).
3. (Existence of the extractor, Ei,n+1, and auxiliary input, zEi,n+1): Given Av,i
and zv,i, by the 1-more extractability property of Hk under leakage, there exists an
extractor Ei,n+1 forAv,i, with auxiliary input, zEi,n+1 , that computes (τ̂1−i, ŝ1−i, v̂i)←
Ei,n+1(h, v1−i, zEi,n+1).
The definition of As,1−i, s, follows.
1. Program As,1−i(h, τ, s, st):
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• Parse s as s1−i||v̄i, and set τ1−i := τ .
• Compute vi ← h(si||h̄(τi−1||si−1); τi).6
• Compute (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i, ṽi)← fn+11−i (τ1−i, s1−i, vi).
• Output: (τ̃1−i, s̃1−i||h̄(τ̃i, s̃i)).
2. (Define message s): set s := s1−i||h̄(τi||si).
By the 1-more extractability property of Hk under leakage, Ei,n+1 outputs a valid pre-
image with overwhelming probability and using the same arguments that we used for the
base case, we prove that the extracted value is consistent with tReal[n+ 1]. This concludes
the proof of the claim and implies the correctness of the values computed by A′ in step 3,
lk, t0, t1, up to round j
∗ − 1, conditioned on jd = j∗.
Claim 6.4.8. Conditioned on jd = j
∗, for any message m and all sufficiently large k,
t0[jd] 6= t1[jd], with overwhelming probability over the randomness of Leak0A′,m(k).
Proof. By Claim 6.4.7, we have that the output of the decoder in TampercnmlrA,mb(k), is sim-
ulated perfectly for the first jd − 1 rounds, by the execution of TComp inside the leakage
oracles. Thus, the tampering query made by the attacker in round jd inside the oracles
is consistent with the jd-th tampering query made by the attacker in the execution of
TampercnmlrA,mb(k). By assumption, jd is self-destruct round, thus there exists i ∈ {0, 1},
for which h(s̃i||h̄(τ̃1−i||s̃1−i); τ̃i) 6= ṽi. We denote such an event by Ei and analyze the
execution of TComp under the event E0 ∨ E1. We consider the following cases.
• ∀i ṽi = vi: Since E0 ∨ E1 has occurred we know that for some i ∈ {0, 1}, (τ̃i, s̃i) 6=
(τi, si), and by the definition of TCompq, ti[jd] = ⊥i 6= t1−i[jd], independently of the
value in t1−i[jd].
• ∃i : ṽi 6= vi ∧ ṽ1−i = v1−i: If (τi, si) = (τ̃i, s̃i), we have that ti[jd] = same∗ 6= t1−i[jd],
since c̃1−i 6= c1−i, else if (τi, si) 6= (τ̃i, s̃i), we have that ti[jd] = ⊥i 6= t1−i[jd],
independently of the value in t1−i[jd].
• ∀i ṽi 6= vi: We prove the needed for the non-trivial case in which for all i ∈ {0, 1},
ti[jd] 6= ⊥i. Assuming the extractors executed inside the oracles output valid pre-
images, we have t0[jd] = ((τ̃0, s̃0, ṽ1) , (τ̂1, ŝ1, v0)) , t1[jd] = ((τ̂0, ŝ0, v1) , (τ̃1, s̃1, ṽ0)) .
Conditioned on Ei, we have h(s̃i||h̄(τ̃1−i, s̃1−i); τ̃i) 6= ṽi = h(ŝi||h̄(τ̃1−i, s̃1−i); τ̂i),
which implies that (τ̂i, ŝi) 6= (τ̃i, s̃i). Thus t0[jd] 6= t1[jd], under E0 ∨ E1.
6As knows (τi, si), (τ̃i, s̃i), since they are stored in st.
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Claim 6.4.9. For any message m and all sufficiently large k, j∗ = jd iff d = 1, with
overwhelming probability over the randomness of Leak0A′,m(k).
Proof. By Claims 6.4.7, 6.4.8, we have that for all j ∈ [jd − 1], t0[j] = t1[j] and t0[jd] 6=
t1[jd], and clearly, assuming j
∗ = jd, we have that ĥ(t0[1 : j
∗ − 1]) = ĥ(t1[1 : j∗ − 1]) and
ĥ(t0[j
∗]) 6= ĥ(t1[j∗]), with overwhelming probability, otherwise we can break the collision
resistance property of ĥ by simulating Leak0A′,m(k). Thus d = 1. Symmetrically, assuming
d = 1 we know that t0[j
∗] 6= t1[j∗], and using the collision resistance property of ĥ, with
overwhelming probability, t0[1 : j
∗ − 1] = t1[1 : j∗ − 1]. Thus, d = 1 iff A′ makes a correct
guess on jd.
Claim 6.4.10. Conditioned on j∗ = jd, out ≈c TampercnmlrA,mb(k), over the randomness of
Leak0A′,m(k).
The main arguments that prove the current claim, have already been proved in Claim
6.4.7, as the execution in of A′ in Step 4, is similar to the TComp.
Claim 6.4.11. For any pair of messages m0, m1, PPT adversary A, all sufficiently large
k, and all PPT distinguishers D, assuming that∣∣∣Pr [D(TampercnmlrA,m0(k)) = 1]− Pr [D(TampercnmlrA,m1(k)) = 1]∣∣∣ > ε,
for ε = 1/poly(k), we have∣∣Pr [D′ (Leak0A′,m0(k)) = 1]− Pr [D′ (Leak0A′,m1(k)) = 1]∣∣ > ε/q − negl(k),
where D′, A′, have already been defined above with respect to D, A, respectively.
Proof. Let Li := Leak
0
A′,mi(k) and Ti := Tamper
cnmlr
A,mi(k). For i ∈ {0, 1} we have,
Pr
[




D′(Li) = 1|j∗ = jd, d = 1
]
· Pr[d = 1|j∗ = jd]
≥ Pr [D(Ti) = 1]− negl(k).








D′(Li) = 1|j∗ 6= jd, d 6= 1
]
· Pr[d 6= 1|j∗ 6= jd]
≥ 1
2
− negl(k). (Claim 6.4.9, D′)
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D′(Li) = 1|j∗ = jd
]
· Pr[j∗ = jd]
+ Pr
[
D′(Li) = 1|j∗ 6= jd
]
· Pr[j∗ 6= jd]



















From 6.1, 6.2 we receive∣∣∣∣Pr [D′(Li) = 1]− (Pr [D(Ti) = 1]q + q − 12q
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(k). (6.3)
Let δ := |Pr[D′(L0) = 1]− Pr[D′(L1) = 1]|. We compute,
δ =
∣∣∣∣Pr [D(T0) = 1]q − Pr [D(T1) = 1]q + Pr[D′(L0) = 1]− Pr[D′(L1) = 1]
−
(















∣∣∣∣Pr [D(T0) = 1]q + q − 12q − Pr[D′(L0) = 1]
+ Pr[D′(L1) = 1]−
Pr [D(T1) = 1]
q
− q − 1
2q
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε/q − negl(k). (6.4)
The above inequalities follow from 6.3, the triangle inequality, and the assumption that D
distinguishes between TampercnmlrA,m0(k) and Tamper
cnmlr
A,m1(k), with non-negligible probability
ε. Assuming such an attacker A, we proved that D′ distinguishes between Leak0A′,m0(k) and
Leak0A′,m1(k), with non-negligible probability ε/q− negl(k), and the proof is complete.
The above claim completes the proof of the theorem.
6.4.1 Instantiations
It is not hard to see that, the `-more wECRH of Theorem 4.4.1 satisfies definition 6.4.1,
thus by plugging that construction to Theorem 6.4.5, we obtain a leakage-resilient contin-
uous NMC for polynomially many rounds, as the extractor of Theorem 4.4.1 has running
time linear in the running time of the adversary (cf. Section 4.4). In particular, we receive
the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4.12. Assuming random oracles and collision resistant hash function fami-
lies, construction 6.4.3 is a q-CNMLR code against λ bits of leakage, for any q = poly(k),
assuming λ′ ≥ 2λ+ 6k + 1.
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It should be noted that, the proof of Theorem 6.4.5 is with respect to any `-more
wECRH. When considering the random oracle model, and similarly to [FHMV17], the
random oracle can be simulated inside the leakage oracles using a pseudo-random function.
By plugging the leakage-resilient `-more wECRH of Section 4.3.5,7 against λ bits of
leakage, to Theorem 6.4.5, we receive a continuous NMC for a number of rounds which is
at least poly-logarithmic in the security parameter, and tolerating λ bits of non-adaptive
leakage. In particular, we receive the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4.13. For k, t, λ′ ∈ N, assuming DLOG, t-KEA, and collision resistant hash
function families, Construction 6.4.3 is a q-CNMC against λ bits of non-adaptive leakage,
for λ′ ≥ 2λ+ 8k+ 1 and any q that is at least poly-logarithmic in k. Here, λ′ is the leakage
parameter of the underlying LRS scheme.
Our t-KEA based construction tolerates at least poly-logarithmic number of rounds due
to the fact that, in the current proof, the extractor for round i depends on the extractor for
round i− 1 and extraction is non-black box, thus by considering poly-logarithmic number
of rounds, we avoid the super-polynomial blow-up in the size of the final extractor. If
the extractor’s overhead is linear, then the construction can tolerate polynomially many
rounds of tampering. In addition, our KEA based construction guarantees extractability
only if the hash is indistinguishable from uniform, which is a property that cannot be
achieved when the adversary is given access to the CRS and split-state leakage over both
parts of the codeword. However, the weaker form of leakage resilience that we prove in
Section 4.3.5, yields continuous non-malleable codes against non-adaptive leakage, in which
the adversary can request leakage over the randomness only at the very beginning of the
experiment.





A commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive that enables an entity to commit to a
chosen value, while ensuring that: (i) the committed value remains private until the com-
mitter decides to reveal it (hiding property) (ii) the committer cannot decommit to value
different than the one he committed to (binding property) [KL14]. Commitment schemes
can be classified to interactive or non-interactive, and as far as security is concerned, they
may provide perfect, statistical or computational security, with respect to the hiding and
binding properties. For instance, a commitment scheme is said to be statistically hiding,
if for any two messages s, s′, the distribution of commitments over s, is statistically close
to the distribution of commitments over s′.1 Analogously, a commitment scheme is said
to be statistically binding, if the probability that a computationally unbounded adversary
manages to decommit to a different value, is negligible.
The notion of non-malleable commitments was introduced in the seminal work of Dolev,
Dwork and Naor [DDN91], as a countermeasure against man-in-the-middle adversaries. In
the man-in-the-middle setting, we consider two parties that wish to execute a protocol
in the presence of an adversary, that fully controls the communication channel between
the parties. The adversary is allowed to modify, block, or introduce messages, and also
schedule the order of delivery, while the parties might not be aware of the adversarial
presence. Protocols that remain secure against man-in-the-middle adversaries are said to
be non-malleable [DDN91].
The capabilities of man-in-the-middle adversaries are strong, thus the task of designing
1The process of committing is randomized.
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and analyzing non-malleable protocols is highly non-trivial. In the seminal paper [DDN91],
Dolev, Dwork and Naor propose security definitions for the notions of non-malleable com-
mitments and non-malleable zero-knowledge, and assuming the existence of one-way func-
tions, they construct secure protocols that require log(k) rounds of interaction, where k
denotes the security parameter. Informally, a commitment scheme is non-malleable, if any
man-in-the-middle adversary that is given a commitment over a message v, is not able to
create a valid commitment of a message ṽ, which is related to v. This notion has been
modeled in two ways:
• Non-malleability with respect to commitment [DDN91]: According to this notion, the
adversary succeeds in breaking security, if he manages to commit to a related value,
even without being able to produce a valid decommitment. This notion is meaningful
only for statistically-binding commitments.
• Non-malleability with respect to opening [DIO98]: In this setting, the adversary
breaks security if he manages to both commit and decommit to a related value. This
notion is meaningful, both for the case of statistically-binding and statistically-hiding
commitments.
In the present chapter, we construct succinct,2 non-interactive non-malleable commit-
ments with respect to opening, from `-more wECRHs. Our result is summarized in the
following informal theorem.
Theorem 7.1.1 (Informal). Assuming `-more wECRH, there exists an explicit succinct
non-interactive, non-malleable commitment scheme with respect to opening.
Our primitive achieves a stronger definition of non-malleability, that allows the adver-
sary’s auxiliary input to depend on the message (this is not allowed in [DIO98]), and in
contrast to [PR05], our simulator is weaker, in the sense that it does not need access to the
original message in order to simulate the decommitment phase. Our KEA based instan-
tiation produces commitments of size 2k, while for the random oracle based construction
the commitment size is k.
7.2 Related work
The notion of non-malleable commitments (NMCOM) was introduced in the seminal
work of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN98], as a countermeasure against man-in-the-middle
2The length of the commitment is independent of the message length.
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(MIM) adversaries, and assuming one-way functions, the authors built NMCOM re-
quiring at least logarithmic number of rounds of interaction and zero-knowledge proofs.
In [DIO98, DKOS01, DG03], the authors construct non-interactive NMCOM, by either
assuming that the adversary’s auxiliary input does not depend on the message, or that
the process of sampling a message that is consistent with the adversarial auxiliary input,
is efficient. The work of [PR05], allows the adversarial auxiliary input to depend on the
message, however the simulator requires access to the original message in order to sim-
ulate a valid decommitment. In [GPR16, LP11, CVZ10, LPS17, COSV17, COSV16] the
authors construct interactive (concurrent) non-malleable commitments using various as-
sumptions, while in [Pas13] Pass proves that non-interactive NMCOM cannot be proved
using a black-box reduction to standard assumptions.
7.3 Non-malleable commitments from `-more wECRH
We start by presenting the notion of non-interactive commitments in the CRS model.
Definition 7.3.1 (Non-interactive commitment in the CRS model).
Let (Init,Commit,Open) be a commitment scheme and let Σ ← Init(1k). Then, it satisfies
the following properties:
• (Computational binding): It is computationally infeasible to find s 6= s′, and τ ,
τ ′, such that Commit(Σ, s; τ) = Commit(Σ, s′; τ ′).
• (Statistical hiding): For any two messages s, s′, Commit(Σ, s) ≈ Commit(Σ, s′).
For brevity, the CRS is omitted when calling Commit and Open.
We define the notion of non-malleable, non-interactive commitments, in the standalone
setting, following the definition of Pass and Rosen [PR05], with some simplifications for
the non-interactive settings. First, present the man-in-the-middle execution with respect
to the real game and the ideal experiment, as follows.
Man-in-the-middle experiment (real game). Here we consider a two-stage man-in-
the-middle adversary, A = (A1,A2), where A1 participates in the commitment stage and
A2 participates in the opening stage. More specifically, given a binary relation R(·, ·),
a man-in-the-middle adversary, A = (A1,A2), a sender, Sender, a receiver, Receiver, a
message s, and auxiliary input z, we define the real experiment RealA(R, s, z) as follows:
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(1) Sender sends a commitment c← Commit(s; τ) to A; (2) A1(c, z) sends a commitment c̃
to Receiver; (3) Sender sends the opening of c to A; (4) A2(z, s, τ) sends the opening of c̃ to
Receiver. The experiment outputs 1 if and only if A produces a valid s̃ for the commitment
c̃, and R(s, s̃) = 1. The message s is chosen prior to the experiment and A is allowed to
receive auxiliary input, z, that might depend on s.
The Ideal experiment. Given a binary relation R(·, ·), an ideal adversary, S, a sender,
Sender and receiver Receiver, message s, and auxiliary input z, the Ideal experiment,
IdealS(R, s, z), is defined as follows: S only interacts with Receiver by (1) sending a com-
mitment to c̃ it and (2) sending the corresponding decommitment. The experiment outputs
1 if and only if S produces a valid decommitment, s̃, for c̃ and R(s, s̃) = 1. The message
s is chosen prior to the experiment and S receives the auxiliary input z, as A does in the
real experiment.
Having defined the real and ideal executions, we define the notion of non-malleable
(non-interactive) commitments.
Definition 7.3.2 (Non-malleable non-interactive commitment). A non-interactive com-
mitment scheme is said to be non-malleable (with respect to opening) if for every PPT man-
in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a PPT adversary S and a negligible function negl(·),
such that for every non-reflexive polynomial-time computable relation R ⊆ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n,
every s ∈ {0, 1}n and every z ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have that
Pr [RealA(R, s, z) = 1] < Pr [IdealS(R, s, z)] + negl(n).
It should be noted that, the definition presented above is stronger from the ones pre-
sented in [DIO98, PR05], since (1) we allow the attacker’s auxiliary input to depend on the
message s, and (2), our simulator does not need the original message in order to simulate
the decommitment phase.
In the CRS model, both the real and ideal experiments will generate the CRS by
running Init and all parties will receive access to it.3
Below we define our construction.
Construction 7.3.3 (Non-malleable non-interactive commitment). Let Hk be a hash func-
tion family. We define a non-interactive commitment scheme (Init,Commit,Open), as fol-
lows:
3There is a weaker model called trapdoor CRS, in which the simulator S generates an indistinguishable
CRS with a trapdoor. The construction that is proposed in the present thesis uses the honestly generated
CRS, i.e., it does not require trapdoor information.
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• Init(1k): Sample h← Hk and set Σ := h.
• Commit(Σ, ·): on input string s ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), the algorithm selects random string
τ ∈ {0, 1}poly(k) and outputs h(s; τ).
• Open(Σ, ·): on input a commitment c, the algorithm outputs s, τ . The receiver accepts
if h(s; τ) = c.
In the following statement we formalize the properties that Hk should meet, in order
for the above scheme to be non-malleable.
Theorem 7.3.4. Let Hk collision resistant hash function family, such that for h ← Hk
and any message s, h(s) is statistically close to uniform. Then the commitment scheme
of Construction 7.3.3 is statistically hiding and computationally binding. Furthermore,
if the hash function family Hk, is a 1-more wECRH, then the commitment scheme is
non-malleable with respect to opening (cf. Definition 7.3.2).
Intuitively, if the hash function produces outputs that are indistinghuishable from uni-
form, then the commitment scheme achieves the hiding property. In addition, if it is
collision resistant, then the scheme is also binding. Finally, if the hash function is a 1-more
wECRH, then for any man-in-the-middle attacker that produces a commitment (hash
value) c̃, given c, where c̃ 6= c, there exists an extractor that extracts (ŝ, τ̂), such that
h(ŝ; τ̂) = c̃. Since c reveals no information about s, the extracted value, ŝ, is unrelated to
s. Below we provide a formal proof of security, based on those ideas.
Proof. (of Theorem 7.3.4) The first part of the proof, i.e., proving the statistical hiding
property of the scheme, is straightforward, as by assumption, the distribution of h(s; τ)
is statistically close to uniform. In addition, since the hash function family is collision
resistant, no PPT adversary can find two distinct valid openings for the same commit-
ment, i.e., computing efficiently (s, τ) 6= (s′, τ ′), for which h(s; τ) = h(s′; τ ′), happens only
with negligible probability, assuming the collision resistance property of Hk. The binding
property of the scheme follows.
Next we are going to prove non-malleability. Given any man-in-the-middle adversary
A, we define an ideal adversary S as follows: S, (1) samples τ ← {0, 1}poly(k) and sends
c := h(0; τ) to A, (2) then executes c̃← A1(h, c, z) and forwards c̃ to the external receiver
Receiver, and (3) for the opening, if c̃ = c, then S just sends (0, τ). Otherwise, S runs the
extractor E (defined below) to extract (s̃, τ̃) and forwards the extracted value to Receiver.
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Below, we relate the above execution, with the execution of the `-more ECRH experi-
ment, of Definition 4.2.1.
We first define Av:
Av on input the description of a hash function h, a hash value c = h(s; τ), and
the auxiliary input z, outputs c̃← A1(h, c, z). By the properties of the 1-more
wECRH (cf. Definition 4.3.15), there exist auxiliary input z′ and ex tractor E
that on input z′ and c outputs (ŝ, τ̂).
We will prove that for any A,
Pr [RealA(R, s, z) = 1] < Pr [IdealS(R, s, z)] + negl(k),
using a hybrid argument presented below.
H1: this hybrid is the same as the Real execution, for the first two steps. In the third
step, the sender Sender does not provide an opening for the commitment. Instead, if the
man-in-the middle adversary A forwards the commitment sent by Sender, i.e., c̃ = c the
experiment just outputs R(s, s). Otherwise, the experiment runs the extractor E (defined
above) to extract a value (ŝ, τ̂), and sends (ŝ, τ̂) to Receiver. The experiment finally out-
puts R(s, ŝ).
H2: this hybrid is the same as H1 except that Sender commits to zero in the first step.
Claim 7.3.5. Assuming that Hk is a 1-more wECRH, then for any non-reflexible poly-
nomially computable relation R and any s, z we have
Pr[RealA(R, s, z) = 1] < Pr[H1 = 1] + negl(k).
Proof. Let Av and E be the adversary and extractor as defined above, and let (ŝ, τ̂) be the
extracted value in H1. We further define As as follows: on input (h, τ, s, z), As outputs
(s̃, τ̃)← A2(h, τ, s, z). We define the following events:
• E1: h(s̃; τ̃) = h(ŝ; τ̂) ∧ (s̃; τ̃) 6= (ŝ; τ̂).
• E2: h(s̃; τ̃) = c̃ ∧ c̃ 6= c ∧ h(ŝ; τ̂) 6= c.
Since Hk is collision resistant, Pr[E1] = negl(k). Otherwise, one can find a collision
with non-negligible probability by simulating H1 with A = (A1,A2) and E . By the 1-more
extractability property of Hk, we have that Pr[E2] = negl(k).
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Finally, we observe that Real outputs 1 and H1 = 0 only when the extractor E fails
to extract a valid decommitment, or it extracts a value such that (ŝ, τ̂) 6= (s̃, τ̃). This is
captured by the events E1, E2. Therefore, conditioned on ¬(E1 ∨ E2), RealA(R, s, z) = 1
implies that H1 = 1. We can then conclude:
Pr[RealA(R, s, z) = 1] < Pr[H1 = 1] + Pr[¬(E1 ∨ E2)] = Pr[H1 = 1] + negl(k).
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 7.3.6. Assuming the hiding property of the commitment scheme, we have
|Pr[H1 = 1]− Pr[H2 = 1]| < negl(k).
Proof. We observe that both H1 and H2 do not depend on the opening of the commitment.
Therefore, if one can distinguish H1 from H2, then it can distinguish between Commit(0)
from Commit(s).
It is clear that Pr[IdealS(R, s, z) = 1] = Pr[H2 = 1], as S simulates perfectly the
experiment H2. By the above claims, we receive
Pr [RealA(R, s, z) = 1] < Pr[H1 = 1] + negl(k)
≤ Pr[H2 = 1] + negl(k)
= Pr [IdealS(R, s, z)] + negl(k).
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Instantiations. Construction 7.3.3 can be instantiated using the 1-more (`-more) wE-
CRH of Construction 4.3.2, since it produces hashes that are indistinguishable from uni-
form (see Claim 4.3.17 in the proof of Theorem 4.3.16). It can also be instantiated in
the random oracle model, as the uniformity property of the random oracle based `-more




The fabrication process of integrated circuits (ICs) adopted by the semiconductor industry
is fundamentally global, involving several parties that may not be trusted. As a result, inte-
grated circuits (ICs) are susceptible to the so-called hardware Trojans, which are hardware
components maliciously implanted to the original circuitry, having as a purpose to alter
its functionality, while remaining undetected. Hardware Trojans are aiming at disabling
or compromising the security defences of a system, or covertly leaking information related
to the systems’ private state [LKG+09, CNB09, BRPB14]. Their implantation may occur
during the design phase, by a malicious designer, or during the manufacturing phase, by
a malicious fabrication facility. Once the Trojan is implanted, it may be active the entire
time, or it may be triggered by some special event, e.g., when the user supplies the circuit
with some special input, or after a specific number of circuit invocations.
Reliable detection of compromised circuits via testing and reverse engineering tech-
niques, seems to be an impossible task [BR15], as in practice, all non-destructive testing
techniques can easily be circumvented by properly obfuscating the implanted Trojans. The
U.S. military recognized this threat and started two programs, namely, Trust and IRIS,
with the intent of developing techniques and metrics for certifying ICs that are designated
for weapon systems. The main concern behind this decision, is that non-certified advanced
weapon systems can be potential Trojan carriers, thus while they may appear to function
property when tested, they could be deactivated during combat, after being triggered by
some specific event. Furthermore, even if they remain partially functional, there is no way
to verify that they are not programmed to leak sensitive information [Sha07].
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Inspired by the above considerations, in this chapter we put forward a formal security
model for the problem of utilizing off-shore fabrication facilities, for IC manufacturing.
8.1.1 Contributions
The present chapter proposes a formal framework for assessing security of circuits, whose
production has been partially outsourced to a set of untrusted, and possibly adversarial,
manufacturers. Our security definition ensures that, any black-box execution of the pro-
duced circuit in the wild, leaks no information over its private state, even if the adversary
has modified the outsourced components, arbitrarily. The only requirement is that during
the execution, the circuits communicate with the user/adversary, through its input and
output gates. In the following paragraphs, we briefly summarize the contributions of the
present chapter.
Secure circuit fabrication. Let Γ be any circuit that needs to be produced. We propose
a compiler that, given the description of Γ, returns the description of a circuit Γ̂, together
with some auxiliary information, specifying (i) how Γ̂ can be divided into sub-components
whose production can be outsourced to a set of possibly malicious facilities, and (ii) how
the circuit designer should combine the outsourced components with the ones built in-
house, so as to assemble Γ̂. After assembling Γ̂, the circuit’s private state is initialized
with some private value M1, and the circuit is ready to be used in the wild.
In order for the above approach to make sense, certain requirements need to be satisfied.
First of all, our compiler needs to be functionality preserving, meaning that the compiled
circuit, Γ̂, should compute the same functionality with the original circuit, Γ, for all possible
initial memories M1, and for all possible inputs.
1 Secondly, our compiler should be secure
under plausible assumptions over the set manufacturers that construct the outsourced
components, ensuring that no information over the private state is leaked, when Γ̂ is used
in the wild.
Our security definition is simulation-based, and is inspired by similar definitions in the
setting of tamper-proof circuit compilers [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14, KT13]. In a
nutshell, our security definition requires that, whatever the adversary can learn by inter-
acting with the fabricated circuit, Γ̂, it can be simulated given only black-box access to
the original circuit, Γ. This implies that, even if the outsourced components have been
1For randomized functionalities, we require the outputs of the circuits to be statistically close.
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maliciously modified, e.g., by implanting a hardware Trojan, using Γ̂ is as secure as using
the original circuit Γ, and thus, no information over the private state is leaked.
We also consider a weaker version of the above definition, in which the simulator is
allowed to receive a short advice (leakage) over the circuit’s private state, M1. This models
the setting in which the adversary might be able to learn a short amount of information
over the secret memory, and provides security whenever the original circuit is resilient in
the presence of leakage. An appealing advantage of the weaker definition is that, it might
allow for more efficient circuit compilers.
A compiler based on MPC. In Section 8.3, we show how to construct secure outsourc-
ing compilers, for arbitrary circuits, in the setting where m ≥ 2 outsourcing manufacturers
are available, and a certain unknown subset of them is malicious. Our construction utilizes
a general client-server secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol, i.e., a protocol that,
for any functionality, enables a set of clients to privately communicate their inputs to a set
of servers that will perform a computation and return the output to a single designated
recipient. We stress that many MPC protocols follow this paradigm (e.g., [DI05]), while
others, as we comment later, can be easily adapted to it.
Given such a protocol, the compiler operates in the following way. For a given circuit Γ
it produces the MPC protocol implementing it, isolates the client and recipient computation
for manufacturing in-house, and outsources each of the other components (representing a
server in the MPC protocol) to the untrusted manufacturers. The key points of this
compiler construction are as follows: (i) The client and recipient computation are typically
quite lightweight; the client, in many protocols, simply performs an encryption or a secret-
sharing operation, and the recipient a secret-reconstruction protocol; in either case, the
computation is independent of the circuit that is outsourced, and (ii) there are MPC
protocols that can tolerate up to m − 1 malicious servers, something we can leverage to
argue that, if at least one of the outsourcing manufacturers is honest, the compiled circuit
would be safe for use.
Additional properties of the underlying MPC protocol can also be very valuable by
our compiler: for instance, if the underlying MPC protocol supports guaranteed output
delivery, we can use this guarantee to argue that the final circuit will be resilient to a
certain faulty outsourced sub-component. Moreover, if the underlying protocol satisfies
the identifiable abort property, cf. [IOZ14], we can enable our compiled circuit to switch-off




The work of Seifert and Bayer [SB15] proposes a security model for the fabrication of
Trojan-resilient circuits, requiring that the final circuit always produces the same output
as the original one. In this setting, the authors present a secure construction, only for very
limited classes of Trojans, that are allowed to “corrupt”, only a small fraction of the gates
in each layer of the IC and a small fraction of the wires connecting different layers.
Recently, Wahby et al. [WHG+16] introduced a new approach to the problem of de-
feating hardware Trojans in fabless circuit manufacturing. Their model reflects the fact
that the IC specification and design are trusted, but the fabrication facility is not. Rather
than testing or reverse engineering the IC hardware, which only provides limited security,
they consider a class of solutions where the IC’s operations are continuously verified. Such
an approach makes sense as long as the verification circuitry: (i) is not costly to construct,
and (ii) it is efficient. These properties are achieved by leveraging a verifiable computation
(VC) scheme for the function implemented by the original circuit. Verifiable computation
(see, e.g., [GGP10]) is a recent paradigm in which resource-constrained clients can delegate
the computation of some function, F , on possibly private input X, to an untrusted and
computationally powerful server, without the server being able to lie about the outcome
of the computation, and with the property that verifying the server’s answer is much more
efficient than computing the function from scratch. In a nutshell, the goal of [WHG+16] is
to ensure that the output of the produced circuit is either invalid, or equal to the output
of the original circuit. The main drawback in this setting is that, invalid outputs might be
arbitrarily correlated, and thus leak, part of the circuit’s private state.
In [DFS16], the authors show how to protect against hardware Trojans using testing-
based mechanisms. Their work is based on two existing techniques for Trojan detection,
called “input scrambling” and “split manufacturing” [IEGT13], for which the authors
provide formal models. In this setting, they present a generic compiler that transforms
any circuit into a functionally equivalent one, that satisfies the following: Assuming the
attacker invokes the circuit q ∈ N times, and that the device is being tested t times, for
t > q uniformly random over on a specific range which is not known to the adversary,
the compiled circuit is secure with probability at least 1 − (q/t)`/2, were ` is the number
of sub-circuits whose production is outsourced. The assumption of [DFS16] is an a-priori
known bound on the number q of interactions between the adversary and the device; in
fact, without such a bound, their construction would require a super-polynomial number of
tests. Unfortunately, in many important applications, it is not realistic to assume an upper
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bound on the value q, and thus it is an important open problem to design a methodology
that provides security for an arbitrary polynomial number of interactions between the
adversary and the device.
The approach of applying secure distributed computing to defeat hardware Trojans
has also been recently explored by [MCS+17]. However, this work is more focused on the
implementation aspects of this idea, and moreover it assumes that the possibly malicious
circuit components run applications that are developed and signed by a trusted software
developer.
Prevention of hardware Trojans in ICs might take place during the design, manufactur-
ing, and post-manufacturing stage [Pot10, LJM11]. However, since it is not always possible
to prevent Trojan insertion, Trojan detection has also been vastly explored [BR15]. Com-
mon methodologies used to perform Trojan detection vary from invasive ones, that destroy
the IC to examine its inner parts, to non-invasive ones, in which the circuit is executed
and its output is compared to the output of a trusted copy, or against some already known
output values. Trojan detection is typically an expensive and unreliable process for circuit
protection, explicit countermeasures have also been proposed. For instance, the so-called
“data guards” are designed to prevent a Trojan from being activated and/or to access
sensitive data [WS11], while in [MWPB09, WS11] the authors propose the duplication of
logic elements and the division of the sensitive data to independent parts of the circuit.
Our security definition shares similarities with analogous definitions in the context of
protecting circuit implementations against tampering attacks, which received considerable
attention in the past few years [IPSW06, FPV11, DK12, DK14, KT13]. The main difference
between this setting and the one considered in this chapter, is that tamper-proof circuit
compilers are typically used to protect against fault injection and tampering attacks, during
run-time. Such attacks are usually carried out in an adaptive manner, depending on
the outcome of previous attempts. Outsourcing compilers, instead, only protect against
non-adaptive tampering, taking place during the circuit fabrication process. Importantly,
the latter restriction allows to obtain security against arbitrary modifications, whereas
in circuit tampering, one needs to consider a restricted class of adversaries, e.g., wire
tampering [IPSW06] or gate tampering [KT13].
8.2 Definitions
In the current section, we put forward a formal model for assessing security of a (crypto-
graphic) circuit, whose production is outsourced to one or more untrusted facilities. We
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start by recalling the notion of a Boolean circuit.
8.2.1 Boolean Circuits
A Boolean circuit, is represented by a directed graph Γ = (V,E), where the set of nodes, V ,
represents the set of logical gates, and the set of edges, E, represents wires that establish
connections between gates. For the case of deterministic circuits, the gates can be of type
AND, XOR and copy, where AND (resp. XOR) have fan-in two and fan-out one, and output
the outcome of the AND (resp. XOR) operation over the input bits; a copy gate, which
is denoted as copy, simply forwards the input bit into two output wires. The depth of a
circuit is defined as the longest path from an input to an output gate and the size of a
circuit is defined as its total number of gates. For simplicity, we will use Γ, to denote both
a circuit and its description.
A circuit is clocked, if it executes in clock cycles (or rounds). The input and output
values of a circuit in clock cycle i, are denoted by Xi and Yi, respectively. A circuit is
probabilistic if it uses internal randomness as part of its logic. This randomness is produced
by gates that we call randomness gates and we denote them as $. In each clock cycle, a
gate $ outputs a fresh random bit.
Circuits may also possess memory gates, that maintain the circuit’s state. Each memory
gate has a single incoming edge (wire) and any number of outgoing edges. At any clock
cycle, each memory gate sends its current state to the outgoing edges and updates it
according to the value of the input edges. Any cycle in the circuit graph must contain at
least one memory gate. The state of all memory gates at clock cycle i is denoted by Mi,
with M1 denoting the initial state. When a circuit is executed with state Mi and input Xi,
it produces output Yi and the memory gates will reach the new state Mi+1. This process
is denoted by (Yi,Mi+1)← Γ[Mi](Xi).
Next, we introduce the notion of an outsourcing circuit compiler (or simply compiler).
In a nutshell, a circuit compiler is an efficient algorithm, Φ, that takes as input the descrip-
tion of a circuit Γ, 〈Γ〉, and outputs the description of a compiled circuit Γ̂. Additionally,
Φ returns a list of sub-components Γ̂i, of Γ̂, whose production can be outsourced to one
or more external manufacturers, together with the relevant information on how to connect
those sub-components with the remaining ones (that need to be built in-house) in order
to re-assemble the compiled circuit Γ̂.
Definition 8.2.1 (Outsourcing circuit compiler). Let Γ be an arbitrary circuit. A (ρ,m)-
























Figure 8.1: On the left side we present the description of a (compiled) circuit. On the
right side the same circuit is represented as three different components. The mapping
function M establishes the connections between the blue component and the green and
red components.
• z := ((Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n),M, (I1, . . . , Im)), with n ∈ N and Ij ⊆ [n], for j ∈ [m], mutually
disjoint subsets.
• (Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n) forms a partition of Γ̂ with n components, where Γ̂i := (Vi, Ei).
• M : V × V → {0, 1} is a function such that M(v, v′) = 1 iff v, v′ ∈ Vi, Vj for some
i 6= j, for i, j ∈ [n] and (v, v′) ∈ E, i.e., M defines the connectivity between the
sub-components (Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n).




|Γ| the outsourcing ratio of the compiler.
Informally, the outsourcing ratio ρ, is the ratio of the size of the circuit that is built
in-house, over the total size of the original circuit, Γ. Also, the sub-components (Γ̂i)i∈[n]
“cover” the entire compiled circuit Γ̂, without any overlap, and the mapping function M
specifies the connectivity between the sub-components (Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n), enabling the recon-
struction of Γ̂. For j ∈ [m], the set of indices Ij ⊆ [n], defines the set of sub-components
that will be outsourced to the manufacturer with index j, i.e., the total number of manu-
facturers is m. See Fig. 8.1, for a pictorial representation of a simple toy example.
Correctness of an outsourcing compiler requires that the compiled circuit realizes the
same functionality with the original one.
Definition 8.2.2 (Correctness). We say that an outsourcing compiler Φ, is functionality
preserving, if for all circuits Γ, for all values of the initial memory M1, and for any set
of public inputs X1, . . . , Xq, the sequence of outputs Y1, . . . , Yq produced by running the
original circuit Γ with initial state M1, is identical to the sequence of outputs produced by
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running the compiled circuit Γ̂, with initial state M1 (with all but negligible probability over
the randomness of the compiler and the randomness of the original and compiled circuit).
For randomized functionalities, we require the output distributions of the original and
the compiled, circuits, to be statistically close.
8.2.2 Simulation-based security
In what follows we define security using the real/ideal paradigm. Our approach is similar
in spirit to previous works in tamper resilient cryptography (see, e.g., [IPSW06, FPV11,
KT13]), which aims at protecting cryptographic circuits, against active physical attacks. In
a nutshell, in the real/idea paradigm, security is defined by comparing two experiments. In
the real experiment, the circuit designer compiles the circuit and outsources the production
of some of the resulting components, to a set of m untrusted manufacturers. A subset of
size at most t of those manufacturers can be malicious, and be controlled by a monolithic
adversary A, and the circuit designer cannot distinguish between honest and malicious
manufacturers. During production, A is allowed to modify the outsourced circuit compo-
nents, arbitrarily, e.g., by adding, removing or modifying gates and/or wires. Later, the
designer assembles the circuit by combining all the components (the outsourced ones and
the ones built in-house). Finally, A accesses the assembled circuit in a black-box way, that
is, it is allowed to execute the circuit and observe the output of it on inputs of its choice,
with some initial and unknown memory value M1. The purpose of the adversary in the
real execution, is to leak information over the circuit’s private memory, by exploiting the
fact that some circuit components have been maliciously modified during the production
process.
In the ideal experiment, a simulator S, is given black-box access to the original circuit,
with initial memory M1. The goal of the simulator is to produce an output distribution,
which is indistinguishable from the one in the real experiment, without accessing M1. In
its most general form, our definition allows the simulator to obtain a short leakage over
M1, and this captures a real world scenario in which the adversary could possibly learn a
short amount of information over the circuit’s private memory.
Below, we formally define the real/ideal experiment.
Real experiment. The distribution RealA,Φ,C,Γ,M1(k) is parameterized by the adversary
A = (A0,A1), the set of corrupted manufacturers C, the compiler Φ, and the original circuit
Γ, with initial memory M1.
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1. (Γ̂, z) ← Φ(Γ): In the first step, the description of the original circuit Γ is given as
input to the compiler Φ; the compiler outputs the description of the compiled circuit
Γ̂ plus the auxiliary information z := ((Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n),M, (I1, . . . , Im)) which specifies
(1) how the compiled circuit is split into sub-components, (2) how the different sub-
components are connected (via the mapping function M), and (3) the subset of
sub-components whose production is outsourced to each manufacturer (in the index
sets Ij , for j ∈ [m]).
2. ({Γ̂′i}i∈I , st)← A0(1k, {Γ̂i}i∈I ,Γ, Γ̂): The adversary is given as input the description
of the components from the index set I = ∪j∈CIj , the description of the original cir-
cuit Γ, the description of the compiled circuit Γ̂, and returns the modified components
along with some auxiliary state information, st.
3. Γ̂′ := (V̂ ′, Ê′): The compiled circuit Γ̂′ is rebuilt by replacing the components (Γ̂i)i∈I
with the modified components (Γ̂′i)i∈I , and by connecting the different components




k, st): The adversary A1, with auxiliary information st, is given oracle
access to the circuit Γ̂′, with private memory M1.
Below, we define the ideal experiment.
Ideal experiment. The distribution IdealS,A,Φ,C,Γ,M1,`(k) is parameterized by the sim-
ulator S, the adversary A = (A0,A1), the compiler Φ, the set of corrupt manufacturers C,
the original circuit Γ with initial memory M1, and some value ` ∈ N.
1. f ← S(1k,Γ,Φ,A, C, `): Given as input a description of the original circuit, of the
compiler and the adversary, the subset of corrupt manufacturers, and the parameter
` ∈ N, the simulator specifies an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`.
2. SA,Γ[M1](·)(1k, L) : The simulator takes as input leakage L = f(M1), and is given
oracle access to the adversary A = (A0,A1) and the original circuit Γ, with private
memory M1. We remark that the simulator is restricted to be fully black-box. In
particular, S only accesses the modified sub-components returned by A0 in a black-
box way, i.e., without knowing their description.
Having the above definitions, we formally define security for outsourcing circuit compilers.
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Definition 8.2.3 (Security). We say that a (ρ,m)-outsourcing circuit compiler Φ is (`, t)-
secure, if the following conditions are met.
(i) Non-triviality: ρ < 1, for sufficiently large values of k ∈ N.
(ii) Simulatability: For all C ⊆ [m] of size at most t, for all circuits Γ, and for all PPT
adversaries A, there exists a simulator S with running time poly(|A|, |Γ|), such that
for all initial values of the memory M1 ∈ {0, 1}∗,
{RealA,Φ,C,Γ,M1(k)}k∈N ≈c {IdealS,A,Φ,C,Γ,M1,`(k)}k∈N .
In the above definition, the adversary is allowed to modify each Γ̂i arbitrarily, i.e., there
is no restriction on the edges and nodes of Γ̂′i, as long as the input and output gates enable
connectivity with the remaining components. Also, observe that, the above definition is
only interesting for small values of ` (as, e.g., it becomes trivial in case ` = |M1|). Finally,
the non-triviality condition requires that the ratio of the size of the sub-components built
in-house, over the size of the original circuit, should be less than one, as otherwise a
manufacturer could simply produce the entire circuit by itself, without using any off-shore
facility. Clearly, smaller values of ρ, enable outsourcing of larger fractions of the original
circuit.
8.3 A circuit outsourcing compiler based on MPC
In the current section, we construct a compiler based on multi-party computation (MPC).
Before presenting our compiler, we first revisit the core ideas of MPC and then we give a
generic definition for MPC protocols in the client-server model, along the lines of [Bea97].
MPC in the Client-Server Model. We consider p ∈ N parties, where each party Pi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ p, possesses an input Xi and they all wish to jointly compute the vector
(Y1, . . . , Yp) := F(X1, . . . , Xp), where Yi is the output for party Pi. In the client-server
model, the parties are divided into two categories: the clients, that provide inputs and wish
to receive the output of the computation, and the servers, that perform the computation. A
t-private MPC protocol guarantees that any adversary who controls up to t servers, cannot
leak any information related to the private inputs of the clients, besides the information
that can be inferred by the output of the computation, and regardless of the number of
corrupted clients.
8.3. A circuit outsourcing compiler based on MPC 145
In our construction, the circuits that correspond to the code executed by the servers,
will be outsourced to a number of possibly malicious manufacturers, that may apply arbi-
trary modifications against the circuit components. Thus, we require MPC protocols that
are secure against active (malicious) attackers. The general idea behind our compiler is
the following. Let F be any functionality, let Γ be a circuit implementing F , and let ΠF
be a t-private MPC protocol, realizing F . Then, assuming that the number of malicious
manufacturers is at most t < m, the circuit Γ̂ will implement the code of ΠF , and each Γ̂i
will implement the code of the i-th server.
Below, we define the protocol framework that we are going to use for the rest of this
section. The idea is to describe any MPC protocol using its next message function, denoted
as Next.
Definition 8.3.1 (Protocols using the ). Let C, S, be sets of probabilistic interactive Tur-
ing machines, with cardinalities p, m, respectively. An r-round protocol Π for p clients and
m servers is a tuple (C, S,Enc,Dec,Next), where Next = (Next1, . . . ,Nextm), is described
as follows.
• Setup: Each client computes (X1i , . . . , Xmi ) ← Enc(Xi), and sends X
j
i to the server
indexed by j. For j ∈ [m], let inj := (Xj1 , . . . , X
j
p) and stj := 0.
2
• Computation:
– In each round, for j ∈ [m] execute (oj1, . . . , o
j
m, st′j) ← Nextj(in
j , stj), send o
j
k,
k 6= j, to the server with index k. Set inj ← (o1j , . . . , omj ) and stj ← st′j.
– In the final round, for j ∈ [m] execute oj ← Nextj(inj , stj) and send oj to Dec.
• Output: Execute (Y1, . . . , Yp)← Dec(o1, . . . , om), and send Yj to the client with index
j.
For any function F , the protocol computing F will be denoted by ΠF .
Informally, in the first step of the protocol execution, the clients encode their inputs, as
it is prescribed by Enc, and then the main computation begins. The code executed by the
servers at each round is defined by the function Next, the next message function. Hence,
in the i-th round, server Sj computes Nextj over the outputs and the state information,
st, produced by the other servers in round i− 1. One can also consider deterministic next
2Here, we assume that the network is fully connected, still the properties of the communication channel
depend on the instantiation.
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message functions, assuming the randomness is given as input in each round. Below, we
formally define correctness and privacy for MPC protocols.
Definition 8.3.2 (Correctness). Let F be a p-party functionality. We say that Π realizes
F with perfect (resp., statistical) correctness if for any input (X1, . . . , Xp), the probability
that the output delivered to the i-th client, for i ∈ [p], after the protocol execution, is
different from Yi, is 0 (resp., negligible in the security parameter), where (Y1, . . . , Yp) :=
F(X1, . . . , Xp).
The definition of privacy follows.
Definition 8.3.3 ((t,m)-privacy). Let k be the security parameter, p be the number of
clients and m be the number of servers, and let A be an adversary that may corrupt any
set of parties Ic ⊆ [p], and servers Is ⊂ [m], where |Is| ≤ t. We say that the protocol Π
realizes F with (t,m)-privacy, if there exists a PPT algorithm S such that for all sufficiently
large k ∈ N,
ViewIs,Ic(k,X1, . . . , Xp) ≈c S(1k, Ic, Is, (Xi, Yi)i∈Ic),
where ViewIs,Ic(k,X1, . . . , Xp) denotes the joint view of the servers and clients in Is and
Ic, respectively, within an execution of the protocol upon inputs X1, . . . , Xp, and (Y1, . . . ,
Yp) = F(X1, . . . , Xp).
The main idea behind the above definition is that the view of the adversary during the
protocol execution depends only on its own input and output.
Below we present our compiler.
The compiler ΦΠF . Let Γ be a circuit implementing the function F(M1, ·), where for
any X and i ∈ N, we have (Y,Mi+1) = F(Mi, X). Let ΠF = (C, S,Enc,Dec,Next) be a
protocol realizing F , over a set of m servers and a single client. The compiler produces
(Γ̂, aux)← ΦΠF (Γ), where
• Γ̂ is the circuit that implements ΠF (depicted in Figure 8.2 for the case m = 2 and
p = 1), having as a sub-circuit Γ̂Memory, which is a circuit consisting only of memory
gates, as needed by the original circuit Γ. During initialization, Γ̂Memory stores the
initial private memory value, M1.
• z = ((Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂m+2),M, (I1, . . . , Im)), where





















Figure 8.2: The MPC compiler for the case ofm = 2 outsourcing facilities. The components
Γ̂1 and Γ̂2 can be outsourced, while the connectivity between them and the remaining
components are built in-house. Γ̂1 and Γ̂2 exchange the outputs of the next message
functions Next1, Next2, and they internally update their states. The dotted line depicts
the circuit boundaries.
– Γ̂m+1 = Γ̂Enc and Γ̂m+2 = Γ̂Dec, i.e., the circuits Γ̂m+1 and Γ̂m+2 implement the
encoder, Enc, and the decoder, Dec, of ΠF , respectively.
– For i ∈ [m], Γ̂i is the circuit that implements the code of the i-th server, for the
entire execution of ΠF . Those circuits can be implemented in a straightforward
way using the next message function Nexti (cf. the sub-components Γ̂1 and Γ̂2
in Figure 8.2).
– The mapping function M describes the physical connections between the cir-
cuits described above, and Ij , for j ∈ [m], specifies the components that will be
outsourced to the manufacturer with index j. In our case Ij = {j}.
– In case the original circuit is randomized, in addition to the components de-
scribed above, Φ also outputs a circuit Γ̂$ producing randomness Ri, that is
needed in each invocation of the circuit.
Our construction must be non-trivial (cf. Definition 8.2.3), thus the underlying protocol
Π must satisfy the following outsourceability property.
Definition 8.3.4 (Outsourceability of procotols). A protocol Π = (C, S,Enc,Dec,Next)
that realizes the function F can be outsourced if it satisfies the following condition: The
circuit computing the encoding and decoding procedures (Enc,Dec) must be smaller than
the circuit computing the function F .
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Below we prove security for the proposed compiler.
Theorem 8.3.5. Let F be any function, and let ΠF be a (t,m)-private MPC protocol for
F , satisfying the correctness and outsourceability properties. Then, the compiler ΦΠF is a
correct, (0, t)-secure, (ρ,m)-outsourcing circuit compiler, for ρ < 1.
Proof. The correctness and outsourceability of ΦΠF follow directly by the corresponding
properties of ΠF .
Let F be any functionality and let Γ be the circuit implementing F . Assuming that
ΠF is a (t,m)-private MPC protocol for F , we will prove that ΦΠF is a (0, t)-secure, circuit
compiler. Concretely (cf. Definition 8.2.3), we need to prove that for all C ⊆ [m] of size
at most t, all circuits Γ, all PPT adversaries A, and for all initial values of the memory
M1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, there exists a simulator S with running time poly(|A|, |Γ|) such that
{RealA,Φ,C,Γ,M1(k)}k∈N ≈c {IdealS,A,Φ,C,Γ,M1,`(k)}k∈N , (8.1)
for all sufficiently large values of k. Let A be an attacker ΦΠF . The idea behind the proof is
to relate the interaction between A and the circuits produced by ΦΠF , with the interaction
between an attacker A′ corrupting up to t servers, while executing ΠF . Then, we will
use the simulator S ′ that is given by the (t,m)-privacy of ΠF to construct a simulator S,
satisfying equation 8.1. In what follows, and for the sake of simplicity, we prove the needed
assuming A is a single round attacker, and then we discuss how the proof easily extends
to the setting of multiple executions.
By the compiler definition, the protocol ΠF that ΦΠF is based on, consists of two clients,
C1, C2, where C1 is the corrupted client that provides the public input to the circuit, X,
and C2 supplies the circuit with private input, M , and m servers. Let Γ be the circuit
implementing F . Given the adversary A for ΦΠF we define the adversary A′ = (A′0,A′1)
against ΠF as follows:
• (server corruption): A′0 runs (Γ̂, z)← Φ(Γ), where z := ((Γ̂1, . . . , Γ̂n),M, (I1, . . . , Im)),
and samples ({Γ̂′i}i∈I , st) ← A0(1k, {Γ̂i}i∈I ,Γ, Γ̂). Then corrupts the server Si, for
i ∈ I, so that Si will execute the possibly modified circuit Γ̂′i.
• (protocol execution): A′1 participates in the protocol ΠF choosing the input for
client C1 (the corrupted client), according to the input value chosen by A1. Con-
cretely, A′1 executes the following steps: samples X ← A1(1k, st), defines the input
of client C1 to be equal to X, receives the output of ΠF for C1, Y , for inputs (X,M),
and forwards Y to A1.
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We define the random variable ViewIs,Ic(k,X,M), Is = C, Ic = {1}, to be the view of A
in the executing defined above. Clearly, by the definition of A′, the view of A matches its
view while executing the real world experiment of Definition 8.2.3, thus we have
ViewIs,Ic(k,X,M) = RealA,Φ,C,Γ,M1(k). (8.2)
Assuming ΠF is (t,m)-private against A′, there exists exists a simulator S ′′ that simulates
the view of A′ during the protocol execution. Let S ′ be code of S ′′ that only outputs the
view of A. Then we have that for all sufficiently large k ∈ N,
ViewIs,Ic(k,X,M) ≈c S ′(1k, Ic, Is, (X,Y )i∈Ic). (8.3)
Now we define the simulator S for A against ΦΠF . S on input (1k,Γ,Φ,A, C, 0) executes
the following steps:
• executes A1 with oracle access to Γ[M1](·), and constructs the pair (X,Y ), i.e., it
constructs the valid output of F on input X, chosen by A1.
• executes o← S ′(1k, Ic, Is, (X,Y )i∈Ic), where Is = C and Ic = {1}, and outputs o.
Clearly, from equation 8.3 we have that S ′ produces output which is computationally
indistinguishable from ViewIs,Ic(k,X,M), and then using equation 8.2 we receive,
RealA,Φ,C,Γ,M1(k) ≈c IdealS,A,Φ,C,Γ,M1,`(k),
and this concludes the proof for the case of single round adversaries.
For multi-round attackers against the circuit compiler, we need to have multiple, se-
quential executions, of the same protocol, as a single execution computes a single circuit
output. Moreover, the attacker is non-adaptive, and corrupts the servers only before the
first protocol execution. By the composition theorem of [Can00], we have that any secure
MPC protocol is also secure against sequential composition, even against adaptive adver-
saries. Using a standard hybrid argument, this gives rise to a simulator, S ′, that simulates
the view of the attacker for all executions, and the proof idea is identical to one given
above: we relate the attacker against the compiler to an attacker against the protocol, and
we use S ′ to construct a simulator S for the circuit compiler.
Our compiler is generic, thus any MPC protocol with an efficient preprocessing phase
could be used to instantiate the above compiler, when adapted to the client-server model.
For instance, in the recent work by Wang et al. [WRK17], the preprocessing phase has
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complexity O(m2k/ log(|Γ|)) and achieves security against m − 1 malicious parties. Note
that, cost minimization might not be the primary goal behind circuit outsourcing, as
the lack of technical expertise is also an important factor. In this setting, the size of




9.1 Contributions and future directions
The present dissertation deals with the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware
against physical and hardware Trojan injection, attacks, based on the notions of non-
malleable codes and multi-party computation. Besides that, our techniques find useful
application the problem of establishing secure communication in the presence of man-in-
the-middle adversaries. Our results are briefly summarized below.
• [KLT18a]: We construct efficient non-malleable codes for the class of partial func-
tions, with the additional property of manipulation detection, which guarantees that
any tampered codeword will either decode to the original message, or to ⊥.
• [KLT16]: We introduce the notion of `-more weakly extractable, collision resistant,
hash functions (wECRH) and we use it as the main tool for constructing practically
efficient non-malleable codes for split-state adversaries.
• [KLT18b]: We introduce the notion of leakage-resilient `-more wECRH and we use it
as the main tool for building efficient, continuous non-malleable codes, for split-state
adversaries. In addition, we prove that any `-more wECRH, with some additional
properties, yields efficient, succinct, non-interactive non-malleable commitments.
• [AKM+18]: Finally, we provide a simulation-based definition for the problem of se-
cure circuit outsourcing, ensuring privacy of the circuit’s private memory, even in
the presence of hardware Trojans. As a feasibility result for the problem at study,
we propose a multi-party computation-based compiler that transforms any crypto-
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graphic circuit, into another, that can be securely outsourced, even in the presence
of malicious manufacturers.
The current thesis makes an important step towards bridging the gap between theory
and practice, especially with respect to the notion of non-malleable codes and its appli-
cations in the real-world setting. This is derived from the fact that, besides providing
rigorous mathematical models of security, together with provable secure solutions, the
current thesis develops practically efficient solutions, under realistic security models that
comply with existing attacks. As such, our constructions yield efficient solutions against
memory-tampering attacks on cryptographic hardware, as well as for establishing secure
communication in the presence of adversarial channels. Non-malleable codes with addi-
tional properties, such as manipulation detection, broaden the applicability of the primitive
beyond the scope of tamper-resilient cryptography, thus, investigating new, realistic adver-
sarial models, for which manipulation detection, or similar properties, could be achieved,
as well all exploring other applications of the primitive, are research directions that worth
to be pursued.
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Detection of algebraic manipulation with applications to robust secret sharing
and fuzzy extractors. In Nigel P. Smart, editor, Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2008, volume 4965 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 471–488, Istanbul, Turkey, April 13–17, 2008. Springer, Heidelberg,
Germany.
[CDH+00] Ran Canetti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Shai Halevi, Eyal Kushilevitz, and Amit Sahai.
Exposure-resilient functions and all-or-nothing transforms. In Bart Preneel,
editor, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2000, volume 1807 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 453–469, Bruges, Belgium, May 14–18,
2000. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[CDTV16] Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, Björn Tackmann, and Daniele Venturi. Non-
malleable encryption: Simpler, shorter, stronger. In Eyal Kushilevitz and
Tal Malkin, editors, TCC 2016-A: 13th Theory of Cryptography Conference,
Part I, volume 9562 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 306–335,
Tel Aviv, Israel, January 10–13, 2016. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[CG14] Mahdi Cheraghchi and Venkatesan Guruswami. Capacity of non-malleable
codes. In Moni Naor, editor, ITCS 2014: 5th Conference on Innovations
in Theoretical Computer Science, pages 155–168, Princeton, NJ, USA, Jan-
uary 12–14, 2014. Association for Computing Machinery.
[CGM+15] Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Pratyay Mukherjee, Omkant Pandey, and
Jalaj Upadhyay. Block-wise non-malleable codes. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2015/129, 2015. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/129.
[CGM+16] Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Pratyay Mukherjee, Omkant Pandey, and
Jalaj Upadhyay. Block-wise non-malleable codes. In Ioannis Chatzigiannakis,
Michael Mitzenmacher, Yuval Rabani, and Davide Sangiorgi, editors, ICALP
2016: 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Program-
ming, volume 55 of LIPIcs, pages 31:1–31:14, Rome, Italy, July 11–15, 2016.
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
[CKM11] Seung Geol Choi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Tal Malkin. BiTR: Built-in tam-
per resilience. In Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang, editors, Advances in
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011, volume 7073 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Bibliography 159
Science, pages 740–758, Seoul, South Korea, December 4–8, 2011. Springer,
Heidelberg, Germany.
[CKR16] Nishanth Chandran, Bhavana Kanukurthi, and Srinivasan Raghuraman.
Information-theoretic local non-malleable codes and their applications. In
Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, TCC 2016-A: 13th Theory of Cryp-
tography Conference, Part II, volume 9563 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 367–392, Tel Aviv, Israel, January 10–13, 2016. Springer, Hei-
delberg, Germany.
[CMTV15] Sandro Coretti, Ueli Maurer, Björn Tackmann, and Daniele Venturi. From
single-bit to multi-bit public-key encryption via non-malleable codes. In Yev-
geniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, TCC 2015: 12th Theory of
Cryptography Conference, Part I, volume 9014 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 532–560, Warsaw, Poland, March 23–25, 2015. Springer, Hei-
delberg, Germany.
[CNB09] Rajat Subhra Chakraborty, Seetharam Narasimhan, and Swarup Bhunia.
Hardware trojan: Threats and emerging solutions. In IEEE HLDVT, pages
166–171, 2009.
[COSV16] Michele Ciampi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Luisa Siniscalchi, and Ivan Visconti. Con-
current non-malleable commitments (and more) in 3 rounds. In Matthew Rob-
shaw and Jonathan Katz, editors, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016,
Part III, volume 9816 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 270–299,
Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 14–18, 2016. Springer, Heidelberg, Ger-
many.
[COSV17] Michele Ciampi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Luisa Siniscalchi, and Ivan Visconti. Four-
round concurrent non-malleable commitments from one-way functions. In
Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO 2017, Part II, volume 10402 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 127–157, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20–24, 2017. Springer,
Heidelberg, Germany.
[CVZ10] Zhenfu Cao, Ivan Visconti, and Zongyang Zhang. Constant-round concur-
rent non-malleable statistically binding commitments and decommitments.
Bibliography 160
In Phong Q. Nguyen and David Pointcheval, editors, PKC 2010: 13th In-
ternational Conference on Theory and Practice of Public Key Cryptography,
volume 6056 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 193–208, Paris,
France, May 26–28, 2010. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[CW77] J. Lawrence Carter and Mark N. Wegman. Universal classes of hash functions
(extended abstract). In STOC, pages 106–112, 1977.
[CZ14] Eshan Chattopadhyay and David Zuckerman. Non-malleable codes against
constant split-state tampering. In 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, pages 306–315, Philadelphia, PA, USA, October 18–21,
2014. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[Dam92] Ivan Damg̊ard. Towards practical public key systems secure against chosen
ciphertext attacks. In Joan Feigenbaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO’91, volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 445–
456, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 11–15, 1992. Springer, Heidelberg,
Germany.
[DDF14] Alexandre Duc, Stefan Dziembowski, and Sebastian Faust. Unifying leakage
models: From probing attacks to noisy leakage. In Phong Q. Nguyen and
Elisabeth Oswald, editors, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014,
volume 8441 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 423–440, Copen-
hagen, Denmark, May 11–15, 2014. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DDN91] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryptography
(extended abstract). In 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting, pages 542–552, New Orleans, LA, USA, May 6–8, 1991. ACM Press.
[DDN98] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryptography,
1998. Manuscript.
[DDO+01] Alfredo De Santis, Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Per-
siano, and Amit Sahai. Robust non-interactive zero knowledge. In Joe Kil-
ian, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 566–598, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Au-
gust 19–23, 2001. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
Bibliography 161
[DDV10] Francesco Dav̀ı, Stefan Dziembowski, and Daniele Venturi. Leakage-resilient
storage. In Juan A. Garay and Roberto De Prisco, editors, SCN 10: 7th
International Conference on Security in Communication Networks, volume
6280 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 121–137, Amalfi, Italy,
September 13–15, 2010. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DF11] Stefan Dziembowski and Sebastian Faust. Leakage-resilient cryptography
from the inner-product extractor. In Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang,
editors, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011, volume 7073 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 702–721, Seoul, South Korea, December 4–
8, 2011. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DFS16] Stefan Dziembowski, Sebastian Faust, and François-Xavier Standaert. Private
circuits III: hardware trojan-resilience via testing amplification. In ACM CCS,
pages 142–153, 2016.
[DG03] Ivan Damg̊ard and Jens Groth. Non-interactive and reusable non-malleable
commitment schemes. In 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting, pages 426–437, San Diego, CA, USA, June 9–11, 2003. ACM Press.
[DGL+16] Dana Dachman-Soled, S. Dov Gordon, Feng-Hao Liu, Adam O’Neill, and
Hong-Sheng Zhou. Leakage-resilient public-key encryption from obfuscation.
In Chen-Mou Cheng, Kai-Min Chung, Giuseppe Persiano, and Bo-Yin Yang,
editors, PKC 2016: 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice
of Public Key Cryptography, Part II, volume 9615 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 101–128, Taipei, Taiwan, March 6–9, 2016. Springer,
Heidelberg, Germany.
[DI05] Ivan Damg̊ard and Yuval Ishai. Constant-round multiparty computation us-
ing a black-box pseudorandom generator. In CRYPTO, pages 378–394, 2005.
[DIO98] Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Yuval Ishai, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Non-interactive
and non-malleable commitment. In 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, pages 141–150, Dallas, TX, USA, May 23–26, 1998. ACM
Press.
[DK12] Dana Dachman-Soled and Yael Tauman Kalai. Securing circuits against
constant-rate tampering. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors,
Bibliography 162
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012, volume 7417 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 533–551, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19–23,
2012. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DK14] Dana Dachman-Soled and Yael Tauman Kalai. Securing circuits and protocols
against 1/poly(k) tampering rate. In Yehuda Lindell, editor, TCC 2014:
11th Theory of Cryptography Conference, volume 8349 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 540–565, San Diego, CA, USA, February 24–26,
2014. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DKO13] Stefan Dziembowski, Tomasz Kazana, and Maciej Obremski. Non-malleable
codes from two-source extractors. In Ran Canetti and Juan A. Garay, edi-
tors, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2013, Part II, volume 8043 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 239–257, Santa Barbara, CA, USA,
August 18–22, 2013. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DKO+18] Ivan Damgrd, Tomasz Kazana, Maciej Obremski, Varun Raj, and Luisa Sinis-
calchi. Continuous nmc secure against permutations and overwrites, with
applications to cca secure commitments. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2018/596, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/596.
[DKOS01] Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Jonathan Katz, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Adam Smith.
Efficient and non-interactive non-malleable commitment. In Birgit Pfitzmann,
editor, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2001, volume 2045 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 40–59, Innsbruck, Austria, May 6–10, 2001.
Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DKS17a] Dana Dachman-Soled, Mukul Kulkarni, and Aria Shahverdi. Locally decod-
able and updatable non-malleable codes in the bounded retrieval model. Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/303, 2017. http://eprint.iacr.org/
2017/303.
[DKS17b] Dana Dachman-Soled, Mukul Kulkarni, and Aria Shahverdi. Tight upper
and lower bounds for leakage-resilient, locally decodable and updatable non-
malleable codes. In Serge Fehr, editor, PKC 2017: 20th International Con-
ference on Theory and Practice of Public Key Cryptography, Part I, volume
10174 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 310–332, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, March 28–31, 2017. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
Bibliography 163
[DKS18] Dana Dachman-Soled, Mukul Kulkarni, and Aria Shahverdi. Local non-
malleable codes in the bounded retrieval model. In Michel Abdalla and Ri-
cardo Dahab, editors, PKC 2018: 21st International Conference on Theory
and Practice of Public Key Cryptography, Part II, volume 10770 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 281–311, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 25–
29, 2018. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[DLSZ15] Dana Dachman-Soled, Feng-Hao Liu, Elaine Shi, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Lo-
cally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes and their applications. In
Yevgeniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, TCC 2015: 12th Theory
of Cryptography Conference, Part I, volume 9014 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 427–450, Warsaw, Poland, March 23–25, 2015. Springer,
Heidelberg, Germany.
[DLZ15] Dana Dachman-Soled, Feng-Hao Liu, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Leakage-
resilient circuits revisited - optimal number of computing components without
leak-free hardware. In Elisabeth Oswald and Marc Fischlin, editors, Ad-
vances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2015, Part II, volume 9057 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 131–158, Sofia, Bulgaria, April 26–30, 2015.
Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
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